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“Give the ones you love wings to fly, roots to come back and reasons to stay.”
Dalai Lama
“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they’ve tried every-
thing else.”
Winston Churchill
“If economics were only about profit maximisation, it would be just another name for
business administration. It is a social discipline, and society has other means of cost
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International trade and the integration of global markets are important determinantsof individual wealth and well-being. The main channels through which trade af-
fects welfare are increasing variety of purchasable products, lower consumer prices,
and higher income levels on average. The effects of trade on various outcomes such
as income, welfare, or inequality depend massively on the specific context and insti-
tutional environment such that trade should not be analysed in isolation. Because
of the highly relevant consequences of trade, the factors which determine the func-
tionality of trade as a wealth-generating and re-distributing machinery are important
aspects to analyse.
This doctoral thesis is written in the early stage of an era which is likely to be deter-
mined by raising popularity of anti-liberal and anti-trade advocates as impressively
demonstrated by the recently elected president of the United States of America. As
one of his first acts, the president of the US signed the withdrawal from the agreement
to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership which was initiated as a broad regional trade
agreement connecting the USA with many East-Asian states. Moreover, he suggested
to introduce punitive tariffs for particular products aiming to protect domestic in-
dustries and jobs (Morici, 2017). Such policies do not only ignore but also antagonise
economic laws. The results will probably be contrary to the policy objectives which
are official stated such as higher economic growth rates and reduction of unemploy-
ment.1 As a response, the European Union (EU) has begun to prepare a trade war
in case protectionist policies of the US intensify (Schieritz, 2017).
The American president is not alone. The Turkish parliament has voted for its own
abolishment by accepting a reform which increases power and authority of the presi-
dent. The British have voted for leaving the EU - one of the most successful political
projects (Rodrik, 2012) - in order to regain complete national sovereignty.2 Marine
Le Pen, the leader of the right-extreme Front National in France, could win French
elections in April 2017. The most recent poll from 2nd February 2017 forecasts the
“Alternative für Deutschland” AfD (right-extreme party) to gain 12% if elections had
taken place that day. A nationalist and anti-liberal party would rank third in a gen-
eral German election. This is a novelty in German politics after World War II. This
development goes hand-in-hand with increasing nationalism and higher voting shares
of anti-liberal parties in other countries as well as it is the case for example in Poland,
Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, and probably soon in France, Netherlands, and
Germany. A doctoral thesis within the broad field of globalisation and international
1However, these objectives do not necessarily need to coincide with the de facto objectives of the
government which remain speculative.
2Rodrik re-considered his view about the EU in subsequent years as response to insufficient EU-
policies during the economic and institutional crises of the EU (Zajonz, 2016).
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trade can not ignore the current raising popularity of protectionist trade policies al-
though the explicit research questions themselves address these concerns only partly
if at all. It is my concern to embed my research on trade in the recent political
development.
If this trend of raising nationalism continuous or even intensifies, global trade and
income of particular countries are likely to decline with significant distributional con-
sequences. Unemployment is likely to increase, wages, and welfare overall might
reduce. We do have a blueprint of consequences of severe trade conflicts and protec-
tionist trade policies which is not even 90 years old.
To conclude, it is the author’s belief that economists and liberals have the obligation
to argue again in favour of the liberal world, and thus for free trade, to explain its
mechanisms and to explicitly state policy recommendations to eventually convince
their opponents and those that are currently indifferent. This doctoral thesis is meant
to be a tiny contribution to this objective.
1
1 Introduction
Three chapters of this thesis deal with the effects of food standards on internationaltrade. These build upon the gains of free trade as a fundamental conviction of
economists. Thus, the overall question is to what extent and in which direction stan-
dards affect trade. If these cause protectionist effects, economists and policy makers
need to take this trade-off between protectionism and ensuring food safety into ac-
count by designing standards as least trade-distorting as possible.
The fourth essay is unrelated to standards and trade. Instead, it deals with the most
significant labour market reform – the Agenda 2010 – after World War II in Germany
and how this affect unemployment and other outcome variables. It addresses a po-
tential misperception that is often present in public debates. A causal inference is
often mixed up with the simple correlation of law implementation during the years
2003 to 2005 and the continuous decline of the unemployment rate since 2005.
To relate the debate of standards and trade into the relevant context, the following
Section 1.1 provides a short description of international trade and how it has evolved
over time. Once the research context is sufficiently explained, the subsequent Section
1.2 introduces the reader to the debate of standards and trade which remains the core
of the thesis. The final Section 1.3 summarises all four essays.
1.1 International trade flows are non-linear
Globalisation is often discussed as a natural consequence of technological progress fol-
lowing a one-way direction. However, historians (and economist who were fortunate
enough to study economic history) tell us that globalisation, understood as increas-
ing trade flows in this context, does not only intensify unboudedly but rather follows
waves with many tiny peaks which are business-cycles. Many economist argue that
the current integration of global markets is likely to slow down. For example, the
Economist discusses the trend of shrinking multinationals which come back to their
traditional home markets after intensive experiences of mergers and fragmentation
of production processes abroad (Economist, 2017). This phenomenon has started
earlier than the raising nationalism (briefly sketched in the preface). However, both
factors might amplify each other since raising nationalism makes fragmentation more
difficult and trade overall more costly. Thus, discussing the effects of standards on
trade remains incomplete if this context of a possible slow-down of global trade is
ignored because the raising relevance of standards is not the only new determinant
of global trade flows.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Globalisation in terms of increasing international trade flows is not a new phe-
nomenon. As a key element of the “long 19th century” as well as of the “Belle
Époque”, the first wave of globalisation took place from mid 1800s until the begin
of World War I in 1914. Falling transportation costs and technological progress as
a result of the industrialisation facilitated global exchange of goods and factors of
production. Nationalism, protectionist trade policies as a consequence of global re-
cession in the early 1930s, and ultimately two worldwars impeded international trade
and thus, stopped the first wave of globalisation (Helpman, 2011).
With the disasters of the 20th century in mind, the world has been re-structured
starting in 1944 and proceeding years. Global institutions like the United Nations,
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been established to provide a regulatory framework
for global exchange, financial stability, poverty reduction, and peace. The second
wave of globalisation has been initiated.
Since then, the integration of global markets has intensified, international trade pros-
pered, production processes became heavily fragmented, and many countries have
experienced significant increases in per capita income and welfare. In the beginning,
mostly European countries such as Germany, France, and UK as well as the USA,
and Japan experienced high growth rates. In recent decades, many South East Asian
countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, but also India and China caught
up and have grown significantly. Other countries such as Congo Kinshasa, Nicaragua,
or Ivory Coast, however, have failed catching-up. Reasons for economic divergence are
complex and not limited to trade and the degree of openness. The poverty-reducing
influence of trade remains broad consensus among economists nevertheless (Frankel
et al., 1999; Dollar et al., 2004). Thus, it remains of high interest which factors drive
and which inhibit trade.
The increase of international trade flows has been about three times larger than the
increase of global income. Figure 1.1 depicts the ratio of global trade flows and the
gross domestic product (GDP) of the entire world with an index which is equal to
100 in 1962. Trade increased in the late 1970s and the early 2000s in particular. At
the same time, tariffs (dashed line) have declined as a result of multinational nego-
tiation rounds within the GATT-framework which became the WTO in 1994. This
proxy of globalisation might has peaked in 2008. Scholars like Hoekman (2015) al-
ready proclaimed the “global trade slow down‘” implying that the trade-GDP ratio
not only took a break but indeed peaked in 2008. He argues that globalisation has
an inherent limit because production processes can not be fragmented unboundedly.
Fragmentation is one key driver of increasing international trade flows. If his view is
true, the second wave of globalisation will slow down further.
Various factors influence global trade flows. Tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, and
other trade policy measures have been used in recent decades for multiple objec-
tives such as export support or protection of domestic producers. However, non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) like norms and standards have gained in importance. Producers,
consumers, and governments are increasingly interested in traded products that meet
specific requirements regarding quality and processing.
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This thesis addresses the increasing relevance of standards as an additional deter-
minant of trade. Standards constitute an important subset of NTBs. The effect of
standards on trade needs to be investigated because standards could constitute a
fundamental threat for international trade. If this is found to be true the raising
relevance of standards would contribute to a declining trade-GDP ratio as depicted
in Figure 1.1. The objective of the thesis is exactly the question whether standards
constitute a barrier to international trade or whether standards could actually en-
hance trade flows. The following section provides the background and the current
status of this debate.
1.2 Food standards as new determinants of global trade
The relevance of tariffs as trade barriers has declined during the recent decades while
NTBs to trade have gained in quantitative as well as in qualitative importance (Hoek-
man et al., 2011). For example, the total amount of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
notifications to the WTO as a proxy for public food safety standards increased from
less than 200 in 1995 to almost 1,000 in 2015, see Figure 1.2. Moreover, the number of
GlobalGAP producers as an important private standard increased from below 20,000
in 2004 to more than 150,000 in 2015 (GlobalGAP Annual Reports; Swinnen et al.,
2015). At the same time, agricultural tariffs have declined on average from about 27%
in 1990 to 11% in 2015 (simple mean, all agricultural HS classifications, all countries).
Therefore, the effect of standards on trade is of deep interest for economists and pol-
icy makers that are concerned about global trade and the integration of developing
countries into the world trade system (Otsuki et al., 1999).
Reasons for the increasing relevance of food standards are manifold. Traditionally,
standards were set by governments to ensure food safety and to “prevent food adul-
teration and misbranding” (McClusky, 2007). However, consumers’ preferences have
also sharpened towards higher food quality in various dimensions (Batte et al., 2007;
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Figure 1.2: The raising relevance of standards
(a) Public: SPS notifications
(b) Private: Number of GlobalGAP pro-
ducers
Swinnen, 2007). These are among others food safety, organic production, environ-
mental concerns, sustainability as well as other objectives such as labour standards.
Hence, standards address multiple objectives. Not only demand-side but also supply-
side factors facilitate the increasing relevance of standards. Improved signaling either
via certification or meeting of public standards first, reduces transaction costs within
value chains and second, affects purchasing decision of the final consumer (Swinnen et
al., 2015). For example, lowering transaction costs within value chains belongs to the
primary objective of the International Featured Standards (IFS) which is discussed
in detail in Chapter 5. Among other goals, IFS aims to lower transaction costs by
harmonisation of process standards. Furthermore, certified products are associated
to be of higher value such that consumers have a higher willingness to pay (WTP).
This allows firms to increase prices and hence, supplements incentives to comply with
standards.
The landscape of existing food standards is heterogeneous such that food standards
differ in various dimensions. First, the issuing organisation could be public govern-
ments or private organisations. For example, maximum residue limits (MRLs) are
mostly set by governments to ensure that specific pesticide thresholds are not vio-
lated. If imported food products are found to exceed one particular threshold, the
country can reject to import this product. In contrast, other standards are set pri-
vately. For example, the Fairtrade certificate is issued by Fairtrade International
which is a private organisation located in Bonn and Cologne. Second, standards are
either mandatory or voluntary. MRLs are mandatory because their violation allows
countries to reject food products from being imported. In contrast, Fairtrade is a vol-
untary standard since no country requires their food imports to be Fairtrade-certified.
Third, standards differ in terms of their position within value chains. Whereas Fair-
trade traditionally addresses the final consumer, other standards like GlobalGAP are
business-to-business (B2B) oriented. Finally, standards differ regarding their cover-
age. Whereas food safety was initially the primary objective of food standards, other
objectives like environmental effects, nutrition requirements, and social concerns have
gained in relevance as well (Swinnen et al., 2015).
The implementation of food standards is legally covered by article 20 of the GATT
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which allows countries to adjust their trade policies “to protect human, animal or
plant life or health” as long as these are non-discriminatory. Based on this arti-
cle, the WTO introduced the SPS measures which allow countries to set individual
standards for this purpose as long as these are scientifically justified. The WTO
also asks countries to make use of international standards to reduce potential trade
barriers effects of standards. The Codex Alimentarius was initiated by the World
Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations in 1963 to enable countries to
harmonise their food standards. Nevertheless, many countries set standards individ-
ually to protect domestic consumers. However, the distinction between standards
that are scientifically justified and standards that are primarily implemented due to
protectionist motives often remains difficult to determine in practice. Therefore, it
is of high interest to analyse to what extent standards enhance or reduce trade and
under which conditions which effect predominates.
The effects of standards on trade remain ambiguous from a theoretical perspective.
Lower information asymmetries, higher quality products, and lower transaction costs
are expected to enhance trade (Jaffee et al., 2005). In contrast, compliance with
standards implies significant investment costs which are mostly of fixed costs but
sometimes also of variable costs character. Compliance costs might exclude small-
scale farmers in particular which would counteract development policies in developing
countries. As a result, compliance costs could reduce trade. As we will argue in Chap-
ter 4, compliance costs are not purely of monetary nature but also have a significant
non-monetary part.
Empirical analyses on the effects of food standards on trade flows remain unclear
as well. Previous studies found empirical support for trade-enhancing as well as
for trade-reducing effects. Jaffee et al. (2004) entitled this debate as “standards-as-
barriers to trade vs. standards-as-catalysts to trade”. As one of the main references,
Otsuki et al. (2001) analyse the effect of the EU’s new harmonised aflatoxin standard
on food products imported from a set of African countries by estimating a gravity
equation. They find that African exports of edible groundnuts and groundnut oil are
constrained by MRLs of aflatoxin set by EU member countries during 1989 and 1998.
Xiong et al. (2012) complements the analysis of Otsuki et al. (2001) by using a panel
dataset instead of cross-section and a different method which accounts for sample
selection bias. The availability of panel data allows to account for time-invariant het-
erogeneity and multilateral resistance. Sample-selection might cause biased estimates
because taking the logarithm of the depended variable eliminates all zero trade flows.
Hence, Xiong et al. (2012) follow a two-step procedure based on Heckman (1979)
and Helpman et al. (2008). In addition, ignoring zeros does not allow the study to
estimate the extensive margin of trade, that is the creation of new bilateral trade
partnerships. In other words, all estimates are based on the assumption that trade
already takes place; no conclusions can be made on any implications for new trade
flows. The objective of Xiong et al. (2012) is to examine the effect of the harmoni-
sation and tightening of EU MRLs on aflatoxins in 2002 on African exports of three
groundnut products by accounting for sample selection bias, multilateral resistance,
and the heterogeneity across firms. They find that EU MRLs have no significant in-
fluence on groundnut exports from Africa across all preferred methods of estimation.
Domestic supply conditions in Africa are crucial in order to determine trade volumes
and the propensity to trade groundnut products. Roy (2013) adds an additional as-
pect by arguing that African exports of groundnut had already declined before the
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harmonisation by the EU took place.
The relevance of the chosen method is also highlighted by Ferro et al. (2015) who cre-
ate a restrictiveness index of MRL pesticide for 61 importing countries. By applying
the two-step Heckman procedure as illustrated by Helpman et al. (2008), the authors
find evidence in the first stage that more stringent MRLs reduce the probability to
export due to higher fixed costs. However, once the sample selection bias and the
share of exporting firms are controlled for, standards have no effect on trade flows.
In addition, the first-stage effect is stronger for BRIC-countries than for non-BRIC
countries. Exports from low income countries are more negatively affected by prod-
uct standards than those from higher income countries. Ceteris paribus, countries
export to destination markets which have the lowest fixed costs, i.e. less restrictive
MRL standards. The effect of food safety standards on China’s exports is also anal-
ysed by Chen (2008) who find a statistically significant negative effect. According
to their estimates, the effect is even stronger than imposing tariffs. Further evidence
for trade-reducing effects due to more restrictive standards is – among others – also
provided by Wilson et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2006), Yue et al. (2010), Drogué et al.
(2012), and Melo et al. (2014) who all focus on the effects of MRL on exports.
A meta-analysis of Li et al. (2012) aims to draw some general conclusions out of the
broad empirical literature. By using the available estimates, the authors find that
the agricultural sector compared to any other sector is more characterised by the
barriers-to-trade view. Moreover, not addressing empirical challenges of the gravity
framework such as multilateral resistance increases the likelihood of finding negative
effects of standards on trade flows. Similarly, using analyses on MRLs are more likely
to find trade impeding effects.
In a novel approach Xiong et al. (2014) address both theoretical arguments of trade
impeding and trade enhancing effects of trade flows. They disentangle the effect
and find MRLs to increase import demand and reduce supply of exporting countries.
Again, developing countries are negatively affected.
Cost of compliance with food standards remain the major reason causing trade-
reducing effects due to exclusion of farmers from global value chains. (Kleinwechter
et al., 2006; Schuster et al., 2015; Kiss et al., 2003; Colen et al., 2012). Compliance
costs occur – for example – because of investments in specific production facilities
or new requirements regarding production processes. However, standards could also
act as non-financial barriers in the sense that non-financial resources are required to
comply (see Chapter 4). Compliance costs amplify once each country sets its indi-
vidual standard. Maskus et al. (2005) use firm-level data of 159 firms located in 16
developing countries of the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey Database
to estimate fixed costs of compliance. They find those to equal $425,000 per firm
on average which is about 4.7% of value added on average. Moreover, a one-percent
increase of investment costs of standards in importing countries increases variable
production costs c.p. on average between 0.06% and 0.13%. Based on the same anal-
ysis but emphasised by Czubala et al. (2009), these fixed costs vary by region. Firms
in Sub-Saharan Africa face fixed costs about 7.65% of firm sales, firms located in the
Middle East about 6.67%, and firms in South Asia only 1.79%. Henson et al. (2004)
estimate an increase of production costs for Nile perch exporters in Kenya as a direct
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result of stricter food safety standards of about 25%. As another example, invest-
ment costs due to implementing Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP)
and other procedures sum up to about $40,000 per plant. All in all, there is general
consensus about the economic significance of fixed costs of compliance as relevant
NTB.
Whereas most empirical studies emphasise the potential trade impeding effect of more
stringent or heterogeneous food standards, Henson et al. (2008) highlight the oppor-
tunities associated with standards for developing countries. Without denying possible
trade reducing effects, they argue that developing countries can use standards of de-
veloped countries to re-locate themselves on global export markets by particularly
addressing preferences for these standards. However, the authors admit that firms’
abilities to re-locate might be concentrated among the leading exporters whereas
other – i.e. smaller firms – exporters are likely to be excluded. Research questions of
Chapter 3 address the heterogeneous effects between leading exporters and the rest
explicitly.
Empirical studies on private standards are less frequent probably because relevant
data are more difficult to access. However, these are at least equally important be-
cause private standards gained in relevance in recent years in particular. Furthermore,
Fulponi (2006) shows that private standards are on average stricter than public stan-
dards. Most private standards are considered as de facto mandatory although they
remain legally voluntary (Henson et al., 2010). Schuster et al. (2015) focus on the
effect of a broad set of private standards on exports of Peruvian asparagus firms.
Based on a rich dataset including 18 years and 87 firms, they do not find an effect.
In contrast, Masood et al. (2014) find that GlobalGAP certification increases banana
exports to the EU. Again, empirical results on trade are mixed for private standards
as well as for public standards.
Standards affect economic development of countries not only via changes in trade
flows. For example, Colen et al. (2012) find empirical evidence that GlobalGAP cer-
tification in Senegal improves employment conditions. Chiputwa et al. (2015) show
that Fairtrade certification increases income of coffee farmers in Uganda. Moreover,
standards could help developing countries to meet quality requirements of import-
ing countries. Low productivity and low quality are the most relevant barriers for
developing countries to enter global value chains. While a lack of productivity can
be offset by low wage levels, improving quality is more challenging (Swinnen et al.,
2015). Because compliance with standards often signals a specific quality of particular
products, the proliferation of standards might be a suitable development strategy for
developing countries to integrate into global value chains. For example, several pri-
vate standards like GlobalGAP, TESCO, IFS, and British Retail Consortium (BRC)
facilitate vertical integration of Peruvian asparagus farmers (Schuster et al., 2013).
Table 1.1 provides an incomplete overview by listing a set of related studies which
the author considers to be relevant contributions in the field.
To conclude, the literature review reveals a large set of studies with diverse outcomes.
Thus, no direct one-suits-all answer exist such that deeper analyses are required which
detect under which conditions the catalyst-view or the barriers-view predominates.
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This thesis contributes to the ongoing debate by analysing two different food stan-
dards in econometric settings reflecting the current research frontier. These standards
are first, MRLs as an important public standard (Chapter 3) and second, IFS which
is an important private standard (Chapter 5). The following section summarises all
four essays briefly. All essays build upon a flexible conceptual framework based on
Melitz (2003) which is explained in Chapter 2.
1.3 Summaries of essays
The first three essays (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) analyse under which conditions positive
or negative effects of standards on trade overweight. We look at the following different
determinants: market structure, product complexity, quality of public institutions,
and type of standards. The first essay addresses the role of market structures by
arguing that country-pairs with high trade volumes will trade even more once stan-
dards become stricter whereas country-pairs with low trade volumes trade even less.
The second essay uses fixed costs of compliance as well as point of departure. It
focuses on non-monetary aspects of fixed costs by analysing the role of institutional
quality and its relevance for exports of various food products which differ in terms of
complexity and degree of processing. Finally, the third essay is complementary to the
second essay since it argues that product complexity matters for the direction of the
effect of standards on trade. It considers the IFS as an important private standard
for processed food products.
The fourth essay in Chapter 6 is unrelated to the overall topic of food standards
and trade. It focuses on the effects of the “Agenda 2010” as the most comprehensive
labour market reform in Germany after World War II on labour market outcomes.
This chapter is a novel contribution for this field of literature because it applies
synthetic control methods (SCM) as unique causal identification strategy. Moreover,
these reforms were meant to make the rigid German labour market more flexible and
were accompanied by intensive debates in public. Thus, this chapter is of high policy
relevance.
Essay one: Exporter size matters – heterogeneous effects of food
standards on trade flows
With increasing restrictiveness of standards, leading exporting firms are found to
benefit in terms of trade volume while other firms are disadvantaged (Anders et al.,
2009). Thus, the ex-ante export volume seems to be relevant for the effect of increas-
ing standards on producers. Leading exporters might be more capable to cover the
fixed costs of compliance while such an investment will be less profitable if expected
exports are relatively low. Consequently, we expect the effect of food standards on
trade to depend on the ex-ante export volume.
We argue that this phenomenon is not only present at the firm-level but also at
the country-level because agricultural export markets are highly concentrated. Few
exporting countries often account for a large share of world exports of a particular
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 Chapter 1. Introduction
product. The resulting hypothesis is that the catalyst-view predominates for the
leading exporting countries while the barriers-view applies for country-pairs which
trade relatively little. Hence, the novelty of this chapter is to contribute to a solution
of the debate of barriers- vs. catalyst views by providing insights when which view is
applicable.
Because the gravity model of trade uses bilateral trade flows as dependent variable,
quantile regressions are our preferred method to analyse the hypothesis of heteroge-
neous effects of standards on trade. We employ a rich data set including MRLs as
our target variable covering ten years from 2005 until 2014. MRLs are an important
public food safety standards which have been frequently studied in previous works.
This makes our results comparable to earlier findings.
We apply quantile regressions within the gravity framework by following a three-step
procedure which addresses empirical challenges that became a matter of concern in
recent years. Our empirical strategy builds upon Figueiredo et al. (2014) who suc-
cessfully control for multilateral resistance, selection-bias, and the high share of zeros.
Moreover, we conduct robustness checks regarding construction of the dataset.
As a result, we indeed find empirical support for the hypothesis. To be more precise,
standards impede bilateral trade between country-pairs from the first to the eighth
decile while country-pairs at the highest decile trade even more as standards become
stricter. We also find an heterogeneous effect of tariffs on trade such that we devote
analyses of heterogeneous effects of trade costs overall on trade to future research.
Thus, the contribution of the chapter is that the effect of standards on trade is
not only determined by income but also by the relative export volume. This is a
relevant finding because previous research mostly focused on income as a reason for
non-compliance. In the long run, these results imply that stricter standards could
increase the degree of concentration of agricultural export markets.
Essay two: Institutional quality and the ability of organisations to
adopt foreign agri-food trade standards
Surveys conducted with farmers reveal that non only income-constraints inhibits com-
pliance with standards but also non-monetary factors. We construct a conceptual
framework in which the standard-adoption-ability (SAA) at least partly determines
whether an organisation complies or not. We argue that non-monetary aspects like
the institutional setting affects SAA. Moreover, we claim that SAA is in particular
important for compliance with food safety standards of rather complex products.
To test the hypotheses, we use the gravity model in which production dummies in-
teracted with the quality of public institutions and exports to the EU constitute the
main variable of interest. This empirical strategy relies on the fact that the EU be-
longs to the strictest importers of agricultural products. Furthermore, we use five
different agricultural product categories which are dairy, meat, fruits, vegetables, as
well as fish products. Due to their animal origin, we consider dairy, meat, and fish
products to be more complex to produce. Public institutions of high quality are likely
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to support farmers to produce relatively complex products. Thus, we expect the ef-
fect of institutions of the exporting country on trade to be more pronounced for these
products and less important for exports of fruits and vegetables.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are used as proxies for the quality of
public institutions (Kaufmann et al., 2010). These are six indicators which have been
calculated based on firm level surveys and other indices. WGI aim to reflect the func-
tionality of a state such as rule of law or effective governance. Principal component
analysis is applied to comprise all six indicators to one single variable.
We find empirical support for the hypothesis for all products except fish. The quality
of institutions is particularly important for exports of dairy and meat products but
not relevant for the other three categories. We substantiate the results by providing
descriptive data on the number of exporting countries for each product category.
The number of countries which export meat and dairy products is much smaller than
for the other products in absolute in relative terms. We interpret this as additional
support for our hypothesis since it indicates – but not proves because production
decisions of agricultural products obviously depend on other conditions like climate
and soil characteristics as well – that relatively few countries are capable to export
dairy- and meat products to the EU.
Essay three: the role of private standards for manufactured food
exports from developing countries
The third essay focuses on exports of processed food products instead of agricultural
raw products. We estimate the effect of IFS certification as an important private
standard on agricultural exports. IFS certifies processed food products at upper
parts of value chains. This feature makes IFS distinct from other private standards
like GlobalGAP which is more frequently analysed. IFS is a post-farm gate standard
whereas GlobalGAP is a pre-farm gate standard mainly for agricultural raw products
that originate directly from farms. The focus on processed food items in contrast to
raw products is a particular relevant subject to analyse because the value added of
production is higher for processed food products than for raw products. In addition,
IFS explicitly aims to reduce transaction costs within the value chain which might
support the trade-catalyst perspective.
As key novelties of this chapter, we have data of IFS certification for six years of
12,000 producers located in 88 different countries. Furthermore, we use certification
in neighbouring countries of an exporting country as an instrument to address endo-
geneity due to reverse causality. Finally, we conduct the analysis by income of the
exporting country and at the sectoral level.
As a result, we find that IFS certification c.p. increases exports on average. However,
once we separate exporting countries by income, the positive effect only remains for
high-income countries while it turns negative or statistically insignificant for upper-
middle and low-income countries respectively. This finding reveals important policy
implications because the discussed raising relevance of standards then impose an ad-
ditional burden on low-income countries. Private standards are not a one-suits-all
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development tool to increase agricultural exports of developing countries. Instead,
our results stay in contrast with other studies which emphasise the potential of Glob-
alGAP certification to integrate Senegalese farmers into global value chains (Colen
et al., 2012).
Essay four: the Hartz reforms and the German labour Force
The fourth essay in Chapter 6 of this thesis investigates whether the most compre-
hensive labour market reform “Agenda 2010” in Germany after World War II caused
the decline of the unemployment rate in 2005 and subsequent years. There is little
empirical evidence based on causal identification strategies that support this conclu-
sion. This is surprising because there seems to be broad consensus in public debates
in Germany that these reforms were responsible for the decline of the unemployment
rate and for the current economic strength of Germany despite the crises in Europe.
Therefore, we consider this research question to be highly relevant for policy makers
and society overall.
The Agenda 2010 and the Hartz-reforms I to IV were subsequently implemented dur-
ing the years 2003 to 2005. These reduce the amount and duration of unemployment
benefits. Moreover, they facilitate temporary employment and tighten conditions
when job-seekers need to accept a job offer. These reforms were debated intensively
in Germany and ultimately forced chancellor Schröder (social-democratic party) to
resign. The long-run effects for the political landscape are enormous. A new left-wing
party was founded and is well established in German parliaments. The responsible
social-democratic party is still divided between opponents and advocates of these re-
forms. Moreover, research on the effect of these reforms affects policy implications
for economic policies of European countries whose economic conditions are more wor-
risome than Germany’s.
We apply a novel causal identification strategy which relies on SCMs. The under-
lying idea is to construct a counterfactual which becomes the control group. This
synthetic Germany is built by using a donour pool of OECD countries with a broad
set of predictor variables like schooling, investments, demography, and many other
explanatory variables. We do not only use unemployment as outcome variable but
also labour force participation (LFP) and employment of working age population.
Moreover, we distinguish by gender and age groups. As a result, the effect of the
Hartz reforms on unemployment remains weak. But the reforms have increased LFP,
especially of women and elderly people.
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2 Conceptual framework
This chapter introduces the conceptual framework of the first three essays andof Chapters 3 and 5 in particular. It presents aspects of a model based on
firm heterogeneity following Melitz (2003) and quality upgrading. However, it is not
meant as a complete and full theoretical model which is eventually brought to data.
Instead, it should sketch the lines of thought of the empirical strategies that follows
in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
2.1 Aspects of the Melitz-model
The essential role of fixed costs for production and exports has been emphasised in the
“New-trade-theory” as well as in the “New-new-trade theory”. Whereas the former
is mostly motivated to explain intra-industry trade by implementing product differ-
entiation in a monopolistic competition framework, the latter relaxes the assumption
of firm homogeneity by arguing that exporting firms have fundamentally different
characteristics than non-exporting firms in terms of productivity, wages, production
volumes, and profits. We use elements of the “New-new-trade theory” of the Melitz
model to demonstrate the effect of stricter food standards on bilateral exports (Melitz,
2003).
Melitz introduces firm heterogeneity via the productivity parameter ϕ. Firms need
to pay sunk entry costs fE to draw their productivity level from a cumulative Pareto
distribution G(ϕ). This productivity level determines whether the firm exits the mar-
ket, serves the domestic market only, or even exports to foreign markets. Export costs
from country i to country j are denoted by fij . These include costs for production,
exports, and market access. Thus, if a firm sells to the domestic market only, fij is
denoted as fii. Hence, profits πij of all producing firms are given by Equation 2.1:
πij(ϕ) = Bjτ1−σϕσ−1 − fij (2.1)
Bj is a demand parameter of the destination market j, τ represents iceberg-type trade
costs, and ϕ is the drawn productivity parameter. σ denotes the constant elasticity
of substitution which is assumed to be greater than one. Thus, the zero-profit cutoff
condition for exporting from market i to market j yields the cutoff productivity level
ϕ∗ij at which profits are zero, see Equation 2.2.
πij(ϕ∗ij) = 0
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⇐⇒ Bj(τij)1−σ(ϕ∗ij)σ−1 = fij (2.2)
In equilibrium, higher fixed costs fij are associated with higher demand, lower trade
costs, or higher productivity for σ > 1. Figure 2.1 depicts the relation between fixed
costs and various cutoff productivity levels. If the drawn productivity level is below
ϕ∗D, the firm exits the market; if ϕ∗D < ϕ < ϕ∗X , the firm produces for the domestic
market only but does not export. Once the productivity level exceeds ϕ∗X , the firm
exports. Note that the slope of the corresponding profit curve πX is smaller than for
πD due to variable trade costs. Profits for exporting firms are jointly determined by
πD and πX and given by the bold curve π∗X .
Figure 2.1: Profits, productivity, and standards in the Melitz framework.
2.2 New-new-trade theory and food standards
As argued in the introduction, compliance with food standards requires additional
fixed costs. Melitz already defines fixed costs broadly as “market access” costs. There-
fore, the stricter food standards in the destination market become, the larger are
market access costs. Although compliance with food standards might also increase
variable costs, e.g. due to more intensive auditing, the implied fixed costs because
of investment in modern production technologies are considered as potential barriers
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to trade. Therefore, we add a firm-specific quality upgrading fixed cost term f(qi)
where qi is a firm-specific quality parameter for differentiated goods.
However, we implement food standards not only via increased fixed costs of exporting
at the supply side but also as a strategy to address preferences of modern consumers
at the demand side and hence, as a form of quality upgrading (Ferguson, 2009). Thus,




qiBj (τij)1−σ ϕσ−1 − f(qi)− fij
]
(2.3)
Hence, the optimal upgrading choice is given by:




Thereby, we assume that the firm-specific quality upgrading fixed costs f(qi) are con-
tinuously differentiable which implies that conformance with a specific quality-level,
and hence standards-requirements, is not a binary decision. Instead, an optimal stan-
dard can be chosen from a broad continuum of standards. Following Ferguson (2009),
we need to specify the functional form of f(qi). We assume that meeting relatively
low levels of standards is a low hanging fruit. However, costs are expected to increase
exponentially since it becomes increasingly difficult to meet high levels of standards.
Thus, we assume that quality upgrading fixed costs are convex and increase in qi.
Hence, the partial derivative of f(qi) with respect to qi increases in qi. Higher levels
of standards imply an increase of the right-hand side of Equation 2.4 which in equi-
librium requires c.p. higher levels of demand Bj .
Krugman’s “new-trade theory” introduces production technologies which are often
characterised by increasing returns to scale due to the fixed costs of production.
Hence, larger production volumes result in lower average costs. In other words, if
the demand Bj of a firm is ex-ante relatively small, fixed production costs in the
zero-profit cutoff conditions 2.2 and 2.4 become binding at relatively low levels. Con-
sequently, firms that face lower demand are more likely to exit the market – because
they need to draw c.p. larger productivity parameters – if fixed costs of production
and market access costs increase due to stricter standards. Given the same drawn
productivity level, market demand Bj determines whether firms exit the market as
fX increases to fS . Hence, the level of demand could determine compliance with
standards or not. This completes our conceptual framework for Chapter 3.
However, the model also allows to address the trade-off between quality-upgrading
(compliance with standards) to earn higher profits and non-compliance. It relies on
the idea that firms can either improve quality of their products to earn higher profits
or to export to other markets which do not require products of such quality. A case-
study of Kenyan exports of Nile perch illustrates the trade-off (Henson et al., 2004).
The authors show that only a subset of all Kenyan exporters upgraded production
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capacities to meet for example stricter hygiene standards while others started to ex-
port to countries with lower standards.
To be more explicit, we assume the following functional form of f(qi):
f(q) = q1/θ with θ ε [0, 1] (2.5)
The shape-parameter θ indicates the “ease” of quality upgrading (Ferguson, 2009,
p.10). The larger θ is, the easier a firm can address preferences of consumers that
demand high-quality products; i.e. products that meet relatively strict standards.
Hence, if firms are able to implement standards easily, they will benefit from a lower
increase in associated costs which – eventually – require lower levels of demand.
Using this specific functional form of the costs of quality-upgrading, the optimal









Keeping Bj , τij , and ϕ constant, higher values of θ increase the optimal level of qual-
ity. Thus, if a standard is particularly capable to address consumers’ preferences –
i.e. high values of θ – producers can earn higher profits by investing in stricter –
i.e. high-quality – standards. In this scenario, we would expect standards to increase
profits and therefore, increase trade flows at the aggregate level. Contrary, if a par-
ticular standard is less capable to address consumers’ preferences – θ is close to zero
– the quality level remains low and producers are less likely to invest in the standard.
Therefore, it is the nature of θ that determines whether firms comply with standards
of importing countries or not. Thus, θ captures the characteristics of the specific
standard, which in-turn determine whether trade flows increase or decline in the cor-
responding context.
As we will argue, MRLs as standards in Chapter 3 are assumed to have lower values
of θ because their primary objective is not to address consumers’ preferences to gen-
erate higher profits. Instead, MRLs are set by governments or the WTO to ensure
food safety. Therefore, we expect an overall trade-reducing effect of MRLs. In con-
trast, IFS as an important private food standards, are introduced by major retailers
to reduce transaction costs. Their objective is to address consumers’ prefereces well
such that we assume higher values of θ and as a result, increasing trade flows due to
higher profits.
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3 Exporter size matters –
heterogeneous effects of food
standards on agricultural trade
Abstract:
The effects of food standards on bilateral trade flows remain unclear. Trade the-ory provides arguments for trade enhancing as well as for trade impeding effects.
According to previous studies, standards could exclude developing countries in partic-
ular from high value trade chains due to the high fixed costs of compliance. However,
standards also reduce information asymmetries and address changing preferences of
modern consumers. Using descriptive evidence for highly concentrated agricultural
export markets as our point of departure, we expect the effect of food standards to
differ for leading exporting countries compared to those which export relatively low
volumes. Based on high fixed costs of compliance in combination with increasing
economies of scale, we expect leading exporting countries to be more likely to invest
in food safety standards whereas countries with lower export volumes are not capable
investing. Hence, we claim that it is not only the income level of the exporting coun-
try that determines whether compliance is feasible but also the size of exports. The
application of a three-step quantile regression procedure within the gravity framework
builds the empirical core as this method accounts for heterogeneous covariate effects
along the trade flow distribution. Using MRLs of 54 countries and 50 products from
2005 to 2014, we find the expected heterogeneous effects of MRLs on agricultural
trade at the aggregate level. We conclude tat the previously ignored ex-ante export
volume determines how food standards affect trade.
This chapter is joint work with Bernhard Brümmer and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso. Malte
Ehrich’s contributions are: Development of research question and research design, empirical and
theoretical framework, data management, empirical estimation, and writing of the manuscript. All
authors reviewed and edited the manuscript.
Acknowledgements: We received valuable help for the Stata code from Prof. Erik Figueiredo.
Furthermore, we are grateful to our research student assistants Sascha Berndt and Dela-Dem Doe
Fiankor for excellent support in data cleaning and the descriptive analysis.
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3.1 Introduction
Agricultural export markets are characterised by a high degree of market concentra-
tion. For example, the five leading exporting countries accounted for more than 90%
of world exports of almonds in 2014; the share for apples was about 63%, for bananas
around 70%, and for garlic about 92%. Table 3.1 shows these export shares for 48
different agricultural products. With the exception of tobacco, the export shares of
the five leading exporting countries of all listed products exceed 50%. We expect this
pattern to be an important determinant of trade flows. As we will argue, the degree
of market concentration is in particular relevant – and currently missing – in the dis-
cussion of “standards-as-barriers vs. standards-as-catalysts” to trade, see Section 1.2.
Market concentration becomes relevant in this context because of compliance costs
of food standards. Their fixed costs character – either monetary or non-monetary,
see Chapter 4 – might prevent countries with low export volumes of particular prod-
ucts to enter global agricultural export markets. Thus, we expect countries with low
export volumes to be less likely to invest in food standards. These countries have
lower economies of scale to cover fixed costs. As a result, we expect the effect of
standards on exports to differ along the trade flow distribution. Country-pairs with
relatively low trade volumes might trade even less once standards become stricter
whereas country-pairs at the upper part of the trade flow distribution might trade
even more. If we find such heterogeneous effects of standards on trade, this might
reconcile competing results within the literature. Thus, neither the catalyst-view nor
the barriers-view always predominates. Instead, both are correct depending on the
ex ante level of trade.







p of five leading exporting countries on world exports in
2014. Source: UN Comtrade, author’s calculations
Product Export share Product Export share Product Export share
(%) (%) (%)
Almonds 97.57 Grapes 56.79 Pineapple 72.97
Apples 62.20 Hazelnuts 90.49 Plums 64.82
Apricots 74.86 Hop 89.79 Potatoes 57.32
Asparagus 84.07 Kiwi 87.76 Raspberries 81.51
Aubergine 75.64 Lettuce 77.67 Rice 80.18
Avocados 81.14 Maize 73.65 Rye 76.51
Bananas 66.02 Mandarins 75.25 Sorghum 95.16
Barley 64.87 Mangos 53.41 Soybeans 93.29
Broccoli 75.66 Millet 99.93 Spinach 85.85
Carrots 62.03 Oats 83.26 Strawberries 79.37
Celery 82.39 Olives 87.79 Tea 66.37
Cherries 100 Onions 62.61 Tobacco 37.35
Chestnuts 100 Oranges 69.77 Tomatoes 65.28
Cucumbers 77.99 Papayas 74.75 Walnuts 91.34
Garlic 92.30 Peaches 71.97 Watermelons 72.44
Grapefruit 71.27 Pears 99.95 Wheat 65.23
Krugman (1979) emphasises the role of market size and market concentration for in-
ternational trade. He introduces the concept of fixed costs and increasing returns to
scale within a monopolistic competition framework. According to his theory, the ab-
solute number of firms worldwide that produce a specific product (or variety) reduces
once countries switch from autarky to frictionless trade. We argue this mechanism is
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more pronounced the higher fixed costs of trade are. Since food standards increase
fixed costs of exporting, the increasing relevance of standards is likely to enhance this
mechanism identified by Krugman (1979).
We base our hypothesis on the conceptual framework explained in Chapter 2. How-
ever, instead of focusing on productivity itself our framework emphasises on the role
of demand as an additional determinant of profits and trade. If demand in the im-
porting country is high, the exporting country is more likely to invest in standards
because the investment is more likely to pay off. To put it differently, we claim that
the existing trade volume determines whether standards act as barriers-to-trade (low
ex-ante trade volume) or as catalyst-to-trade (high ex-ante trade volume).
Literature related to the role of exporter size
Anders et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence that the introduction of HACCP in-
creases exports of leading exporters of seafood and reduces exports of countries with
lower exports of seafood. Moreover, developing countries are more likely to expe-
rience lower exports as a response to stricter standards than developed countries.
As a drawback, this article is limited to seafood products. It also does not include
standards as a separate explanatory variable; instead standards are represented by
a time-dummy which indicates the introduction of the HACCP. The authors apply
random effects which is often found to be a non-valid method because of the likely
correlation between omitted time-invariant heterogeneity and the error term. Thus,
future research is required to further validate their findings.
The relevance of “historical” trade for current trade flows has been shown a while ago
by Eichengreen et al. (1998). By including the one-year lag of the dependent variable,
which is trade, into the gravity framework, the authors argue in favour of historical
trade as an important determinant of current trade flows. This result is – together
with the high concentration of export markets and compliance costs – one essential
cornerstone for the argumentation of this chapter. If ex ante trade flows between two
countries are large, they are not only more likely to trade more ex post, but also – as
we show – more likely to comply with standards.
The study which bears the most similarity to our own analysis was conducted by the
World Bank (Fernandes et al., 2015). The authors apply a rich firm-level dataset
which allows them to analyse the effect of relative restrictiveness based on MRLs
on firm level exports. Among other results, the authors find that firms’ past export
volumes increase the probability of a firm to enter or to stay in the market. Smaller
exporting firms are less likely to enter new markets as standards increase. Hence,
this analysis addresses a similar research question at the firm level. We aim to pro-
vide further evidence for the relevance of export volume at the country-level with a
different method. Herzfeld et al. (2011) analyse compliance of firms in developing
countries with the BRC Food Technical Standards and GlobalGAP as two impor-
tant B2B private standards. The authors show that both standards act as additional
market entry barriers and that country pairs with well established trade relationships
are more likely to comply with these standards. Graffham et al. (2007) demonstrate
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that large scale producers in particular are more likely to comply with EuroGAP1.
These findings already indicate the importance of production volume and trade vol-
ume for compliance with standards. We contribute to these findings by applying
quantile regressions as a novel method in this field combined with a rich dataset at
the country-level.
By using data of Vietnamese pangasius farmers Hansen et al. (2014) applied quantile
regressions in order to analyse the influence of standards on income of relatively poor
farmers compared to relatively rich farmers. As a result the authors find that only
farmers between the 50% and 85% quantiles benefited from standards in terms of per
capita consumption expenditures. Poor farmers were excluded and the income effect
for the very rich farmers was negligible.
If trade volumes determine whether exporting countries comply with standards of
the importing country or not, we expect a negative effect of standards on trade flows
of country pairs with small trade flows and a positive effect (or less negative effect)
for countries with relatively high trade flows. Quantile regressions allow to estimate
coefficients for various quantiles and are therefore, a suitable method to test our
hypothesis. As a result, quantile regressions allow for a richer interpretation than
standard regression analysis which are narrowed to the conditional mean.
In addition to the first novelty of analysing heterogeneous effects via quantile regres-
sions, we consider our dataset as a second novelty. We employ a rich dataset which
contains trade flows between 54 importing and exporting countries of 49 agricultural
raw products from 2005 to 2014 summing up to 1,402,380 observations. We use
data on MRLs which define important public food safety standards. Countries define
maximum levels of tolerated residues in agricultural products to minimise the risk of
unhealthy food consumption.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 introduces quantile
regressions in the context of gravity estimations. Because of a broad range of ad-
vantages the gravity model has been established as the workhorse model in empirical
trade analysis. We explain how quantile regressions can be embedded into the gravity
framework and how major empirical challenges of gravity models can be addressed,
in particular heteroskedasticity, the large share of zeros in trade data, and the high
number of fixed effects. Section 3.3 reports results, which are then discussed in the
subsequent Section 3.4. A conclusion summarises the chapter.
3.2 Methods and data
We now link the conceptual framework of Chapter 2 with our empirical model. We are
aware of the fact that the traditional Melitz-model is primarily designed at the firm
level. However, in principle the underlying mechanisms and channels of the model are
applicable to the country-level as well. This can be visualised by thinking of coun-
tries that draw productivity parameters instead of individual firms. Furthermore, the
point of departure of distinct characteristics of exporters compared to non-exporters
1EuroGAP is the predecessor of GlobalGAP.
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remains similar at the country-level.
3.2.1 Quantile regressions: estimation issues
As the key novelty of this analysis, quantile regressions are applied within the grav-
ity framework as these allow us to distinguish heterogeneous effects of covariates at
different parts of the distribution of the dependent variable. Thus, the empirical anal-
ysis is not constrained towards the conditional mean as it is the case with standard
regressions.2 We estimate the following exponential model:
Qτ [lnYijpt|Xijpt] = exp (Xijptβ (τ)) , τ ε (0, 1) (3.1)
where Qτ denotes the τ − th conditional quantile of lnYijpt. For example, for τ = 0.5,
β(τ = 0.5) is the coefficient at the median of the bilateral trade flow distribution. We
estimate β for deciles.
Anderson et al. (2003) show that previous gravity estimations mostly do not account
for third-country effects, consequently biasing the coefficients. The so-called “multi-
lateral resistance” implies that bilateral trade between two countries is affected by the
accessibility of both countries by third countries. Fixed effects are therefore frequently
used to account for multilateral resistance (Head et al., 2014). In our context, this im-
plies the inclusion of at least importer-year, exporter-year, and country-pair-product
fixed effects. Shingal et al. (2016)3 argue that country-year-product fixed effects shall
be included to address endogeneity at the sectoral level adequately. However, in this
chapter, we consider importer-year, exporter-year as well as country-pair-product
fixed effects which account country-year and for country-pair-product specific char-
acteristics. Thus, we address multilateral-resistance equally well at the sectoral level.
Due to the size of our dataset, we do not estimate all fixed effects as additional re-
gressors in Equation 3.1, but rather follow the procedure of Guimaraes et al. (2010)
in which fixed effects are estimated beforehand. They are then subtracted from the
dependent variable and subsequently, a quantile regression procedure is applied by
using this transformed dependent variable. Although the procedure is computation-
ally intensive and not efficient, it imposes minimum memory requirements.4 This
alternative procedure of computing fixed effects has been pointed out by Head et al.
(2014) and applied in different fields as well; see for example Pomeranz (2015) for
an analysis about taxation enforcement. McCaffrey et al. (2012) summarise different
techniques and Stata commands that have been developed recently to control for un-
observed heterogeneity. See Appendix B.1 for more methodological details.
2Quantile regressions are also beneficial from a methodological point of view as discussed in detail
by (Figueiredo et al., 2014)
3This article has not been included in this dissertation because our co-author Liliana Foletti has
already included parts of it in her dissertation. It is currently under review at American Journal of
Agricultural Economics.
4Therefore, we use the Stata command reg3hdfe which is a modified version of reg2hdfe. We
are thankful for Prof. Figueiredo who provided the code of reg3hdfe.
22 Chapter 3. Exporter size matters – heterogeneous effects of standards on trade
The gravity model as mentioned above naturally assumes strictly positive trade val-
ues. However, most trade datasets are characterised by a large fraction of zero trade
flows, especially for highly disaggregated data (Head et al., 2014). Zeros emerge ei-
ther due to statistical rounding, missing values, or because of de-facto zero trade.
Statistical rounding is highly common in trade data and hence represents one ma-
jor source of zeros. Consequently, we observe bilateral trade flows Yij between both
countries as long as lnYij exceeds the threshold κ:
Y ∗ij =
{
Yij , if lnYij > κ
0, if lnYij ≤ κ
(3.2)
As we describe in Section 3.2.2 below, our dataset exhibits 84% zero trade values.
Because all zero-observations would be dropped when takings logs, which is a nec-
essary transformation for the estimation of gravity models via OLS, this could lead
to a systematic selection bias. Not accounting for this high frequency of zeros in the
estimation would hence yield inconsistent estimates. Cameron et al. (2010) and Head
et al. (2014) suggest to replace zeros by the minimum uncensored value of lnYij to
address this challenge adequately.
The remaining problem is that we do not know which observations are actually cen-
sored. Therefore, we follow a three-step procedure proposed by Figueiredo et al.
(2014, pp.10-14).
I In a pre-step, we compute the fixed-effects µ1ijp, η1it, ν1jt which we need to estimate
the probability Π that two countries are engaged in trade by using standard
gravity variables like GDP, distance, tariffs, language etc. with a simple linear
probability model:
Π(µ1ijp, η1it, ν1jt,Xijpt) = Pr
(
Yijpt > 0|µ1ijp, η1it, ν1jt,Xijpt
)
(3.3)
The estimated probability Π̂ is then used to construct the subset J0:
J0 =
{
(i, j, p, t) : Π̂(µ1ijp, η1it, ν1jt,Xijpt) > 1− τ + cN
}
II Again, we compute the fixed effects µ2ijp, η2it, ν2jt beforehand. Since we do not
estimate a linear probability model as in step one but rather a quantile regression
model instead, lnYijpt is the dependent variable. As proposed by Guimaraes et al.
(2010) we use a transformed dependent variable which is the difference between
lnYijpt and the estimated fixed effects: lnŶijpt = lnYijpt − µ̂2ijp − η̂2it − ν̂2jt. The
fixed-effect quantile regression estimator of Koenker (2005) is applied to the
observations of subset J0.
III Finally, the third step basically repeats the second one to increase efficiency. We
construct a second subset J1 by using the quantile regression parameters β̂0 of
step two:
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J1 =
{
(i, j, p, t) : µ̂1ijp + η̂1it + ν̂1jt + Xijptβ̂0) > 1− δNT
}
with J0 ⊂ J1 and where δNT is a small positive value. Step two is repeated by
using observations of the subset J1. Hence, fixed effects based on this subset
are computed and subtracted from the dependent variable. This transformed
variable Ŷ ′ is then used as dependent variable in the final quantile regression.
To conclude, our estimate procedure accounts for all mentioned empirical challenges
associated with the gravity model. First, we include country-year and country-pair-
product estimates to address potential concerns related to multilateral resistance.
Second, we employ a comprehensive three-step procedure to account for the selection
bias. Third, quantile regressions naturally account for heteroskedasticity due to their
property of being invariant to monotone transformations.5
The final specification of the empirical model is then given by Equation 3.4.
Qτ
[
lnŶ ′ijpt|Xijpt, µijp, ηit, νjt
]
= β(τ)0 + β(τ)1Rjpt + β(τ)2ln(Tariffijpt + 1) (3.4)
Note, that Ŷ ′ is the transformed dependent variable which is a result of the three-step
procedure. The main explanatory variables are the restrictiveness indices (Rjpt) as
described below by Equation 3.5 and tariffs (Tariffijpt). The latter do vary along
the importer-exporter-product-year dimension and are therefore, not captured by the
fixed effects. We estimate Equation 3.4 based on the aggregate dataset.6
3.2.2 Data
Our target variable is food standards and we use MRLs which determine the thresh-
olds of tolerated residues of for example pesticides in food imports. MRLs are an
important public food standard and they are frequently used in empirical research.
MRLs are adopted to control for aflatoxin contamination of the food supply. The
toxicity of aflatoxin for human and animal health has been analysed and confirmed
for many decades (Eaton et al., 1994). Aflatoxins are naturally occurring in myco-
toxins that are produced by various species of fungi in agricultural commodities. For
example the fungi Aspergillus flavus appears in soil, wheat, and hay and especially
grows at high temperatures and humid climates. Aflatoxins are toxic and belong
to the group of most carcinogenic substances. For example, the lethal intake of the
aflatoxin B1 lies between 1-10 mg/kg of the bodyweight of an adult.
Therefore, in order to facilitate comparability to previous studies on the effects of food
standards on trade flows, we use MRLs as a measure of the restrictiveness in terms
5A mathematical derivation of this property is omitted here. Instead, we refer again to Figueiredo
et al. (2014).
6Regressions at the disaggregated product-level often faced problems related to multicollinearity
and convergence such that the few results obtained were not representative and are omitted here.
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of food standards of the importing country. Data are obtained from the Agrobase-
Logigram’s Homologa database which covers ten years from 2005 to 2014. In total,
we include 54 countries. Table B.1 displays the number of MRL-observations per
country and year. They differ substantially across countries and years. For example,
Ukraine set only 154 different MRLs in 2005, but 454 in 2014. The total number
of MRLs almost doubled from about 15,000 in 2005 to about 29,000 in 2014. Fig-
ures B.1 and B.2 in the appendix display the number of regulated residues and the
number of regulated products per country for the years 2005 and 2014, respectively.
European countries, Germany and Austria in particular, were leading in terms of
regulated residues in 2005. Ten years later, all EU countries are now subsumed as
EU due to the harmonisation of MRLs in September 2008, regulated more than 500
residues per product on average. Japan regulated more MRLs than any other country
in 2014. Figure B.2 also shows that the US regulated more than 900 products in 2005
followed by Australia, Germany, and other European countries. In 2014, Candada
regulated most products while the US reduced its number slightly but still exceeds
800. Upper-middle-income countries such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and Ar-
gentina regulate on average fewer products and residues.
Countries usually apply a mixture of country-specific MRLs, default values, and inter-
national harmonised values. The plain dataset only contains country-specific MRL
data. Thus, additional adjustments are required to obtain the complete dataset.
However, to make our results more robust to the way of dataset construction, we
use three different datasets: RS0 indicates no replacements while RS1 and RS2 are
constructed via a clear procedure which is explained below.
In RS0, missing observations were not replaced at all. In RS1, missings were re-
placed with country-specific values according to the following procedure, see Table
B.2:7 Some countries apply the Codex Alimentarius (FAO and WHO, 2016) as in-
ternational harmonised MRLs if nothing else is specified. The Codex Alimentarius
is an international harmonised food standard system which was developed by the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO).
Hence, for specific countries we replace missing observations with values of the Codex
Alimentarius. Other countries, for example Canada, apply the default value of 0.01
ppm if nothing else is specified. Furthermore, we replaced missing values of EU mem-
bers states with 0.01 parts per million (ppm) for the years 2009 to 2014 since the
EU harmonised the MRLs from September 2008 onward. We have country-specific
data for most EU member states and data for the EU overall. However, some EU
member states such as Latvia, Croatia, Finland, or Slovenia were not included in the
purchased dataset. Thus, we use EU values for these countries. Finally, we replace
missing values of each importer-product-year-residue combination with the maximum
value (i.e. the least restrictive value) across all importing countries to create the third
dataset RS2. This procedure is most frequently used in articles that construct restric-
tiveness indices, for example Ferro et al. (2015). Therefore, RS2 is our main dataset
in the following sections and analyses based on RS0 and RS1 were only employed as
robustness-checks.
7This replacement-procedure is based on additional information that we received from Homologa.
Chapter 3. Exporter size matters – heterogeneous effects of standards on trade 25
Restrictiveness index
A direct inclusion of MRLs in the regression analysis would lead to misleading results.
We are interested in the de facto restrictiveness of MRLs for a specific product p in
time t of the importing country j. However, an absolute value for example of 0.5
ppm for pesticide A might be less or more restrictive in practice than for pesticide B.
Furthermore, we need to aggregate across residues to make the computation feasible.
For example in the case of MRLs of Spain in 2014, we have data for 779 different
residues just for Maize. Thus, we need an index that aggregates across residues and
normalises MRLs.
Ferro et al. (2015) developed a restrictiveness index which is normalised between zero









MAXp,a,t refers to the maximum MRL of product p, pesticide a in year t across all
importing countries. Values closer to unity imply stricter standards and hence, the
index does not require an inverse interpretation as MRLs in general do. The draw-
back is that the economic interpretation becomes less accurate by using this index.
It limits the interpretation towards sign and statistical significance of the coefficients.
Also, while we can compare magnitudes across coefficients and to coefficients of other
studies, we will not know to what extent a change of MRLs relates to expected changes
of bilateral trade flows.
The development of Ferro indices are depicted in Figure 3.1. The solid line repre-
sents the average across all countries and products whereas the other lines represent
averages across products of different countries (or country groups). There is a slight
increasing trend of the overall average which implies that MRLs are set at relative
stricter levels over time. The increase is in particular pronounced from 2008 to 2009
which is partly driven by the harmonisation of MRLs of the EU (red long dashed
line). The EU set continuously stricter MRLs and overtook the US in 2009 which
became slightly less strict over time. China, which has been significantly less strict
on average than other countries, has been catching up in 2013 and 2014. Although
Japan’s restrictiveness has declined remarkably from 2005 until 2007, it has remained
among the strictest countries.
Developed countries are usually criticised for imposing relatively strict standards on
their agricultural imports. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 provide general support for this view
by relating number of regulated MRLs and restrictiveness to per capita income. Fig-
ure 3.2 plots the average number of residues of a country and per capita income
calculated as the mean from 2005 to 2014. Richer countries impose more MRLs in
quantitative terms than poorer countries. Moreover, richer countries impose not only
more MRLs but also relative stricter standards. The two strictest countries, however,
are outliers. Vietnam and South Africa set the strictest MRLs on average. BRICS-
countries (except South Africa) are less restrictive in relative terms: Brazil, Russia,
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Source: Homologa database, own graph
India, and China are located in the bottom.
Figure 3.2: Number of regulated
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Figure 3.3: Restrictiveness
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Figures B.3 and B.4 in the appendix show worldmaps in which dark shaded countries
either regulate many residues or set strict standards. The EU as well as the USA
set many MRLs as well as relatively strict standards. Overall, Canada, Argentina,
Norway, and Japan set the strictest MRLs whereas most other Asian countries are
less strict. Data for African countries and most countries located in the middle-east
are rare such that these regions are (except for Egypt and South Africa) are excluded
from the analysis.
Since the analysis is conducted within the gravity framework, the remaining vari-
ables are standard in gravity models. We use import data for 54 importing and
exporting countries for which we have MRL data in current US-Dollars from the UN
Comtrade database. Overall, we selected 49 products depending on the number of
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Table 3.2: List of included products
HS Code Product HS Code Product HS Code Product HS Code Product
080211/2 Almonds 0707 Cucumbers 100820 Millet 1007 Sorghum
080810 Apples 070320 Garlic 1004 Oats 1201 Soybeans
080910 Apricots 080540 Grapefruits 071120 Olives 070970 Spinach
070920 Asparagus 0806 Grapes 070310 Onions 081010 Strawberries
070930 Aubergine 080221/2 Hazelnuts 080510 Oranges 0902 Tea
080440 Avocados 1210 Hop 080720 Papayas 24 Tobacco
0803 Bananas 081050 Kiwi 080930 Peaches 0702 Tomatoes
1003 Barley 080530 Lemons 080820 Pears 080231/2 Walnuts
070410 Broccoli 0705 Lettuce 080430 Pineapples 080711 Watermelons
0706 Carrots 1005 Maize 080940 Plums 1002 Rye
070940 Celery 080520 Mandarins 0701 Potatoes 1001 Wheat
080920 Cherries 080450 Mangos 081020 Raspberries
080240 Chestnuts 080710 Melons 1006 Rice
MRL-observations. Table 3.2 provides a list of all products included and the corre-
sponding HS codes.
Ad valorem equivalent tariffs are obtained from the International Trade Center8 for
each trading pair, product, and year. Other typical gravity variables like proxies
for the masses of both trading partners and proxies for trade costs such as distance,
common language, shared colonial history, contiguity, and religion are not included
because these vary only at the country-pair dimension and are captured by country-
pair-product fixed effects.
3.3 Main results: The effect of MRLs on trade
This section reports the main results of the quantile regression of Equation 3.4. Figure
3.4 shows coefficients of restrictiveness (solid line) across deciles based on the index
of Ferro et al. (2015) and the RS2 full dataset. The full set of results are presented in
Table B.3. The coefficients of MRLs remain below zero for all deciles except for the
ninth decile. The coefficient for τ = 0.1 is close to minus two, increases to -0.13 in the
third decile, declines again to more than -1.5 in the median regression and increases
then steadily until 0.5 in the ninth decile. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically
significant for all deciles.
Although the index does not allow us to infer on economic significance directly, we
can compute trade changes as deviations from the mean. The mean of the index is
equal to 0.51. If the index increased from the mean by 0.01 to 0.52, trade between
country-pairs at the lowest decile declines by a factor of e−1.973×0.01 = 0.98 which
implies a decline in trade flows of about two per cent. In contrast, trade flows be-
tween country-pairs at the largest deciles are expected to increase by 0.5 per cent if
the mean increases by 0.01.
This supports the trade-barriers perspective for most trading country-pairs except
the highest decile. Hence, MRLs impede bilateral trade between country pairs with
8Access via www.macmap.org in January 2016.
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relatively low trade volumes including the pair at the median. However, the catalyst-
to-trade view predominates for the highest decile. Thus, the effect of MRLs on trade
is heterogeneous which we interpret as empirical support for our hypothesis and jus-
tifies quantile regression as our preferred method.
The coefficients on the variable tariffs are depicted by the red dashed line. Again,
we find heterogeneous effects which underlines the importance of applying quantile
regressions in this context. Tariffs are found to reduce trade independent of the re-
spective decile. The coefficients are statistically significant for all deciles. However,
the trend is less clear compared to MRLs because the effect becomes again more
negative after a sharp increase in the eighth and the ninth decile.
Results that are based on the other two datasets RS0 (no replacement of MRLs) and
RS1 (replacements with country-specific MRLs only) are less clear (Table B.3). The
coefficients of the lowest decile remain of similar magnitude of about minus two. The
coefficients of the highest decile are larger than of the lowest decile for all datasets but
only positive for RS2. The effect becomes less negative from the fifth to the eighth
decile in all three datasets. In contrast to RS2, country-pairs are found to be more
adversely affected by standards at the ninth decile than for the eighth decile as long
as RS0 and RS1 are considered. Overall, we do find heterogeneity of the effect of food
standards on trade, but the trend is less clear for the other datasets RS0 and RS1.
Overall, we expect RS2 to be closest to the true degree of restrictiveness because it is
reasonable to assume that countries, that do not have a regulation of a specific residue,
are likely to be at least as restrictive as the least restrictive country. Moreover, not
replacing any MRL (RS0) is unrealistic as well because it ignores valuable information
on default values. These findings underline the sensitivity of results of the empirical
literature of MRLs and trade.
Figure 3.4: Estimated coefficients of restrictiveness (left axes) and tariffs (right axes)
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Based on methods reflecting the current research frontier in empirical trade analysis,
we find evidence that the effect of food standards on trade flows differs by export
size. We find a similar, heterogeneous effect for tariffs, a more traditional trade cost
variable. We base our argument on two pillars: First, food export markets are highly
concentrated. Few countries often account for more than 50% of total world exports
at the product-level. We show that the combination of concentrated agricultural
export markets and compliance costs due to food standards lead to heterogeneous
effects of standards on trade.
Standard regression techniques, which do not allow for differentiate effect sizes, would
have missed the heterogeneity of the effect of food standards on trade flows condi-
tional on the size of exports. In line with previous studies, we would have been able to
estimate the average effect only, which turns out to be negative in this case. However,
quantile regressions allow us to draw more specific conclusions: It is not only income
that matters for compliance but also export volume.
In terms of policy recommendations, we emphasise that provision of fair and equal
market access is certainly necessary, but not sufficient to allow all countries to ben-
efit from globally integrated agricultural export markets. Aid-for-trade programmes
are one option which especially help those countries which have the potential to en-
ter global export markets but are constrained by the high fixed costs of compliance.
Nevertheless, since we find that the ex-ante export volume – among other factors –
determines whether or not countries comply with stringent food standards, not all
countries will gain from global export markets in the same way.
The results also help to improve our understanding of how food standards affect the
structure of global agricultural markets. Our findings touch upon results of the cur-
rent Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024 of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and FAO in which the high degree of export concentration
is identified as a serious risk (Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024 ). As specialisation pro-
cesses of food production continue, food importing countries become more dependent
on a very small set of exporting countries. If countries with smaller trade volumes
continue to be more adversely affected by stricter standards, the number of exporting
countries per product might decline even further. In the long term, global agricultural
export markets might become even more concentrated if standards continue to become
stricter. One could even think of a vicious cycle in the sense that more concentrated
agricultural export markets are, the larger the negative effect is for country-pairs with
smaller trade volumes. This might be particularly relevant if fixed costs of compliance
are not only of a financial nature. For example, the more experienced countries are
and the larger their export volumes, the more product-specific knowledge they could
accumulate over time with corresponding spill-over effects which, in turn, increase
the comparative advantage of those few countries even further.
If agricultural export markets continue to become more concentrated, worldwide sup-
ply of particular products might become more vulnerable to external shocks. If, for
example, extreme weather conditions in California reduce the harvest of almonds,
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the effect on worldwide supply of almonds would be substantial because only very
few other producing countries would be able to replace the USA as the major ex-
porting country. Although the consumption of almonds might be less essential than
other products, as for example onions in India, it illustrates possible drawbacks when
agricultural markets become increasingly concentrated. A shortage of supply of po-
litically sensitive products is likely to result in protectionist trade policies like the
recent export ban of Indian onions (Bhosale, 2017). Increasing volatility of supply
could increase food price volatility with direct effects on poverty of affected countries.
From a market-competition perspective, a sufficient set of exporting countries is desir-
able to allocate production risks adequately. High degrees of concentration increases
the likelihood that a small set of suppliers can ask for an extra price-premium which
contradicts gains of free and liberal markets.
Although the pattern of heterogeneity of the effect of tariffs on trade is similar com-
pared to that of MRLs, it requires a different discussion. The essential argument for
finding the heterogeneous effect of MRLs on trade builds upon fixed costs of compli-
ance. In contrast, ad valorem tariffs are not characterised by fixed costs but rather
depend on total trade value. Moreover, there are no obvious arguments for trade-
enhancing effects of tariffs on trade as it is the case for standards. Hence, our finding
of purely negative effects of tariffs on trade matches our hypothesis that fixed costs
of compliance make the crucial difference.
However, the high degree of market concentration as the second argument which
underlies our hypothesis of heterogeneous effects remains valid for tariffs as well.
Country-pairs with low trade volumes are more vulnerable to tariff increases, prob-
ably because these trade relationships are less well established. On the other hand,
country-pairs at the upper part of the trade flow distribution with well established
trade relationships might be less affected as tariffs increase because they trade re-
gardless. In other words, their trade elasticity with respect to tariffs is lower.
If this explanation is true, we should find similar patterns of heterogeneity of other
trade cost proxies as well. We find some evidence in Table 4 of Figueiredo et al.
(2014) in which the authors analyse the effect of WTO membership on trade. They
include a dummy for common currency in their analysis, which reflects trade costs
due to different currencies of trading partners. The coefficients for the lowest quantile
and the median regression are both equal to 0.8, but increase to one for the upper
quantile. However, the discussion of heterogeneous effects of all types of trade cost
proxies is left to further research as it exceeds the scope of this paper.
Policy recommendations are not limited to exporting countries. The overall gain from
setting standards can be expected to diminish. The SPS and Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) regulatory framework of the WTO already provides an adequate mech-
anism to ensure that public standards are set based on scientific evidence. Allowing
each country to set their individual food safety standards makes trade costly. More-
over, we can show that high-income countries tend to set stricter MRLs compared to
lower-income countries. Thus, high-income countries impose an additional burden on
international trade which is in particular problematic for countries with lower trade
volumes. As shown in earlier studies and discussed in Section 1.2, historical trade
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flows affect current trade flows. However, their effect seems to be relevant in particu-
lar once trade costs, especially fixed costs due to compliance with standards, increase.
The effect of past trade flows on current trade is not desirable from a liberal market
perspective if it impedes entry to global export markets. Other arguably aspects such
as individual productivity levels or the ability to address relevant preferences should
determine entry decisions of countries and firms and shall not be overweighted by
past trade volumes. This is a matter of concern even if countries with low exports
of a particular product are not necessarily low-income countries: as we will show in
Chapter 5, the level of income of the exporting country is relevant as well for the
effect of standards on trade.
Therefore, standards can be problematic from a development perspective and poten-
tially counteract aid-for-trade programmes which aim to integrate developing coun-
tries into global value chains. Although Swinnen et al. (2015) argue that standards
have the potential to facilitate trade integration processes, we show that stricter
MRLs impede integration strategies based on proliferation of certification schemes as
described by Schuster et al. (2013).
Countries which set strict MRLs should take the described negative consequences for
other potential trading partners into account. Setting the “right” MRL shall be the
objective and not setting MRLs at levels that are too strict on average. The determi-
nation of the correct MRL requires solid and long-term research of related disciplines.
Policy makers should guarantee that sufficient research can be conducted in adequate
environments.
Costs for compliance, but also for determining the correct MRLs can be minimised
by harmonisation of standards across countries. Thus, the harmonisation of MRLs
within the EU in 2008 was a useful step into this direction. Instead of allowing each
country to set its individual MRL, the WTO might set incentives as such that mem-
ber countries apply the Codex Alimentarius (or a modified version) more frequently.
There is no a-priori argument based on food safety concerns why MRLs should dif-
fer across countries. Food-safety requirements can be assumed to be identical – or
very similar at least – for every human being. Nevertheless, preferences differ across
countries which makes complete harmonising of standards difficult and not desirable.
In addition, because harmonisation could either lead to stricter standards or to in-
creasing protests of citizens in countries that end up with less strict standards. These
concerns would certainly need to be taken into account and not neglected.
To conclude, our findings explain at least partially the contradicting results in the
literature whether standards act as catalysts or barriers to trade. We contribute to
this debate by providing empirical evidence for the presence of both effects. Future
research should address which conditions are required to support the catalyst-effect:
How shall standards be designed to be least-distorting for trade? That is, how can risk
of trade-distorting and trade-reducing effects be minimised for countries that trade
little? Furthermore, a broader set of standards needs to be examined to improve
external validity of results. For example, standards that indeed enhance trade at the
conditional mean, could potentially also affect trade heterogeneously.
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4 Institutional quality and the
ability of organisations to adopt
foreign agri-food trade standards
Abstract:
The implementation of quality standards among agricultural exporters is often de-scribed as having fixed cost character. This can be misleading if fixed costs
are only understood in terms of required monetary investments. Instead, standard
adoption can be viewed as the result of exporting countries’ private and public organ-
isations managing to solve the standard implementation problem. This hypothesis is
tested based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators as proxies for the institutional
characteristics of countries that successfully export fruits, dairy products, meat, fish,
and vegetables. Within a gravity framework, the role of export countries’ institutional
quality is assessed for agri-food exports to the EU as a market with relatively high
standards, in comparison to their agri-food exports to all markets. Results indicate
that institutional quality is not relevant for successful exports of fruits, vegetables,
and fish, while it turned out to be an important determinant for successful exports
of dairy- and meat products, which may be viewed as products of rather demanding
process- and quality standards.
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4.1 Introduction
Fixed costs of compliance with food standards remain the major reason why food
standards might be a threat for global agricultural export markets (see Section 1.2).
However, the nature of fixed costs is poorly understood. Within the international
trade policy environment, distinctions between different standards and their varying
influence on fixed costs of trade are not commonly considered. Especially exporting
developing countries tend to view food quality standards broadly as nontariff barriers
that impede their market access (WTO, 2013).
At first glance, the concept of fixed cost suggests that financial investment in some way
or the other (e.g. aid for trade programmes, foreign direct investment in the exporting
country) would be the main constraint to overcome such trade impediments. In this
context, the WTO (2013) conducted a private sector survey in which they evaluated
several aid-for-trade programmes. The authors identify various non-financial barriers
of standard adoption, e.g. the absence of networks with governments, the absence
of supply chain relationships, a lack of confidence in existing and new markets, and
difficulties in collaborating with the public sector (WTO, 2013, p.13). Clearly, the
provision of financial support alone would not be sufficient nor adequate to eliminate
these non-financial trade barriers.
Nunn et al. (2013) and Levchenko (2007) identify the general quality of public insti-
tutions as a potential source of comparative advantage. Nunn (2007) analyses the
role of contract enforcement and its implications for product-specific investments and
finds that institutional quality alone explains an even larger share of trade flows than
skilled labour and capital combined. Institutional aspects of trade have been de-
scribed in terms of contract enforceability, democracy, social networks, relevance of
informal activities, information asymmetries, and the availability of skilled workers
e.g. by Rauch et al. (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Yu (2010), Bloom et al. (2012),
de la Mata, T. et al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013), and Muange et al. (2014).
Henson et al. (2004) underline the relevance of public institutions in the case of
Kenyan Nile perch exports. The authors identify weak governance as one reason why
only few Kenyan exporters upgraded their production facilities as hygiene standards
of the EU between 1997 and 2000 became stricter. Although the Kenyan government
“invested heavily in changes to legislation, administrative structures, [...], and certi-
fication procedures”, other factors such as infrastructure remain of low quality and
increased fixed costs of compliance by about 25% (Henson et al., 2004, p.75).
Thus, well-functioning public institutions seem to increase trade in general, while the
“fixed cost” behaviour of food standards seems to be more complex, and potentially
related to different institutional aspects of the firm or the country that aims to adopt
a certain standard. Alternatively, different types of food standards or standards for
different types of food products might reveal different degrees of sensitivity with re-
spect to their trade-elasticity of institutional quality.
We therefore study the particular effect of institutional quality on developing coun-
tries’ probability to successfully export agri-food products to high-value markets by
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analysing the product-specific effect of the exporting country’s quality of public in-
stitutions.
It is hypothesised that the effect of institutions on exports depends on the one hand
on the stringency of food standards of the importing country and on the other hand
on the degree of complexity of the exported product. If this hypothesis was correct,
then high quality institutions in an exporting country should c.p. prove relevant for
agri-food exports to markets with relatively strict standards, and for agri-food prod-
ucts with relatively demanding standards.
This article is therefore organised as follows: the next section explains our conceptual
framework from which we derive the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4.3 presents data
and the different gravity model specifications that are used. Results are presented in
section 4.4. Section 4.5 discusses the results and concludes the chapter.
4.2 Conceptual framework
The models by Caliendo et al. (2012) and Garicano et al. (2015) focus on the role of
firms’ ability to organise knowledge-intensive production optimally in order to ben-
efit from export activities. Even though these models do not consider the problem
of standard implementation explicitly, they can provide a theoretical foundation for
the relationship between institutions and export success: in both models, production
requires knowledge (as an interpretation of capital) and labour (to be thought of as
the amount of time that workers are willing to offer to the labour market). One unit
of labour (e.g. 1 hour) can be supplied by two types of agents: workers (L) and
managers (K). Both together solve problems for which a minimum level of knowledge
is required. Problems need to be solved in order to transform otherwise useless pro-
duction into α, which is useable output of the corresponding product variety.
We therefore assume that in a given country, the agri-food sector is composed of het-
erogeneous firms. A firm pays fixed costs fα in order to design a product variety α.
Melitz (2003) argues in this context that only the most productive firms will export.
However, instead of randomly drawing a productivity parameter as in the model of
Melitz (2003), here the corresponding total market demand for product variety α is
by each firm drawn from a probability distribution. This level of demand induces the
optimal organisational structure in terms of optimal share of workers L and managers
K in labour that the firm has to match. In other words: Higher (global) market de-
mand for a product variety α will require firms to work with a higher level of problem
solving capacity than firms with lower market demand for their variety.
Garicano et al. (2015) show this in their theoretical model, where the purpose of a
hierarchical organisation (such as e.g. an exporting firm) is to economise on the ac-
quisition of knowledge in order to solve problems, and this is obviously more relevant
if the costs of acquiring relevant knowledge are relatively high. Thus, firms that are
better at solving problems will be more productive, and consequently are going to be
more likely involved in export activities.
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For instance, in order to solve the problem of implementing a new standard relevant
for entering a foreign market, the firm will have to invest effort in terms of capital,
time, and knowledge. In other words: implementing the new standard will increase
the demand for managers K in the firm relative to workers L, and the fixed costs
related to the export of α will raise consequently, which on turn can pay off only if a
comparatively large market is served, namely through exports.
We therefore conclude that the fixed cost character of a foreign trade standard can be
distinguished according to a monetary component and an organisational component.
This organisational component should consist of a private and a public dimension:
the private dimension reflects (change in) organisational capacity within the export-
ing firms, e.g. more managers are hired who have better knowledge and skills about
how to implement the new standard.
The private dimension of export-related organisational capacity within any firm should
according to Garicano et al. (2015) be reflected by the firm’s productivity, and should
therefore correspond to the market demand for α. This private dimension of organ-
isational capacity should under conditions of monopolistic competition or perfect
competition thus in the long run just be equivalent to the firm’s productivity. Since
this is primarily the outcome of competition between firms, we are assuming that
this private dimension of organisational capacity remains constant and does not get
affected by the public dimension. Instead, we are especially interested in this public
dimension of export-related organisational capacity.
The public dimension however describes the institutional environment within which
the firm’s managers have to solve the problem of implementing the new standard for
α. Obviously, two identical firms within two different institutional environments will
perform differently: institutions that are relevant for exporting activities are a coun-
try’s foreign missions, the diplomatic body, access to credit and insurance markets,
quality of communication infrastructure, freedom and transparency regarding legal
procedures, and the level of corruption in the country where the standard has to be
implemented.
This institutional component is in our analysis denoted by Θ and describes the “trade
standard adoption ability’ (SAA) of a firm to successfully implement and adopt a
certain quality standard for its exports to the standards-setting importer j. Based
on the empirical literature about institutional aspects of trade, SAA (Θ) can be
expressed as a function of various indicators of institutional performance:
Θ = f(social capital, government effectiveness, corruption, . . . ) (4.1)
Figure 4.1 displays the positive relationship between profits π(α, θ) of a firm that is
producing product variety α, and its corresponding SAA, Θ. Larger values of Θ are
required to export to markets with relatively strict standards. The corresponding
thresholds are indicated as ᾱ.
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Figure 4.1: Self-selection of firms into markets that vary in stringency of product-
related standards.
Thus, to match a relatively high standard, SAA has to be higher than for the adop-
tion of a relatively low standard, whereas “high” and “low” refer to the required
problem-solving capacity. This degree of complexity of the problem will depend on
i) the type of standard that is set by the importing country and ii) the ease at which
this standard can be implemented into the production process of ᾱ.
This complexity of the standard implementation problem that an exporting firm faces
has at least two important dimensions: restrictions on content of the imported food
item, and restrictions on related production procedures and processes. The restric-
tions on content constitute e.g. MRLs or minimum requirements in terms of quality
content. Restrictions on procedures may refer to cooling and storing regulations,
traceability, special treatment of animals, and so on.
In reality, those importing countries with more demanding standards regarding food
quality will restrict imports based on a combination of these two dimensions, which
leads to the following hypotheses regarding exporting firms’ SAA:
Hypothesis 1: Higher SAA favours exports to markets with relatively demanding
standards; an exporting country is c.p. more likely to be observed exporting to des-
tinations with relatively high trade-related standards if the SAA is higher than in
other countries.
Hypothesis 2: Higher SAA favours exporting those agri-food products for which
standard implementation is relatively more demanding than for other agri-food prod-
ucts. Agri-food products may not all require the same level of SAA, e.g. because
different levels of processing or e.g. cooling requirements or specific residues.
Both hypotheses are in the following sections put to an empirical test.
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4.3 Data and model specification
Both hypotheses could be tested by conducting surveys and compiling firm level data
in order to assess the values of Θ empirically, e.g. from subjective estimates that
workers and managers provide about the relative ease at which they deal with vari-
ous foreign agri-food standards. However, firm level data across countries are difficult
to obtain and managers are usually reluctant to reveal data about productivity, ex-
port success, and internal restructuring.
Instead, official statistics about trade flows and trade-related standards contain im-
plicitly all relevant information about the ability of the organisations within a certain
country to adopt foreign trade standards.
This enables us to test the hypotheses within a gravity framework, after controlling
for the effect of distance, GDP, tariffs, and institutional quality as an approximation
to the public dimension of SAA. For this, the following testing strategy is employed:
I If institutional quality matters for exporting firms’ SAA, then institutional in-
dicators should reveal positive and significant estimation coefficients regarding
observed trade flows from exporters towards those markets that exhibit more
demanding agri-food trade standards than the average country.
II Ranking countries precisely according to the ease, at which their agri-food trade
standards can be matched by trading partners, is difficult. Instead, we assume
that the EU can serve as an example of a market that has more demanding agri-
food standards than the average country. We do not claim that the EU has the
highest standards of all countries. However, the EU may serve as an example of
a market that is both relatively demanding in terms of standards and due to its
size and purchasing power at the same time reasonable attractive for most global
exporters.
III Both hypotheses are tested by evaluating the estimation coefficients of empirical
proxies for institutional quality with respect to their effect on exports to the EU,
in comparison to exports to all countries for various products.
4.3.1 Empirical approximations to institutional quality
A broad and heterogeneous array of proxies for a country’s institutional quality ex-
ists in this respect. For example, the World Bank provides doing-business indicators
which are based on firm-level questionnaires. Among others, these indicators assess
the number of documents required to start a business.
In addition, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank provide
in this context an example of several indicators that may approximate the quality of
a country’s public institutions (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Such indicators include sta-
bility and effectiveness of the government, the extent of corruption, public violence,
and — among others — freedom and democracy. Table 4.1 provides an overview of
all six indicators that are potentially relevant for the abovementioned hypotheses.
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Table 4.1: Definition of WGI, Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Indicator Brief definition
(1) Control of corruption Extent to which public power is exercised for private gain
(2) Government effectiveness Perceptions of the quality of public services
(3) Political stability Likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown
(4) Regulatory quality Ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
(5) Rule of law Confidence in enforcement of contracts, property rights
(6) Voice and accountability Participation in government, freedom of expression, association
For instance, higher government effectiveness at the country-level increases the SAA
of firms because firms might receive more support for upgrading their production
processes and for meeting foreign trade standards. In addition, the relevance of
government effectiveness is even more pronounced for exports of relatively complex
products for which standards are more difficult to fulfill.
Figure 4.2 plots all six indicators for Brazil and Australia, respectively. Both coun-
tries are major agricultural exporters. The WGI are heterogeneous between countries
and vary over time. In this case, Australia achieves substantially higher levels of in-
stitutional quality such that we expect Australia to have a comparative advantage
for exports of process-demanding products to the EU in particular.
Figure 4.2: Institutional quality varies over time (WGI range between -2.5 and 2.5),
































V&A: Voice and Accountability
In addition, it turns out that all six indicators are highly correlated (Table C.1).
Hence, including all indicators simultaneously into a gravity regression is not ap-
propriate due to collinearity. Therefore, a principal component analysis (PCA) is
applied instead of choosing only one indicator or an arbitrary subset. PCA allows us
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to reduce the dimensions of the data. The PCA reveals that one component explains
around 87% of the variation, see Table C.2. Corresponding eigenvalues are listed in
Table C.3. This component represents institutional quality in the following model
description and is denoted as WGI hereafter.
4.3.2 The Gravity dataset
The gravity dataset covers the period from 1996 until 2014. However, WGI are not
available for 1997, 1999, and 2001. Bilateral imports in current US-Dollar are included
from the UN Comtrade database of 170 importing and 177 exporting countries. In
general, the quality of import data is higher than for export data because developing
countries in particular rely on tariff revenues which are based on imports.
Five different categories of frequently traded agri-food products at different levels of
processing were included into the dataset: Meat (HS 02), fish (HS 03), dairy products
(HS 04), vegetables (HS 07), and fruits (HS 08). These products constitute categories
of some of the most widely traded and at the same time highly valuable agri-food
products. Furthermore, these products include sufficiently many different subcate-
gories such that the implementation of different trade related import standards may
constitute relevant organisational problems for the exporting firms. To keep the com-
putation feasible, all country-pair-product combinations are excluded, for which less
than three out of 16 observations over time are available which reduces the share of
zeros from 85% to 36%. In total, the dataset contains n = 245,632 observations.
The standard gravity type variables have been obtained from the following sources:
GDP of both trading countries are taking from the World Bank development indi-
cators in current US-Dollars. Trade cost proxies like distance, colonial ties, common
language, common border, and religion are downloaded from the CEPII homepage.
In addition, ad valorem equivalent tariffs for each country-pair-product-year combi-
nation were taken from the International Trade Centre and have also been added to
the gravity regressions. Table C.4 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics of
the gravity data set.
4.3.3 The EU as an example of a relatively demanding import mar-
ket for agri-food products
For all agri-food products on aggregate, the EU belongs to the world’s leading agricul-
tural exporter and importer regions. The EU’s agri-food trade with non-EU countries
has in principle to comply with all internal EU agri-food quality standards. The EU’s
general approach to food safety includes risk assessments, animal health, animal wel-
fare, and plant health assessments that focus for many products on the entire supply
chain “from farm to table”.
The European Commission for Health and Food Safety approves in this respect agri-
food firms and processing plants in non-EU and EU countries (European Commission,
2017b). Thus, not only tariffs and non-tariff barriers limit the number of countries
that have market access to the EU, but the cost and difficulties of implementing EU
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standards and continuously having to comply with them considers a market entry
barrier by itself.
The left panel in Figure 4.3 presents in this respect the number of observed trading
partners that export in any year to the EU within each of the agri-food product cat-
egories under consideration. The left panel of this figure depicts the absolute number
of exporting countries. The left-hand panel in Figure 4.3 reveals that only a relatively
small number of non-EU countries is eligible for exports of meat and dairy products
to the EU. In contrast, almost half of the world’s countries are currently eligible for
exports of fishery products, fruits, and vegetables.
The right panel shows these numbers relative to the total volume of imports of the
EU in each of these product categories. This is especially meaningful because the
EU external trade can be expected to have risen along both intensive and exten-
sive margin (Hummels et al., 2005). In addition, several EU enlargement steps took
place during the observed time period, and further microeconomic shocks such as the
creation of the euro zone or the financial crisis may have affected external trade flows.
Figure 4.3: Observed number of countries that export to the EU by product category,














































































Source: UN Comtrade, own graph
Figure 4.3 demonstrates that and enlarging EU has maintained about the same num-
ber of trading partners over time in each of the product categories, which means
a decline in the number of trading partners relative to the number of EU members.
This view is exacerbated when the number of exporting countries is expressed relative
to the total volume of imports (right panel).
Apparently, countries have rather specialised in exports to the EU than would new
countries have gained market access. One important explanation for this is the EU’s
system of preferential trade agreements. For instance, it is plausible that the EU as
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a major beef and dairy producer has limited interest in beef and dairy imports, while
it has substantially less own production of certain tropical fruit. It is therefore neces-
sary to control for different levels of import tariffs applied by the EU when assessing
the potential role of institutions in exporting countries.
However, the different number of exporting countries in each product category may
also point towards relative differences regarding the ease of implementing agri-food
standards that are set by the EU. As long as these standards can, besides tariffs and
other trade barriers, be viewed as part of the effect observed in Figure 4.3, then only a
relatively small number of countries seems to manage to comply with meat and dairy
product standards, while a relatively large number of countries seems to comply with
standards for fishery products, fruits and vegetables.
Furthermore, a certain country might in principle be eligible for exports to the EU,
but shipments may have been rejected at the border, e.g. due to violations against
MRLs. The latter might be especially relevant in the case of fruit and vegetable
products.
































Source: RASFF and UN Comtrade
Rejections divided by imports/1000000000
Relative rejections
Figure 4.4 provides absolute and relative counts of agri-food shipments that were re-
jected at EU borders over time. The relative count takes the import value and each
year as a reference in order to control for the fact that more frequently traded product
categories may also exhibit higher rejection numbers in absolute terms. Figure 4.4
however reveals that absolute and relative rejections in the year 2014 were highest
for fruits and vegetables, while dairy and meat products encountered the smallest
number of border rejections.
In other words, the findings in Figure 4.4 can be interpreted as the outcome of the two
dimensions of agri-food trade standards, namely product quality and process quality:
the EU does not restrict so severely the number of countries eligible for the export
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of fruits and vegetables a priori, but the type of quality restrictions in place and the
corresponding monitoring procedures lead to rather frequent rejections at EU borders.
In turn, the EU seems to strictly limit the number of countries eligible as exporting
partners for dairy and meat products, and this may happen through a combination
of tariff-related measures and the rather tight monitoring of the entire supply chain
within each country that is eligible for exporting these products.
Although institutional quality enhances exports of both quality types — product
quality and process quality — it can be expected to be in particular relevant for
products which require high levels of process quality, such as meat and dairy prod-
ucts (European Commission, 2017a).
Fishery products constitute in this respect the product category in the middle between
fruits and vegetables (as an example of mostly product quality related standards) and
dairy and meat products (as examples of mostly process quality related standards):
a large number of countries is eligible for exports to the EU, while the number of
rejections ranges between fruit and vegetable products on the one hand and dairy
and meat products on the other.
4.3.4 Endogeneity of institutional quality
The potential endogeneity of institutions has been emphasised in various studies re-
lated to empirical growth and empirical trade analyses (Frankel et al., 1999; Acemoglu
et al., 2001; Dollar et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 2011). For example, reverse causality
could cause institutions to be endogenous since large trade volumes and historical
trade flows could improve the quality of public institutions as well via spillover effects
and knowledge transfers.1
A valid and relevant instrument is difficult to find. Existing instruments like for
example settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001) are often limited to few countries
and few – if not only one – years. Using these instruments would reduce the benefits
of our rich panel dataset. Other instruments that are primarily applied in growth
regressions are the population share of English speaking people (Hall et al., 1999)
or geography-based instruments like distance to the equator (Bénassy-Quéré et al.,
2007). However, most of them have been criticised as well, for example for weak
first-stage results in particular settings.
We address potential endogeneity by using the one-year lag of WGI. At the first
place, there is no argument why current trade flows should affect WGI one year ago.2
This identification strategy has been used in previous studies as well. Dollar et al.
(2003) for example instrument changes in institutional quality with the one-year lag
as explanatory variable in growth regressions.3
1See Chapter 5 in which we explicitly use these spillover effects and knowledge transfers as argu-
ments for an instrumental variable approach.
2We discuss in Chapter 5 under which conditions this assumption is invalid.
3However, their empirical approach of using regressions based on growth rates instead of levels
has been questioned by (Pritchett, 2003).
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4.3.5 Econometric model and estimation procedure
In order to test the hypotheses econometrically, a structural gravity model is esti-
mated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator to account
for heteroscedasticity and the high share of zeros (36%) as the two most serious em-
pirical challenges in gravity modelling (Santos Silva et al., 2006; Santos Silva et al.,
2011). Although other estimators can be in principal superior under specific circum-
stances (Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013), the PPML estimator has been widely applied in
recent years and therefore constitutes in our eyes the current state-of-the-art.
The PPML estimator does not rely on a linear model, which allows to use trade data
in its non-logarithmic form as the dependent variable. Hence, zeros remain in the
data set and are not eliminated as the log-transformation requires in linear models.
Thus, Xijpt denotes bilateral imports of country j from country i of product p in year
t. The final estimation equation is given as:
Xijpt = exp(β0 + β1WGIit−1 + β2WGIit−1 ∗DEU + β3WGIit−1 ∗DEU ∗DProduct
+ β4lnGDPit + β5lnGDPjt + β6lnDistij + β7ln(Tijpt + 1)
+ β8Ωij + ηi + νj + δp + µt) + εijpt
(4.2)
GDPs of the importing as well as of the exporting country are used as proxies for the
economic size of both trading partners whereas distance is used as proxy for trade
costs. Country-pair and product-specific ad-valorem equivalent tariffs Tijpt are in-
cluded as well. Furthermore, the matrix Ωij contains additional dummies as trade
costs proxies, namely colonial ties, common language, common border, and religion
(compare Table C.4). Importer-, exporter-, product-, and year-fixed effects are in-
cluded to control for multilateral resistance (Anderson et al., 2003; Head et al., 2014).
Ideally, time-dimensional fixed effects for exporters and importers would also have to
be added to the estimation equation in order to control for time-varying multilateral
resistance. However, this is computationally not feasible because it would leave the
dummies for institutional quality redundant, since they do not vary according to p.
Instead of time-dimension fixed effects, we therefore apply the Taylor series approxi-
mation of Baier et al. (2010) as a robustness check.
In order to test the effect of institutional quality on exporters’ ability to implement
more demanding standards, it is assumed that the EU constitutes an example of a
market with relatively high standards. For this purpose, institutional quality of the
previous year of the exporting country is interacted with the dummy DEU (unity for
tradeflows towards the EU) and a product dummy for product p.
This specification allows to test whether product-specific effects of institutional qual-
ity exist regarding exports to the EU as an example of a market with relatively
demanding product standards. The one-year lag of WGI is furthermore used in order
to address potential endogeneity due to reverse causality. This specification is also
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plausible because the process of implementing a new standard, and obtaining EU
approval for it, would typically take several months, if not years.
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 reports the results of four different specifications of the econometric model
outlined in Equation 4.2. In columns one and two, importer-, exporter-, product- and
year-fixed effects are used to control for multilateral resistance whereas coefficients
in columns three and four are obtained by using the Baier and Bergstrand approach
including product dummies. Furthermore, both equations have been estimated with
and without distinguishing between products through the interaction term of β3. In
column one, the partial effect of WGI, which is the sum of β1 and β2 is close to zero
which indicates on average no effect of WGI on trade in this specification.
The interpretation of further estimated coefficients is overall in line with the litera-
ture of gravity models on trade in general: negative and large effects of tariffs and
distance on trade flows are found occurring together with positive effects of income
of the importing country as well as from sharing a border.
The dummies for different agri-food products reveal that higher levels of institutional
quality (WGI) increase c.p. on average exports of dairy products to the EU but are
negatively associated with exports of fruits. Exports of meat, vegetables, and fish are
not affected by WGI. In contrast to column one, the Baier and Bergstrand approach
in column three reveals a partial effect of WGI on exports in general, but to the EU
in particular. In addition, the coefficient of tariffs declines from -2.261 to -1.080. The
coefficient of the exporting country’s GDP becomes statistically significant, and so
do the coefficients for former colony and religion, respectively. These findings are
complemented by a positive and statistically significant effect for dairy, meat, and
vegetable products. The coefficients for exports of fruits (negative), and fish (not
statistically significant) remain as in the model in column two.
Thus, results overall suggest a trade-increasing effect of WGI in particular to the
EU as a market (that we have used as an example of a market with relatively high
trade-related standards) for the agri-food products in question. This implies that
hypothesis one cannot be rejected based on the results in Table 4.2.
However, the overall positive effect of institutions on agri-food exports to the EU
cannot be generalised across product categories. Instead, WGI turns out to be es-
pecially relevant for exports of dairy and meat products. These products of animal
origin provided examples of mostly process quality related standards. The effect of
governance indicators on the export of fish and fish products to the EU is insignifi-
cant throughout, and the positive and significant effect of WGI on vegetable exports
appears in only one of two model specifications. For fruits, the observed effect is even
negative, implying that countries with relatively well-functioning public institutions
according to the WGI are less likely to export fruits to the EU.
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Table 4.2: Regression results - dependent variable: Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PPML PPML PPML-BB PPML-BB
WGI_1 -0.0291* -0.0202 -0.00516 -9.34e-05
(0.0173) (0.0144) (0.00740) (0.00756)
WGI_EU_1 0.0230 0.00955 0.132*** 0.0112











lnAdvalorem_Tariff -1.870*** -2.261*** -0.672*** -1.080***
(0.632) (0.626) (0.198) (0.202)
lnGDP_Exporter 0.0500 0.0466 0.384*** 0.394***
(0.0408) (0.0443) (0.00539) (0.00539)
lnGDP_Importer 0.887*** 0.876*** 0.692*** 0.697***
(0.0449) (0.0460) (0.00525) (0.00528)
lnDist -0.800*** -0.803*** -0.708*** -0.700***
(0.0469) (0.0466) (0.0127) (0.0124)
Contig 0.699*** 0.690*** 0.671*** 0.671***
(0.137) (0.135) (0.0435) (0.0431)
Comlang_off 0.102 0.105 -0.197*** 0.207***
(0.123) (0.121) (0.0357) (0.0351)
Colony 0.0954 0.0883 0.131*** 0.158***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.0346) (0.0338)
Constant -11.24*** -11.00*** -13.31*** -13.74***
(1.479) (1.659) (0.222) (0.223)
Observations 512,257 511,055 512,257 511,055
R-squared 0.369 0.410 0.261 0.297
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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This finding is interesting because the gravity equation has already controlled for the
fact that some former colonies of EU member states have traditionally strong trade
relations to the EU. Some of these countries at the same time happen to be both ex-
porters of tropical fruit and examples of particular poor public institutions. Beyond
that, the results suggest that rather low scores on the WGI may still constitute a
source of comparative advantage for the export of fruits, but not vegetables.
From the perspective of the EU food inspection agency, this result might potentially
be worrisome, given that one explanation could be that for major food products cer-
tain stages of the approval process could be subject to corruption. Alternatively, the
result may point that socioeconomic circumstances such as market power along fruit
chains, oppression of seasonal farm workers or other issues that may be more widely
spread under poorly functioning public institutions while at the same time leading to
more competitive exports of fruits.
Thus, regarding our second hypothesis, it is difficult to argue whether higher SAA
indeed favours exporting those agri-food products for which standard implementation
is relatively more demanding than for other agri-food products. Instead, our find-
ings show that especially the process quality -related standards in case of dairy and
meat products clearly benefit from better public institutions, and this may indeed
contribute to higher SAA. The negative coefficient on fruit exports however shows
that in reality, this effect may for specific agri-food products be dominated by export
competitiveness that is rather due to especially low quality public institutions.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We find an overall positive effect of institutional quality on countries’ exports to the
EU as a market with relatively strict standards. This implies that our hypothesis ac-
cording to which institutional quality facilitates firm’s ability to solve export related
problems cannot be rejected. Furthermore, once interaction terms with dummies
that mark product-specific exports are introduced, our results show that institutional
quality is only trade increasing for dairy products and meat, as examples of product
categories with rather process quality related standards.
In contrast, the rather product quality related standards in the area of fish, fruits
and vegetable exports do not confirm this finding. Dairy and meat products tend
to show more processing stages and more intensive monitoring through the EU and
more difficult approval procedures for producing firms and processing factories in the
exporting country than for the case of fruits and vegetables on average.
We interpret these results as empirical support for our second hypothesis, accord-
ing to which standard implementation problems tend to be more difficult to solve
for firms in product categories that exhibit more complex steps of the corresponding
supply chains. However, our evidence regarding the second hypothesis is more mixed
than concerning the first one.
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Regarding predictions of the New New Trade Theory, these findings suggest that
two firms with otherwise identical productivity that are producing identical product
varieties but having to operate in two different institutional environments, will face
different probabilities of succeeding in the implementation of EU standards.
If one assumes that the EU is an example of presumably rather higher than average
product standards, our analysis furthermore suggests that even within the agri-food
sector the effect of institutions on export performance varies according to the type
of product. This is according to our analysis due to the fact that market access
is (in terms of required problem-solving capacity) comparatively difficult to achieve
for exporters in agri-food products of higher processing order. We explain this find-
ing as the result of trade-related standards for these products being relatively more
knowledge-intensive and therefore relatively more affected by a lack of institutional
quality in the exporting country than is the case for less knowledge intensive products.
With respect to the discussion of standards as trade catalyst versus trade barriers, our
results reject any across the board conclusion and rather highlight that these effects
will be highly product specific in therefore inseparable from the specific agri-food
supply chain in question. Regarding the fixed cost character of standards, our results
show that it is necessary to interpret these fixed cost not only in terms of required
investment for laboratories and processing plants, but also in terms of private sector
human capital and public sector institutional quality.
Especially the latter two have according to our results to go hand-in-hand in order
to create not only necessary but sufficient conditions for agri-food exporting firms to
succeed in high quality and potentially high-value export markets.
Future research needs to extend the list of included products. Moreover, other des-
tination markets with relatively strict standards such the USA or Japan would be
worthwhile to analyse. More robustness checks regarding endogeneity of WGI are
also required. Although we do control for income, it would be interesting to know to
what extent these findings differ by the income level of the exporting country.
Due to the diverse effects of WGI on exports we conclude that aid-for-trade pro-
grammes should focus on building up production capacities of agricultural products
which are relatively complex to produce. Although we do not distinguish between
the extensive and intensive margin of trade, our findings suggest that improving the
quality of public institutions could increase the relatively low number of exporting
countries of complex products. Hence, this discussion relates to the conclusion of
the previous Chapter 3 in the sense that a sufficient number of exporting countries is
desirable to avoid potential market failures due to too concentrated markets. In other
words, higher quality of public institutions would not only increase exports of these
products but also reduce the risk of too concentrated agricultural export market by
making the integration of countries into global value chains more likely.
To what extent (private) standards are a useful policy tool to increase exports of
relatively complex agricultural products, is subject of the analysis of the subsequent
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Chapter 5. It complements findings of this chapter because it investigates the effect
of an important private food standard on exports of processed food standards.
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5 The role of private standards
for manufactured food exports
from developing countries
Abstract:
The relevance of non-tariff barriers for global trade flows has increased in recentdecades. However, the effect of food standards – as a particular important non-
tariff measure – on agricultural trade flows remains unclear. We contribute to the
debate with a unique dataset that contains the number of food processing firms of
88 countries from 2008 to 2013 that are certified with the International Featured
Standard (IFS). We estimate a gravity-model using the one-year lag of IFS as well
as IFS certification in neighbouring countries as an instrument to address potential
endogeneity. We find that IFS increases c.p. bilateral exports on average of seven
agricultural product categories in both specifications. The effect is more pronounced
for high-income countries compared to low income countries. Hence, whereas IFS
increases exports on average, the trade-enhancing effect remains only for high-income
countries. We argue that food standards are not necessarily a suitable development
tool to integrate low-income countries into high-value chains per se because high-
income countries benefit more in terms of trade flows than low-income countries.
Moreover, we contribute to the debate about food standards and trade by specifying
the nature of IFS and – based upon our theoretical model of Chapter 2 – under which
circumstances food standards enhance or reduce agricultural trade.
This chapter is joint work with Axel Mangelsdorf. An earlier version is under revision at World
Development.
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manuscript. Axel Mangelsdorf provided the dataset, excluding instrumental variables and tariffs.
Acknowledgements: We are thankful for comments of Marie-Luise Rau and other participants
of the ETSG conference in Helsinki 2016, and for valuable comments of Bernhard Brümmer, Miet
Maertens, Insa Flachsbarth, and Katharina Krumbiegel.
52 Chapter 5. The role of private standards for food exports from developing countries
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 already emphasises the increasing relevance of public but also of private
food standards for international trade. While public standards, set by public au-
thorities, are usually mandatory and legally enforceable, private standards are set by
the private sector which often have a wider scope than only food safety (Schuster
et al., 2015) and are on average more restrictive (Fulponi, 2006). As a result, the ef-
fect of private standards on trade is likely to differ from the effect of public standards.
The debate of “standards-as-catalyst and standards-as-barriers” has been described
in Section 1.2. The different types of standards, like public vs. private, are likely to
constitute one source for the heterogeneous findings in empirical literature. There-
fore, this chapter contributes to the debate by analysing the effects of IFS on trade
as one particular and important private standard for processed food products.
For example, compliance with private standards can be more costly due to the higher
degree of restrictiveness on average (Fulponi, 2006) which would support the trade-
barriers view. In contrast to MRLs (see Chapter 3), private standards affect trade
via additional channels: first, private standards might be more capable to signal high
product quality and hence, might be more likely to meet preferences of modern con-
sumers. If small-scale farmers are given the opportunity to enter global value chains
by certifying their products with GlobalGAP, Fairtrade, or other certificates, they are
more capable to convince western consumers about the quality of their agricultural
products. Second, private standards might reduce transaction costs of producers and
within value chains overall (David et al., 1990). This is in particular relevant for
IFS. It is an important B2B-standard that was established by German and French
retailers to harmonise standards within value chains. This objective of western re-
tailers explicitly addresses transaction costs. Thus, compliance with IFS is likely to
reduce transaction costs and hence, facilitates integration within value chains which
finally c.p. increases trade flows. Therefore, we expect IFS to increase trade flows in
contrast to other standards like MRLs.
The potential ability of private standards to integrate small-scale farmers from de-
veloping countries into global value chains makes them a complementary tool for
development strategies (Swinnen, 2007; Swinnen et al., 2015; Colen et al., 2012).
Since standards potentially reduce market failures due to lower information asymme-
tries, food standards might be more relevant for developing countries in particular
(Jaffee et al., 2004). If private food standards are found to increase exports of de-
veloping countries, this would have important policy implications. In addition to the
poverty reducing effect due to larger trade volumes, food standards would facilitate
equal access to global agricultural export markets. The latter is important from a
global perspective since it improves the functionality and benefit of global markets
for all participants.
Moreover, there are potential additional benefits at the firm level. Since trade is not
only welfare-enhancing via lower consumer prices, export sectors are on average also
the most competitive sectors in a country. Thus, exporting firms earn on average
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higher profits, employ a larger number of workers, and pay higher wages than non-
exporting firms worldwide (Mayer et al., 2007). Colen et al. (2012) provide empirical
support that this pattern occurs in developing countries as well. In the context of
GlobalGAP certification in Senegal, the authors show that exporting firms are impor-
tant drivers for job creation and productivity spillovers which underlines the potential
of private food standards as a development policy tool.
Because of their private nature, data on private standards are more difficult to obtain
than for public standards which are often publicly available. As a result, private
standards are less frequently analysed. Using firm-level data of the Peruvian aspara-
gus sector Schuster et al. (2015) cannot confirm that BRC, IFS, and other private
standards act as catalyst to trade. Although private standards are on average more
stringent than public standards (Fulponi, 2006), these have nevertheless the potential
to increase agricultural trade. Masood et al. (2014) find that GlobalGAP certifica-
tion increases banana imports of the EU. The trade enhancing effect of GlobalGAP
certification is also found by Colen et al., 2012 for mango and bean producers in
Senegal which have larger export market shares and larger export volumes than non-
certified firms. The differential effect of voluntary private standards compared to
public standards on trade is also emphasised by Shepherd et al. (2013) who find that
EU harmonised standards, that are equivalent to ISO norms, can even enhance trade.
Eventually, Mangelsdorf et al. (2012) estimate the effect of Chinese public and private
standards and also find a trade-enhancing impact. The latter was most pronounced
for internationally harmonised standards.
Overall, few studies exist that analyse the effect of private food standards on agri-
cultural trade. Moreover, existing analyses use either cross-sectional data (Latouche
et al., 2015) or are based on data which are limited to specific cases. This ques-
tions external validity as emphasised by Beghin et al. (2015). Major challenges are
the quantification of private standards and data availability. Most studies do not
allow to draw general conclusions because they are based on very few products and
countries. Furthermore, endogeneity of the standard variable arises as a result of
reverse causality. A correct identification of the causal impact requires to distin-
guish whether it is certification that enhances trade or whether trade increases the
likelihood of certification. Finally, a correct specification of the empirical framework
requires to account for recent developments in the field of gravity modeling which
became the workhorse model in empirical trade analysis (Head et al., 2014).
We address these shortcomings, first, with a unique dataset which was obtained via
the IFS auditing database. In contrast to previous studies on private standards and
trade, the dataset is rich in all dimensions: It contains more than 50,000 audits
from about 12,000 companies in 88 countries for seven agricultural product cate-
gories including a time-span of six years from 2008 to 2013. Second, we apply a
novel instrumental variable approach which we consider to be superior compared to
the standard method of taking a one-year lag which is not appropriate if the errors
are autocorrelated. Third, we estimate a gravity model via PPML which accounts
for high share of zeros and heteroskedasticity (Santos Silva et al., 2006; Santos Silva
et al., 2011). Furthermore, we apply the Baier-Bergstrand method to address multi-
lateral resistance (Baier et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2003). This approach allows us
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to contribute to the debate whether standards act as barriers or catalyst to trade.
We find that IFS certification as a private standard increases bilateral trade flows
in general which illustrates the trade increasing potential of IFS. However, the effect
remains robust only for high-income countries while effects are unclear for low-income
countries once we distinguish by income groups. This finding has important policy
implications. Although IFS certification increases trade on average, only high-income
countries benefit in contrast to low-income countries. This finding reduces the po-
tential of food standards as a development tool to integrate developing countries into
the world trade system.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides additional
informational background on IFS certification. The subsequent Section 5.3 explains
the PPML-estimation and the instrumental variable approach in particular including
the control-function approach. Section 5.4 shows the results, which are discussed
within the research context in Section 5.5.
5.2 IFS background and trends
The increasing complexity of agricultural value chains due to fragmentation and spe-
cialisation increases the necessity for sufficient transparency within value chains. Re-
tailers need to guarantee quality and food safety of the products that they sell, but
which they do not produce themselves. Moreover, to ensure the enforcement of legal
contracts it is crucial to have transparent responsibilities at every stage within a value
chain. Therefore, the association of the German retail sector HDE1 found together
with the French counterpart FCD2 the initially named International Food Standard
in 2003. The IFS is applicable at every stage of a value chain apart from agricultural
raw products. This private standard – today the International Featured Standard –
avoids that each retailer is required to test whether their suppliers meet the imposed
standards or not. Instead, retailers agreed on the same standards. These standards
are continuously modified in collaboration with the retail sector. Hereby, most regula-
tions go beyond usual food safety standards (International featured standard, 2016).
The overall objectives are twofold: first, IFS ensures comparability, transparency, and
quality for the consumer within a complete value chain. Second, it aims to reduce
costs for the retail sector and their suppliers by harmonizing standards. Apart from
the UK, where the BRC is the most relevant food standard certification body, all
major retailers within Europe are member of the IFS3 which also certifies in other
fields like logistics for example.
IFS does not certify products and food manufactures directly but rather via third
party certification bodies which takes place on average once a year. All retailers that
accept the IFS have access to these audit reports of their suppliers via an online
database. In addition, all certified producers have access as well. But apart, access
1Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels
2Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution
3Metro Group, Edeka, Rewe Group, Aldi, Lidl, Kaufland, Kaiser’s Tengelmann, Auchan, Carre-
four Group, EMC – Groupe Casino, Leclerc, Monoprix, Picard, Surgelés, Provera (Cora and Super-
machés Match), Système U, COOP, CONAD und Unes.
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to the database and information concerning audit reports and other confidential data
is not possible.
Moreover, it is not only the availability of IFS data that makes our analysis distinct
from previous studies. As a post-farm gate standard, which needs to be distinguished
from pre-farm gate standards like GlobalGAP that certify agricultural raw products,
IFS certifies processed food. These manufactured food products yield a higher value-
added than non-processed food products. Hence, certification with IFS is expected
to generate even higher profit than other standards (Colen et al., 2012).
We consider our data set as unique since it contains the number of certificates per
country and product from 2008 to 2013. The amount of certification is an indicator
for the relevance of IFS within a country. The about 12,000 food manufacturing
companies are located in 88 countries including 53 developing countries.4 The total
number of certification increased from about 4,000 in 2008 to almost 12,000 certifi-
cates in 2013. Europe is the major hub of IFS certification, see Figure 5.1. Numbers
increased especially in Asia and Europe from 2008 to 2013 by almost 500% and about
100% respectively. The unequal distribution of IFS with Europe being the most rel-
evant region is displayed in the world map in Figure 5.1 as well.























































Source: IFS Audit Database
(a) Numbers of certificates per continent (b) Number of certificates worldwide
Moreover, Figure 5.2 underlines some regional patterns regarding the correlation be-
tween exports and income. Countries with more IFS certification tend to have higher
exports with central European countries leading both IFS and exports. Similarly,
richer countries have more certified producers on average. Both patterns naturally
reflect the dominance of central European countries.
4All products and countries including HS classification are listed in Tables D.1 and D.2 respec-
tively.
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Figure 5.2: Regional aspects of IFS (2)
(a) IFS and exports (b) IFS and per capita income
5.3 Model specification
5.3.1 Data
Since we are predominantly interested in the effect of IFS as an important private
standard on bilateral trade flows, IFS is our main variable of interest. As highlighted
by Head et al. (2014), the gravity model became the “workhorse model” in empirical
trade analysis. The required variables are explained briefly:
Bilateral trade in current US Dollar from UN Comtrade is the dependent variable for
seven different product categories: egg products, meat, fruits and vegetables, bakery
products, dairy products, and beverages. We use seven importing countries in which
IFS is widely applied: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and
Switzerland, see Table D.2. In addition to total export values per product, Figure 5.3
also displays the export performance per continent. Hereby, we use an index equal to
100 for the year 2008. Exports declined for all four continents until 2009 due to the
economic and financial crisis, peaked in 2011 and mostly increased again for 2013.
Asia is the only continent that performed worse in 2013 compared to 2011. Exports
overall increased by 11% and Europe is the best performing continent with increasing
exports of 15%.
The remaining variables are of standard gravity nature: we include the logarithm of
GDP in current US-Dollar from the World Bank as proxies for the economic mass
of both trading partners. Proxies for trade costs like distance, language, and colony
are obtained from CEPII whereas ad-valorem tariffs come from the ITC. Descriptive
statistics are provided in Table 5.1. In total, we use 146,091 observations from which
58% of the deflated export observations are equal to zero.
Since IFS was particularly designed by modern retailers and therefore, for high value
chains, we expect IFS to have high values of θ - the “ease” to address preferences of
modern consumers. Thus, compliance with IFS allows producers to sell their products
at high-value markets. We expect IFS to allow producers to make their products
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Figure 5.3: Exports per product and continent
































(b) Export performance (2008=100)
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP_Exporter (WDI, current US-D, logs) 146,091 25.207 1.967 20.563 30.305
GDP_Importer (WDI, current US-D, logs) 148,131 27.520 .843 26.491 28.758
Distance (CEPII, logs) 148,131 8.044 1.085 4.088 9.740
Exports (UN Comtrade) 148,131 4,324.555 29,524.54 0 1,343,673
Exports (UN Comtrade, deflated) 146,091 37.519 263.816 0 12509.41
RTA (CEPII) 148131 .2424611 .4285731 0 1
Language (CEPII) 148131 .0847291 .278479 0 1
Colony (CEPII) 148131 .0332 .180 0 1
Tariff (ITC, logs) 148131 .052 .136 0 1.643
IFS certification (IFS Audit database) 148,131 13.829 52.373 0 694
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distinct from others. This is a crucial difference to public mandatory standards like
MRLs since these need to be met in any case. Based on this argumentation, we
expect IFS to increase trade. However, compliance costs might still be too high such
that developing countries might not be able to benefit from IFS as an opportunity
to gain access to high-value markets. Hence, we expect differential effects of IFS on
trade depending on the income level of the country of origin.
5.3.2 The benchmark specification
The estimation strategy of gravity models in international trade needs to address
several empirical challenges. The model needs to account for multilateral resistance
(Anderson et al., 2003), high share of zeros (Helpman et al., 2008), and heteroskedas-
ticity (Santos Silva et al., 2006; Santos Silva et al., 2011) in particular. Country-year
fixed effects are frequently used to account for multilateral resistance. However, this
approach becomes computationally difficult the larger the data set becomes in terms
of countries and years included. Alternatively, Baier et al. (2010) propose a different
method which adjusts all trade cost proxies in such a way that multilateral resistance
does not differ across countries. We chose country-, year-, and product fixed effects
as our baseline specification as well as the Baier-Bergstrand method. Mainly because
country-year fixed effects are computationally difficult but also because multilateral
resistance is less likely to change over time during the relatively short time period
of five years, we expect country- and year fixed effects to capture multilateral resis-
tance well. Moreover, we estimate a multiplicative gravity model with PPML (Santos
Silva et al., 2006) which does not require to take logs of the dependent variable and
therefore, does not drop zeros. In addition, it is robust to heteroskedasticity which
is usually present in trade data. The final model of the benchmark specification is
defined as follows:
Xijpt =exp(β0 + β1lnIFSipt−1 + β2lnGDPit + β3lnGDPjt + β4lnDistij
+ β5lnTariffijpt + β6Languageij + β7Colonyij + β8Contiguityij
+ β9RTAijt + µi + νj + λt + υp)ηijpt
(5.1)
Xijpt denotes deflated exports from country i to country j of product p in year
t. IFS represents the number of certifications in the exporting country and is the
main variable of interest. However, IFS is likely to be endogenous because of reverse
causality. Certification might not only increase trade flows due to the beforehand
explained reasons. Vice versa, products might be more likely to be certified if trade
flows are high. Therefore, in the benchmark specification IFS is introduced as a
one-year lag to address partially endogeneity due to reverse causality.
5.3.3 An instrumental variable approach
Because of the above mentioned reverse causality, we expect IFS to be endogenous.
The lag of IFS as an instrument for IFS does not solve the endogoneity problem if
the errors ηijpt are autocorrelated.
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E (IFSiptηijpt) 6= 0
If the one-year lag of IFS was exogenous, it should not be correlated with the error
term:
E (IFSipt−1ηijpt) = 0
This argument is based on the assumption that IFS itself is correlated over time but
the errors are not. However, in the presence of autocorrelation the one-year lag is not
a valid IV:
ηijpt = ρ1ηijpt−1 + ιijpt
If the coefficient ρ̂1 is significantly different from zero, the error terms are autocorre-
lated and the exogeneity assumption of IFSijpt−1 does not hold. If IFS is correlated
with the current error term, it is also correlated with its lag if the errors are auto-
correlated. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation rejects the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation for all usual significance levels. Therefore, an additional identification
strategy is required.
IFS certification in neighbouring countries as an instrument
Applying an instrumental variable approach allows to address the endogeneity of IFS
if a valid instrument is available. Relevance and excludability are the two key re-
quirements of a valid instrument. An instrument is relevant if it explains sufficient
variation of the endogenous variable. This relevance-condition can be tested em-
pirically for example via partial R-squared of the first-stage estimation. In contrast,
excludability (or strict exogeneity) as the second condition is not testable and requires
arguments based on economic theory. An instrument is excludable if it affects the
outcome variable only through the endogenous variable. This requirement makes it
difficult and sometimes impossible to find a valid instrument. As we will argue in the
following, the total number of IFS certified producers in all neighbouring countries of
a particular exporting country i meets both requirements.5
This instrument has been used previously in the context of genetically modified organ-
isms (GMO) regulation and trade (Vigani et al., 2012). The authors use the weighted
average of GMO indices of the five closest neighbours to avoid biased estimates due
to endogeneity. The estimated negative effect on trade due to GMO regulation even
increases in magnitude compared to the non-IV specification. In a similar approach,
Djankov et al. (2010) use export delay of neighbouring countries as an instrument of
5We used modern grocery distribution as an instrument in an earlier version of the paper. However,
the prevalence of modern grocery stores is correlated with income which is – by definition of gravity –
a determinant of trade. As a result, we make use of a different instrument which is explained below.
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domestic trade time.
Using specific characteristics of neighbours as instruments is well established in par-
ticular at the micro-level. For example Chege et al. (2015, p.398) use the “number
of supermarket farmers among the five nearest neighbours” as an instrument for su-
permarket participation of a particular farmer. Based on Maertens et al. (2013), the
authors argue that social interactions within a neighbourhood of farmers determine
adoption behaviour of modern agricultural technologies. These effects and mecha-
nisms are also present and verifiable at the macro-level. There is empirical evidence
for the relevance of neighbours for exports of a particular country. Kamal et al.
(2016) show that firms of an exporting country i are more likely to establish trade
relationships with firms in an importing country j if firms of a neighbouring country
of i have already well established relationships with firms in j. The authors discuss
various channels like knowledge transfer in terms of destination-specific cultural and
business norms as well as legal requirements. A second channel refers to cost-sharing
like reducing search- and matching costs between sellers and buyers. Both channels
are particularly relevant in the presence of imperfect information. These spillover-
effects of neighbouring exporters are especially important for the exporting decision
(extensive margin), but less relevant for export volume per firm (intensive margin)
(Koenig et al., 2010). The authors refer this difference to the varying relevance of
fixed- and variable trade-costs. Thus, spillover-effects due to exporting neighbours
reduce barriers to trade which are a result of fixed costs. This makes these finding
interesting for the debate of standards and trade. Moreover, the effect is stronger at
disaggregated levels like product- and destination-dimensions than at the aggregate
level. Summing up, there is empirical support in related literature that export deci-
sions of firms within a country are influenced by firms in neighbouring countries.
Networks between these firms facilitate knowledge transfer which we could directly
link to compliance with standards like IFS. As shown in Chapter 4, not only mone-
tary costs determine compliance but also non-monetary costs which emphasises the
important role of knowledge transfers. Thus, we argue that the extent of compli-
ance with a particular standard in a country affects the likelihood of compliance in a
neighbouring country.
Figure 5.4 supports this argument. It shows the positive correlation between the en-
dogenous variables IFS certification and the instrument which is defined as the sum
of IFS certification in all neighbouring countries. The correlation is most pronounced
in Western European countries like Germany, France (the initiators of IFS) but lower
in Easter European countries like Ukraine, Belarus, Albania, and Armenia. However,
note that some countries do have neighbours for which we do not have any IFS ob-
servation. Nevertheless, the correlation between both measures is equal to 0.51. To
conclude, we are confident that the instrument is relevant and therefore, meets the
first requirement.
The exclusion restriction requires the instrument to affect exports only via the en-
dogenous variable. In contrast to the benchmark specification, reverse causality is
not a problem in this IV specification. There is no plausible argument why exports
of a country should influence compliance with IFS in neighbouring countries. Fur-
thermore, there is also no channel through which IFS in neighbouring countries could
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Figure 5.4: Scatter plot of number of IFS certification in exporting country i and the
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affect exports apart from IFS of the country itself. The extent of IFS certification in
a country does neither affect for example GDP of its neighbour nor tariffs or other
determinants of exports of their neighbour. Instead, domestic borders are exogenous
such that countries cannot self-select themselves towards specific neighbours.
The control-function approach
We modify our estimation strategy of Section 5.3.2 by including an instrumental
variable via the “control function approach” as proposed by Wooldridge (2010) and
Martínez-Zarzoso (2015).
IFS is the endogenous variable whereas the vector Z denotes all exogenous variables
from which Z1 is a sub-vector. These are the standard gravity variables like GDP,
distance and other trade cost proxies.
Xijpt = Z1δ1 + α1IFSipt + uijpt (5.2)
The exogeneity assumption can be expressed as follows:
E(Z′1u) = 0 (5.3)
Consequently, the reduced form for IFS is:
IFSijpt = Zπ2 + εijpt (5.4)
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where Z includes Z1 as well as IFS of neigbours as an instrument. The residuals ε̂ijpt
of this first stage regression are needed for the linear projection of the residuals of
Equation 5.2 uijpt on these residuals of the first stage εijpt.
uijpt = ρ2εijpt + φijpt (5.5)
Ultimately, we plug Equation 5.5 into Equation 5.2 to obtain the final control function:
Xijpt = Z1δ1 + α1IFSijpt + ρ2εijpt + φijpt (5.6)
If the estimate ρ̂2 is significantly different from zero, we can conclude that IFS is ac-
tually endogenous. If IFS was exogenous, there would not be any variation within the
reduced form residuals that explain variation of exports in the control function be-
cause variation of IFS is completely explained by the vector of exogenous variables Z.
As robustness, we also estimate the IV approach with General Methods of Moments.
5.4 Results
We estimate the effect of IFS on trade by using three different methods: first, ppml
without IV and two models with IV which are estimated via the control function
approach and GMM. Furthermore, we estimate these models at the aggregate level
(Table 5.2), by income group of the exporting country (Table 5.3), and finally by prod-
uct at the sectoral level (Table D.3 in the appendix). This section presents all results.
Column one of Table 5.2 shows coefficients of the benchmark specification which is
estimated via ppml and the one-year lag of IFS certification. The coefficient is equal
to 0.568 is interpreted as elasticity and it is statistical significant. Thus, a one per
cent increase of IFS certification increases country i’s exports c.p. by 0.568 per cent
on average. Other elasticities match general findings obtained via ppml within the
gravity framework. Coefficients of GDP-variables are statistically significant and be-
low unity. In contrast, distance and tariffs reduce trade whereas other trade costs
proxies language, colonial relationship are contiguity are trade enhancing. The coeffi-
cient of regional trade agreement is equal to 1.4 which implies an economic magnitude
of 300%.6 An increase in exports of 300% if a regional trade agreement is signed, is
not plausible.
Column two contains estimates of the IV regression via the control function approach.
Most are remarkably similar compared with the non-IV method. The IFS-coefficient
is about same magnitude equaling 0.518. The few differences are that tariffs and
language become statistically insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient of RTA, which
was unreasonably high in the benchmark specification in column one, is now equal to
0.815. This implies that is expected to increase by 122% which is still high neverthe-
less. Column three and four belong to the control function approach. Column three
shows estimates of the first stage which indicates the indeed high relevance of IFS
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neighbouring countries for IFS certification itself. The statistical significant constant
ρ2 in column four means that IFS certification is indeed endogenous, see Equation
5.5. Finally, GMM results are shown in column five. Again, most coefficients remain
similar. The effect of IFS on trade is slightly higher now (0.635). Summing up, IFS is
statistically and economically significant in all three specifications. IFS-certification
increases exports c.p. on average by about 0.5 and 0.6 per cent if certification in-
creases by one per cent.
However, results differ by income of the exporting country. Table 5.3 shows coef-
ficients of the benchmark specification (columns one, five, and eight) as well as of
the discussed IV specifications. We distinguish between high-income, upper-middle
income, and low-income groups (see Table D.2). The effect of IFS on trade is positive
and statistically significant in the benchmark specification for all income groups. The
effect is largest for high-income countries and lowest for upper-middle income coun-
tries. However, the effect remains similar in IV models for the high-income group but
switches in sign for the upper-middle income group. In fact, the coefficient equals
-1.649 which is extremely large. A GMM estimate is not available here due to conver-
gence problems. Moreover, IFS is found to have no effect on exports of low-income
countries according to both IV models. Coefficients of distance are unusually large.
First-stage results are large in particular for high-income and upper-middle income
group which underlines the high relevance of the IV.
Because our dataset also allows to distinguish by sector, we estimate all estimations
also at the sectoral level (Table D.3). Due to convergence problems, IV estimates
based on GMM are not available for eggs and dairy-products. IFS increases c.p.
exports of all seven product categories apart from fish where results are mixed. Ex-
ports of bakery products increase in particular due to IFS certification. Estimates of
beverages, egg, meat, and FV products remain mostly between 0.4 and 0.6 which is
of similar magnitude as at the aggregate level. Only the GMM estimator of FV is
higher with a value of 0.8. According to the control function approach, exports of
dairy products increase drastically as IFS certification increases. The negative coef-
ficient on fish exports in the control function approach remains to be discussed (see
Section 5.5 below). The GMM model shows the expected positive sign of reasonable
magnitude.
5.5 Discussion and conclusion
After the plain description of the results, this section discusses and interprets the
obtained findings. Several aspects ask for deeper discussion.
Interpreation of negative standards coefficients
First, the IFS coefficients for exports of fish is negative in the control function ap-
proach. Although the coefficient is positive in the GMM-model which makes a final
interpretation difficult, it remains worth discussing what a negative coefficient would
mean in this context. Therefore, it is important to highlight the different nature of
standards proxies that we use in this Chapter and in Chapter 3. In the latter, stan-
dards are applied in terms of mandatory and legal minimum requirements of food
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Table 5.2: The effect of IFS on trade at the aggregate level: Results of ppml and IV
estimations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ppml - no IV IV (cfa) IV (cfa, 1st) ρ2 IV (gmm)
IFS_lag 0.568***
(0.014)
lnGDP_Importer 0.731*** 0.836*** -0.023* 0.757***
(0.023) (0.053) (0.014) (0.054)
lnGDP_Exporter 0.385*** 0.607*** 0.435*** 0.343***
(0.014) (0.041) (0.007) (0.042)
lnDist -0.861*** -0.798*** 0.011 -0.851***
(0.054) (0.094) (0.034) (0.121)
lnTariff -0.741*** 0.213 -0.235*** -0.367**
(0.149) (0.412) (0.074) (0.169)
Comlang_ethno 0.735*** 0.070 -0.028 0.788***
(0.066) (0.189) (0.061) (0.148)
Colony 0.208** 0.543** 0.002 0.218
(0.095) (0.236) (0.065) (0.217)
Contig 0.251*** 0.867*** 0.022 0.211
(0.068) (0.149) (0.054) (0.146)
RTA 1.400*** 0.815*** 0.027 1.363***
(0.112) (0.152) (0.053) (0.248)
D_Bakery 0.249*** 0.080 -0.024 0.278**
(0.059) (0.141) (0.066) (0.130)
D_Beverages 0.554*** 0.741*** -0.506*** 0.617***
(0.063) (0.153) (0.064) (0.141)
D_Dairy 1.006*** 0.965*** -0.135** 1.024***
(0.067) (0.167) (0.069) (0.152)
D_Egg 0.530*** 0.626** -0.599*** 0.646*
(0.151) (0.276) (0.085) (0.341)
D_FV -0.673*** -0.575*** -0.081 -0.697***
(0.060) (0.150) (0.065) (0.132)
D_Fish 0.371*** 0.945*** 0.092 0.437***





Constant -28.450*** -37.356*** -10.242*** 0.097* -28.319***
(0.761) (1.666) (0.434) (0.058) (1.843)
Observations 59,458 56,043 56,043 56,043 56,043
R-squared 0.230
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baier-Bergstrand method used to account for multilateral resistance.
FV stands for Fruits and Vegetables.
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products. Negative effects on trade are straightforward to explain. In this Chapter
however, standards are implemented as the number of certified firms in the exporting
country. There is no immediate argument why more certified firms should reduce
exports. However, it is possible that more IFS certification of fish farms crowds out
exports of non-IFS certified fish such that exports of IFS-certified fish increase, but
the net effect of fish exports is negative. This channel remains difficult to prove
because it would require firm level data of (fish-) farms. Assuming that this explana-
tion is correct, the effect on overall welfare remains unclear nevertheless. If the effect
on total exports of a particular product remains negative even in the long-run, it is
questionable whether the found positive effects in terms of better vertical integration
(Colen et al., 2012) offset lower exports.
IFS and the integration of developing countries into global export
markets
The effect of IFS-certification on exports differs by income-level of the exporting coun-
try. If our hypothesis that high income countries benefit more from IFS certification
in terms of increasing exports than countries with lower income-levels holds, the IFS
coefficients should either decline in magnitude or become even negative. While the
coefficient for high-income countries is as expected, it turns negative for upper-middle
income countries and non-distinguishable from zero for low-income countries. These
diverse findings require a detailed discussion.
First, we interpret our hypothesis as confirmed based on the heterogeneous find-
ings which differ by income. Second, only high-income countries benefit from IFS-
certification in terms of increasing export volumes. The negative effect for upper-
middle income countries might be a result of similar mechanisms as explained for the
negative coefficients on fish exports. Thus, the net effect remains unclear. Maybe
IFS-certified products increases nevertheless, but the net effect remains negative. The
non-significance for low-income countries might be due to the same effect only that
the net effect is non-distinguishable from zero. Alternatively, findings indicate that
IFS-certification is not sufficient to integrate low-income countries into global value
chains. In other words, the trade-enhancing factors such as lower information asym-
metries and lower transaction costs are not sufficiently relevant to offset factors of
the trade-barrier view such as compliance costs and non-monetary barriers like weak
public institutions (see Chapter 4). As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, low income coun-
tries have on average lower compliance levels than high income countries. However,
the non-significance of the IFS coefficient does allow us to conclude only that IFS
certification in low-income countries does not affect exports. Hence, we do not know
whether compliance costs are actually a relevant trade barrier in this context because
the empirical model does not address the likelihood of compliance, but rather that
compliance does not affect trade. This might be the case because the assumed re-
duction of information asymmetries is not sufficient to increase demand of importing
countries. Consequently, even if compliance takes place, our findings do not provide
empirical support for the conclusion that compliance as such is sufficient to increase
country i’s exports.
The latter interpretation might contradict findings of previous studies, especially
about vegetables production in Senegal (Maertens et al., 2009; Colen et al., 2012;
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Swinnen et al., 2015). The authors emphasise – based on a rich firm- and household-
level dataset – the potential of standards to integrate low income countries into global
value chains, increasing rural income, and agricultural exports. However, although
these analyses address multiple outcomes and not only trade, these studies remain
case-specific such that external validity remains unclear. Moreover, most studies
related to the Senegal-project are based on the private standard GlobalGAP (or for-
merly EuroGAP) which is a pre-farm gate and mostly addresses agricultural raw
products. In contrast, IFS is a post-farm gate standard for processed food products.
The effect on trade of such a post-farm gate standard might be less pronounced,
because high-income countries have on average higher tariffs on processed food prod-
ucts. Moreover, food processing generates on average higher value-added than the
production of agricultural raw products. Most high-income countries prefer to gen-
erate the value-added themselves. This phenomenon is known as “tariff escalation”
and a serious threat for integration of developing countries into global value chains
(Akyol et al., 2005). Thus, a possibly trade-enhancing effect of IFS-certification in
developing countries might be offset by these protections trade policies of high-income
countries which are distinct for processed food products.
The type of food standard and θ
As explained in the conceptual model in Chapter 2, the decision of firms to invest in
quality upgrading in terms of stricter standards is c.p. determined by the parame-
ter θ, which represents the “ease” to address preferences of consumers. In contrast
to Chapter 3 in which standards are found to reduce trade without exception, IFS-
certification increases trade at the aggregate level, for almost all products included in
the study (only results of fish are mixed), and for high-income countries. Apparently,
firms are more likely to invest in IFS certification compared to MRLs which were
found to reduce trade.
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical model specifies θ to keep both models flex-
ible. In the case of IFS, θ is relatively large because of the trade-enhancing effect.
In other words, exporting countries with relatively high numbers of IFS certification
have an advantage for exporting processed food products compared to those with
less IFS certification. It seems that IFS is particularly capable to reduce information
asymmetries and to signal high quality of processed agricultural products. Other
standards, such as MRLs as a relevant public standard, are less capable to signal
high quality or do not allow firms to increase the mark-up. Thus, consumers are
not willing to pay higher prices for these products. This is different in the case of
IFS certification. First, because it certifies processed food for which the value-added
is higher than for agricultural raw products. Moreover, IFS might be more able to
signal high quality. Both is important since these affect the WTP of consumers.
For example, Balogh et al. (2016) analyse the WTP of Hungarian salami and find
quality certification as an important determinant of consumers’ WTP. The authors
conclude that producers can charge a higher price premium in these cases. All in all,
by combining our research results from the macro-trade perspective with firm-level
case-studies from the marketing-perspective we conclude that this price premium is
important for producers of processed food products whether they comply with stan-
dards or not.
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To conclude, this analysis aims to lift the debate of food standards and trade towards
a higher level by looking more specifically on the characteristics of the standard. Fu-
ture research is required to complement these results of the country-perspective with
those at the food-processing firm level in low-income countries. Eventually, to evalu-
ate the increasing relevance of food standards comprehensively, various perspectives
ranging from macro-trade, marketing towards rural development studies, and many
more need to be taken into account. Moreover, to further validate the argument of
quality upgrading and WTP, future research should deal with effects on trade of B2C
standards such as Fairtrade or the MSC. If the quality-upgrading argument in com-
bination with higher WTP are a reasonable explanation, the trade-enhancing effect
should be even stronger for these certification schemes.
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6 The Hartz reforms and the
German labour force
Abstract:
We estimate the impact of the Hartz Reforms, the most prominent labour re-forms in Germany since the Second World War, on the German labour market.
We adopt a cross-country program evaluation approach where, employing Synthetic
Control Method (SCM) for comparative case studies, we utilise the characteristics
of OECD countries to construct a counterfactual for Germany. Existing research
primarily focused on the unemployment rate. We find that while the impact of the
reforms on unemployment rate is weak – which is consistent with existing research –
they increased labour force participation, particularly among women and the elderly.
These findings are further supported by the finding that employment to working age
population climbed as well.
This chapter is joint work with Devesh Roy and Abdul Munasib. Malte Ehrich’s contributions are:
Development of research question, conceptual framework, research design, data management, and
writing of sections about political and legal background. Devesh Roy is the corresponding author
and responsible for writing overall. Abdul Munasib is responsible for empirical estimations.
70 Chapter 6. The Hartz reforms and the German labour force
6.1 Introduction
While most of Europe including sizeable economies such as Italy, Spain, and Great
Britain struggled following the 2008 crisis the German labour market remained strong
and resilient. Despite a decline of 4.7% in GDP in 2009 and an output decline of over
18% in manufacturing, employment level in Germany remained at 40 million in both
2008 and 2009, and subsequently rose to 41.5 million (Rinne et al., 2013). The same
Economist magazine that had called Germany the sick man of Europe (Economist,
1999) called it a miracle in labour markets in 2010 (Economist, 2013).
Over the decade prior to 2005, unemployment rate in Germany stayed consistently
above 8% and, in some years, reached double digits. The passage of the Hartz re-
forms, the most aggressive post-war labour reform in the country, began in 2003 and
the final stage was instituted by 2005. Since 2005, having peaked at 11.3%, the Ger-
man unemployment rate has been in a continuous decline in each subsequent year –
to 7.5% in 2008 and ultimately to 5.5% in 2012. The Hartz reforms coinciding with
the turnaround in the labour markets has naturally been of particular interest to
researchers and policy analysts.
The flexibilities brought in by these reforms is often credited by some for the steep
decline of German unemployment rate after 2005 and the limited impact of the down-
turn of 2008 on German economy (Rinne et al., 2013). Overall, however, the literature
finds a less clear connection between the Hartz reforms and unemployment rate in
Germany: while some authors offer evidence of at least some positive impact of the
reforms on unemployment rate (Krause et al., 2012; Krebs et al., 2013; Launov et al.,
2013) others strongly disagree (Dustmann et al., 2014; Akyol et al., 2013).
In principle, the Hartz reforms did aim to bring down unemployment rate quickly
and reduce the average length of unemployment by a third. More importantly, how-
ever, the Hartz reforms aimed at encouraging labour force participation, notably for
women and older persons, providing incentives for the unemployed to accept a job
and strengthening job-search activities (Bouvard et al., 2013). These reforms rolled
out a series of laws that overhauled the unemployment benefit system and the organ-
isation of labour market services.
Some of the specific measures included shortening of the period of entitlement to un-
employment benefit, ending of options for early retirement, and reduction of employer
social security contributions (Gaskarth, 2014). No other EU country has implemented
such extensive reforms in all these areas in such a short time (Knuth, 2014). The
Hartz reforms, therefore, are also presumed to have changed the nature of job cre-
ation itself in Germany (Spermann, 2011).
In this paper, we conduct a comparative case study to estimate the impact of the
Hartz reforms on the German labour market. We find that the reform did not have
a robust causal impact on the overall unemployment rate, which supports some of
the existing literature. Our main focus, however, is on labour force participation.
We find that the Hartz reforms raised labour force participation (LFP) specifically
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among women and relatively older in the workforce.
Our results are further supported by the additional findings of increased proportion
of employed in the working age population. It is important to note that the Hartz
reforms may not exhibit any impact on the unemployment rate if both employment
and labour force participation increased. Proportion of working age population em-
ployed captures the impact of the Hartz reforms on employment more cleanly.
We disaggregate the labour force by gender and age groupings to capture the dif-
ferential impact of Hartz by worker type. To the best of our knowledge, the causal
impact of Hartz on such labour market outcome disaggregated by age and gender
remains unexplored. This is the research gap that we try to bridge. Burda et al.
(2016) in a rare study do present data to show the increase in LFP after Hartz but
do not estimate its causal link with reforms. We carry out a variety of robustness
checks and provide additional evidence in support of our findings.
Hartz reforms changed the value of LFP at the margin. Those who were most likely
to be out of labour force or were near dropping out were impacted by Hartz to join,
rejoin or delay dropping out, whatever the case may be. Importantly, the groups
that were impacted significantly in terms of LFP, women and older workers, had an
increase in their employment rates as well. We estimate a positive and significant
causal impact of Hartz on LFP for women and for workers in the age group 55-64.
In 1997, the minimum age to receive 32 months of unemployment benefit – the max-
imum duration of unemployment benefits – was raised to 57 years (Gaskarth, 2014).
In effect, unemployed citizens over the age of 57 continued to be able to stop their job
search and withdraw from labour force and still receive unemployment benefits. Prior
to Hartz, the labour force participation rate for elderly was expectedly low (Gaskarth,
2014).
Given the magnitude and the extent of the Hartz reforms and the large observable
changes in the German labour market, a proper identification of the causal impacts of
the policy change is of crucial importance. This estimation, however, faces a number
of challenges. First, the Hartz reforms, a country-wide policy, is specific to Germany.
With just a single treatment unit, accurate inference is difficult, perhaps impossible,
in a clustering framework (Buchmueller et al., 2011; Donald et al., 2007). We, there-
fore, adopt a case-study approach and use the Synthetic Control Method (SCM),
which is devised to address precisely these kinds of situations (Abadie et al., 2010).
Specifically, we use the OECD countries to construct a counterfactual for Germany.
In studying the impact of German reunification, Abadie et al. (2015) uses an SCM
setup with OECD countries. Note that this cross-country context is essential due to
time varying events. For example, consider the great recession of 2008, which makes
pre-Hartz Germany a poor counterfactual for the post-Hartz Germany.
In impact evaluation, the reliability of an estimate critically hinges on the accuracy
of the counterfactual (Abadie et al., 2010). Because of time-varying factors, both
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observed and unobservable, the pre-Hartz period is unlikely to be an accurate coun-
terfactual for post-Hartz Germany. Also, while constructing counterfactuals using
other countries as the control group, it is highly improbable that a single country
would make for an adequate counterfactual for a treated Germany; it is also unlikely
that all control units would play equally important roles as counterfactuals.
SCM provides a systematic way to choose comparison units: the counterfactual is the
weighted average of the control countries, where pre-intervention matching across a
range of characteristics over a long period of time generates the weights. SCM also
naturally lends itself to permutations or randomization tests for inference (Bertrand
et al., 2004; Abadie et al., 2010; Buchmueller et al., 2011; Bohn et al., 2014).
It is important that our analyses cover a 25-year time span (1991-2013). With twelve
years of pre-Hartz reforms data, we are able to achieve good pre-intervention fits, i.e.,
generate a good counterfactual. Equally important is the long post-intervention data
(ten years) that offers a major advantage for assessing the employment impacts. The
long time period is crucial to account for changes in technology, firm responses to the
policy change, and individuals’ responses to the changed labour market conditions.
Moreover, policy responses are also often staggered and might require time to unfold.
Such a long term view, however, has accompanying econometric issues; it is dif-
ficult to expect that unobservable factors that can potentially bias the estimates
would remain invariant over the entire study period. Therefore, unlike the standard
difference-in-difference model, the fact that SCM does not assume unobservables to
be time-invariant (Abadie et al., 2010) is a notable strength of our estimation strategy.
6.2 The Hartz reforms: Background Information
6.2.1 The Labour Market and Unemployment in Germany
In 1999, The Economist magazine had called Germany the sick man of Europe
(Economist, 1999). In the period following the unification, Germany had started
to stagnate and between 1994 and 2002, at 1.6% its growth was slower than the
EU average (Gaskarth, 2014).1 The slow growth was combined with high rates of
unemployment exceeding 13 percent. Abadie et al. (2015) look at the impacts of
1990 reunification on West Germany’s GDP using SCM and find a significant gap in
German GDP due to the event. The German labour market was perceived as highly
rigid and – among other factors like the inefficient education system – as one of the
major reasons for Germany’s weak economic performance (Schäfer, 2003; Ochel, 2005;
OECD, 2006). The OECD even urged for “further institutional reform [i.e. in addi-
tion to the Hartz reforms] of the Public Employment Service to better activate the
1Unification in Germany increased the labour force by one third, a large share of which was
inadequately trained for immediate employment in an open market economy. Despite the need to
first retrain the labour force and reshape the formerly centrally planned economy it was, however,
also a political objective to adjust East German wages to the comparatively high West German levels
as quickly as possible (Jacobi et al., 2006).
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unemployed” (OECD, 2006, p.8).
With surging unemployment, then German Chancellor Schröder convened the Hartz
Commission in 2002 to reform the labour market. Chancellor Schröder and his cabi-
net comprising members of the Social-democratic party (SPD) and the Green party
agreed on the so-called Agenda 2010 with various packages being passed by the par-
liament during the years 2003 to 2005. While Agenda 2010 reform addressed several
sectors of the German economy, the labour market component called the Hartz re-
forms aimed primarily at reducing unemployment payments and the duration of eligi-
bility to receive unemployment benefits, easing of hiring for temporary employment,
and, arguably, changing the incentive structure for the unemployed to search for and
accept a job.
6.2.2 The Agenda 2010: Structural change of German labour mar-
ket policy
The Hartz Commission’s recommendations comprised the following four crucial re-
forms (Gaskarth, 2014): (i) the creation of Personal-Service-Agency (PSA) to act
as temp agencies to place unemployed people with employers; (ii) a grant for en-
trepreneurs, the “Ich-AG” (Me, Inc.), to encourage new businesses; (iii) benefit cuts
of up to 30% if a person on unemployment benefits refused to take up a reasonable
offer of work (the reforms made it a requirement to take up “reasonable” offers of
employment or provide a valid reason for declining them thus shifting the burden of
proof to the unemployed) (Gaskarth, 2014); (iv) merging social welfare benefits with
long-term unemployment benefits.
The first set of reforms, Hartz I and Hartz II, were introduced on January 1, 2003.
Hartz III addresses the structure of the Federal Labour Office and not labour markets
directly. Hartz IV combines the former unemployment assistance and social security
payments to a fixed and means-tested unemployment assistance (ALG II) (Nagl et
al., 2014).2 The second part of Hartz IV deals with the duration of unemployment
benefits (Arbeitslosengeld, ALG I).3
The standard entitlement period for unemployment benefit was one year. Afterwards,
or if not eligible at all, the unemployed received ALG II. ALG II accounted for a maxi-
mum of 57% of the former net wage. Further, the social security assistance was aimed
2The previous welfare system in Germany was designed to maintain the unemployed in their
current station until they could find a job they desired, and which matched their qualifications and
experience. Benefit levels were high and were of long duration. The FLO gave a low priority to job
search assistance and monitoring. Sanctions for failing to meet job search requirements were rarely
applied. Linking unemployment benefits to the former salary set a high de facto minimum wage,
meaning there was little incentive for the unemployed to find work (Gaskarth, 2014).
3Traditionally, the unemployment insurance in Germany has been based on three pillars: un-
employment benefits (ALG I), unemployment assistance (ALG II), and social security assistance
(Sozialhilfe). ALG I account for 57% of the previous net wage if the person had worked for at least
360 days in the preceding two years (Nagl et al., 2014). With Hartz IV reforms, in addition to the
switch from wage-dependent compensation to fixed-amount payments in ALG II, the means test was
tightened.
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at guaranteed access to basic human needs by a fixed payment.4
With Hartz, the entitlement period to receive ALG I reduced from 32 months to 18
months for workers aged 55 and over on February 1, 2006 (Ebbinghaus et al., 2006).
PSAs in effect aimed at placing the unemployed who found it hardest to find work,
e.g., the young who lacked work experience or the long-term unemployed who may
have fallen out of the habit of work. Hartz II reforms also initiated new types of
employment, "Minijob" and "Midijob" which were short term and part-time employ-
ments with higher thresholds for taxes and social insurance payments for employees,
and with less worker protection. Mini jobs were attractive for people who already
had insurance from another source, e.g., through their parents or spouse, or as a
pensioner. The employer pays a flat rate tax, which means that earnings from mini
jobs do not have to be included in the household income tax assessment and are,
therefore, not affected by tax progression (Knuth, 2014).
The unlimited duration of unemployment benefit payments used to be an extraor-
dinary feature of the German labour market leading to replacement rates for the
long term unemployed which were higher than in any other OECD country (OECD,
2006). Replacement rates of short-term unemployed, in contrast, were – and still are
– comparable to many other OECD countries (Jacobi et al., 2006).
6.2.3 The Unemployment Rate and the Existing Literature
Some existing literature studying the consequences of the Hartz reforms use calibra-
tion based on search models to simulate the impacts of Hartz reforms on unemploy-
ment (Krause et al., 2012; Krebs et al., 2013). These studies find that Hartz reforms
significantly reduced unemployment in Germany. Launov et al. (2013) using struc-
tural modeling show that some measures in the Hartz package had no noteworthy
impact on the unemployment rate in Germany whereas some other measures seemed
to have played a role in reducing unemployment rate to a moderate extent.
Dustmann et al. (2014) question attributing German labour market success to Hartz
reforms; according to these authors, the threat of off-shoring jobs to recently opened-
up central and eastern European countries in the early 1990s and decentralised nature
of employer-union negotiations allowed German firms to successfully push for limited
wage growth, thus allowing them to mitigate the impact of recession. Also, the Ger-
man recovery of the 2000s was due more to other economic factors, such as the sharp
increase in demand from emerging nations (e.g. China) for capital goods.
Similarly, Akyol et al. (2013), based on micro evaluations, argue that various Hartz
related measures do not show effects on variables that can be related to employment.
4The maximum duration of unemployment assistance was raised to 32 months for 57 years old
in 1997. However, unemployed over the age of 57 continued to be able to stop their job search and
withdraw from official unemployment status and still receive unemployment benefits. The elderly
used these benefits as a “popular bridge between the exit out of regular employment and the entry
into old age pension. Unemployment incidence was high among older workers with long tenure,
and their labour force participation rate was very low.” Unemployment rates for the elderly rose to
between 20% and 25% in the mid-1990s (Gaskarth, 2014). Hartz fundamentally changed this system.
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Ac-cording to Akyol et al. (2013) it is likely that employment increased due to a pro-
cess of wage moderation that had already begun in the 1990s, which is an argument
also put forward by Dustmann et al. (2014). Note that results that do not attribute
reduction in unemployment to Hartz reforms are compatible with increases in LFP
and rising employment rates for some segments of the actual or potential work force.
6.3 Estimation technique
6.3.1 A Case Study Approach with Synthetic Control Method (SCM)
There are a number of advantages to using SCM for this study. As discussed above, in
creating a comparison group, neither every other country nor a single country with-
out a comparable reform would likely approximate the most relevant characteristics
of Germany where labour market reform was adopted. SCM, in contrast, provides a
comparison unit (or synthetic) that is a combination of the control countries – a data-
driven procedure that calculates “optimal” weights to be assigned to each country in
the control group based on pre-intervention characteristics – thus making explicit the
relative contribution of each control unit to the counterfactual of interest (Abadie
et al., 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). In SCM, the researcher is forced to demonstrate
the affinities between the affected and unaffected units using observed characteristics
(Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie et al., 2015).5
Secondly, when aggregate data are employed (as is the case here) the uncertainty re-
mains about the ability of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual outcome
that the affected unit would have exhibited in the absence of the intervention. This
type of uncertainty is not reflected by the standard errors constructed with traditional
inferential techniques for comparative case studies. As Buchmueller et al. (2011) ex-
plain, in a “clustering” framework, inference is based on asymptotic assumptions that
do not apply in our case as the focus is on one country Germany with its labour re-
form in 2003.
The comparison of a single country, Germany, against all other countries in the con-
trol group collapses the degrees of freedom and results in much larger sample variance
compared to the one typically obtained under conventional asymptotic framework.
The latter can seriously overstate significance of the treatment (Donald et al., 2007;
Buchmueller et al., 2011). We, therefore, apply the permutations or randomization
test (Bertrand et al., 2004; Abadie et al., 2010; Buchmueller et al., 2011; Bohn et al.,
2014) that SCM readily provides.
Additionally, Abadie et al. (2010) argue that unlike the traditional regression-based
difference-in-difference model that restricts the effects of the unobservable confounders
to be time-invariant so that they can be eliminated by taking time differences, SCM
5Neumark et al. (2014), in the context of the impact of minimum wage legislations, point out
that in several studies that adopted regression-based models, there were underlying assumptions of
similarities across states (for example, categorization by region). Unlike the ad hoc strategies with
a presumption of affinity, SCM demonstrates affinities of the donour pool states with the exposed
state.
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allows the effects of such unobservables to vary with time. In particular, Abadie et al.
(2010) show that with a long pre-intervention matching on outcomes and character-
istics, a synthetic control also matches on time-varying unobservables.6
Finally, because the construction of a synthetic control does not require access to post-
intervention outcomes, SCM allows us to decide on a study design without knowing
its bearing on the findings (Abadie et al., 2010). The ability to make decisions on
research design while remaining agnostic about how each particular decision affects
the conclusions of the study is a safeguard against actions motivated by a “desired”
finding (Rubin, 2001).
6.3.2 The Synthetic Control for Germany
A typical SCM analysis is feasible when one or more countries exposed to an inter-
vention can be compared to other countries that unlike Germany were not exposed
to the same intervention. In this paper, the outcomes are the different measures of
employment/unemployment, the exposed country is Germany, the intervention is the
set of the Hartz reforms that started in 2003, and the donour pool (unexposed/control
countries) comprises the OECD countries.
Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2007) argue that chancellor Schröder’s social democratic gov-
ernment was not expected to introduce such wide-ranging cuts in the social insurance
system. The fact that these reforms were largely unanticipated is useful from the
point of view of program evaluation (Abadie et al., 2010).
We construct a synthetic Germany (the counterfactual) using the “optimal” weights
and then conduct placebo studies (or permutations/randomization tests) that help in-
fer the statistical significance of the estimated impact of the Hartz reforms in the form
of a post-intervention gap between the actual and the synthetic Germany. Details
are in Appendix of this chapter.
6.4 Data
All data for the outcome variables are collected beginning with 1991 – establishing
a long period prior to the enactment of the Hartz reforms in 2003 – and ending in
2015, the last period available for the outcome variables at the time of this study. All
the outcome variables are taken from the OECD database.
The working age population refers to people aged 15 to 64. The labour force consists
of individuals of working age who are available for work and have taken specific steps
to find work. The labour force participation rate is calculated as the labour force
divided by the total working-age population. The unemployment rate is defined as
the number of individuals who are unemployed as a percentage of the labour force
6As Abadie et al. (2015) state, “only units that are alike in both observed and unobserved deter-
minants of the outcome variable as well as in the effect of those determinants on the outcome variable
should produce similar trajectories of the outcome variable over extended periods of time.”
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and it is seasonally adjusted. Since the labour force includes the total number of un-
employed individuals plus those in civilian employment, the unemployment rate and
labour force participation rate, in conjunction with the count of working age popu-
lation, allow the construction of the measure proportion of working age population
that is employed. We express this measure as a percentage.
The use of the OECD database, therefore, is of particular importance that presents
the harmonized unemployment rate as comparable measure across countries (OECD,
2016a). While the universe of our donour pool is the set of OECD countries, due to
missing values, not all countries can be in the donour pool for every outcome (Table
E.1 has a list of donour pool countries).
An extensive set of predictors (i.e., variables for pre-intervention matching) was used
to construct the synthetic control for Germany. First, variables were included to re-
flect the state of the economy and its structure: per capita income and growth in per
capita income, consumption, public expenditure and investment shares of GDP, and
an openness measure (from Penn World Tables, PWT 7.0-7.1).
Demographic variables such as population density, share of urban population, and
infant mortality rates were also used as predictors; these were obtained from World
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. To measure the state of the finan-
cial market, we draw from the WDI, domestic credit to the private sector and domestic
credit by the banking sector (as percentages of GDP). Since education plays an im-
portant role in determining labour market outcomes, the average years of schooling
in a country is also used as a predictor (Barro-Lee database). Finally, to capture the
demographics component of the Hartz reforms, we include as a predictor the share of
population aged 65 and over (from World Bank).
Table E.2 shows that, overall, the averages of the outcome variables for Germany
were comparable to the donour pool countries over the study period. In terms of
pre-intervention characteristics, the donour pool is very similar to the averages of all
OECD countries. The same averages for Germany, however, are quite different from
the donour pool, especially for population weighted distance, openness measure, pop-
ulation density, percentage of urban population in the largest city, infant mortality
rate and trade union density. These differences indicate that a simple average of the
neither the OECD countries nor the donour pool is likely to be a good counterfac-
tual for Germany, and that a reasonable counterfactual would require a systematic
weighting procedure as done under SCM.
6.5 Results
Separate SCM estimations were carried out for each of the outcome variables (the
top panel in Table E.2 lists the outcome variables).
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6.5.1 Main Estimates
We start our SCM estimation with labour force participation rate. The top two pic-
tures in Figure E.1 show the impact of the Hartz reforms on labour force participation
rate. The picture on the left shows a close fit between the actual and the synthetic
prior to the intervention and a wide gap afterwards. The post-intervention gap is the
measure of the causal impact of the Hartz reforms on labour force participation rate.
As a next step, the statistical significance of the gap needs to be determined.
The permutations/randomisation test answers the question, ’How often would we
obtain a gap as large as this if we had chosen a country at random instead of Ger-
many?’ This is the question that the placebo tests address. We therefore apply the
SCM to each country in the donour pool (the placebos). The pictures on the right
panel of Figure E.1 present results of the permutation/randomisation/placebo tests
as described in Appendix E.1 (Abadie et al. (2010); Bertrand et al. (2004); Bohn
et al. (2014); Munasib et al. (2015)). The gap between the actual and the synthetic
for Germany is represented in the darker line and for every donour pool country in
lighter lines. We see that Germany stands out from the placebo estimates (where the
intervention did not happen). We thus infer that the impact of the Hartz reforms on
labour force participation rate was significant.
Column 1 of Table E.3 presents the details of the pictorial presentation in Figure
E.1 as described above. Pre-intervention absolute prediction error to mean ratio
(APEMR) and pre-intervention Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE) are
reported that describe the goodness of the pre-estimation fits.
The finding of the permutations or randomisation tests is described in terms of the
following (see Appendix E.1.2 for details). The p-value of the post- to pre RMSPE
ratio is very small (reported as 0.00), Germany has the top post-to pre RMSPE ratio
rank (i.e., ranked 1), and the donour probability – the probability of obtaining a post-
to pre RMSPE ratio as large as Germany’s if one were to assign the intervention at
random in the data – is also very small (4%). We, therefore, conclude that the impact
of the Hartz reforms on labour force participation rate in Germany was statistically
significant.
Column 1 of panel B in Table E.3 reports the “optimal” weights generated by the
SCM procedure. We find that Mexico, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Italy,
Sweden, and Portugal (in order) show up with the largest weights. Column 1 and 4
of panel B in Table E.3 reports a comparison of the pre-intervention characteristics
between the actual and the synthetic Germany. We find them to be very closely
matched. Repeating the exercise for the rest of the outcome variables we find that
the following (the results in the tables and the figures are to be interpreted the same
way as explained above):
Chapter 6. The Hartz reforms and the German labour force 79
Table 6.1: Summary of results
Outcome SCM impact Result reporting
Labour force participation rate Increased Column 1, Table E.3, Figure E.1
Labour force participation rate: men No impact Column 2, Table E.3, Figure E.1
Labour force participation rate: women Increased Column 3, Table E.3, Figure E.1
Employment in working age population (%) Increased Column 1, Table E.4, Figure E.2
Employment in working age population - men (%) No impact Column 2, Table E.4, Figure E.2
Employment in working age population - women (%) Increased Column 3, Table E.4, Figure E.2
Labour force participation rate: age 15-24 No impact Column 1, Table E.5, Figure E.3
Labour force participation rate: age 25-54 No impact Column 2, Table E.5, Figure E.3
Labour force participation rate: age 55-64 Increased Column 3, Table E.5, Figure E.3
Unemployment rate No impact Column 1, Appendix C
Unemployment rate: men No impact Column 2, Appendix C
Unemployment rate: women No impact Column 3, Appendix C
In Table E.4 and Figure E.2, we present the SCM estimates of the impact of Hartz
reforms on percentage of working population employed in Germany, again disaggre-
gated by gender. Once again post/pre RMSPE ratio rank shows significant overall
impact driven by women’s employment rate. In most characteristics and in most out-
comes there is not much difference between the synthetic and actual Germany. The
exceptions are domestic credit to the private sector and to some extent education
expenditure. Barring these exceptions, the synthetics closely replicate the treatment
in eight out of ten characteristics that are compared.
6.5.2 Estimates of the impact of Hartz reforms on labour force par-
ticipation by age groups
Next we look at the case of labour force participation by age groups viz. 15-24, 25-54
and 55-64 respectively. Figure E.3 presents the SCM estimate of the impact of the
Hartz reforms on LFP of different age groups in the working population. The left
panel in the figure shows a post-intervention gap, which is the estimated impact of
Hartz reforms only for the work force comprising age group 55-64. Our placebo tests
in the right panel shows that this gap is also statistically significant (Table E.5):
p-value is small, post- to pre-intervention RMSPE rank is two, and the donour prob-
ability is very small as well (7%).
We also find that Greece, New Zealand, Turkey, and Luxembourg (in order) con-
tribute the most to the construction of the synthetic Germany. And, we find close
matches, in most pre-intervention characteristic, between actual and synthetic Ger-
many (bottom panel C of Table E.5). Averaging over the post-Hartz period 2004-2013,
we estimate that the reforms contributed to an increase in employment rate of women
and workers in the age group 55-64. Importantly, the 2008-09 crisis did not alter the
employment rates for the elderly. Note that the estimates show that even with re-
cession, the supply side in terms of labour force participation for women and elderly
continued to increase. Moreover the secular increase in employment rate continued
unabated even during the crisis as an outcome because of Hartz reforms.
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6.5.3 Robustness tests
In Table E.6 we present a robustness test where we re-estimate the impact of the
Hartz reforms on all outcomes using a different set of predictors. In Table E.7 we
report yet another robustness test: we go back to our main estimates in Tables E.3,
E.4, and E.5 and this time exclude from the donour pool the country with the largest
weight. This is a sensitivity analysis that tests how sensitive the estimates are to the
presence of that particular country in the donour pool.
Since we find evidence of a statistically significant impact of the Hartz reforms on
labour force participation of women and elderly and employment of working popula-
tion particularly women, we conduct a series of tests to ensure that these estimates are
robust. First, we expand the list of predictors. In Table E.6, results of estimation are
presented in column 1. The two additional predictors that we now include are years
of schooling and share of population 65 years or older.7 Next, we use an alternative
donour pool which has eight more countries including some of the newer entrants to
the EU. Expanding the donour pool comes at a cost of a shorter pre-intervention time
horizon (due to missing observations of the outcome variable for the first 6 years).
In both these tests we find that the estimated impacts of the Hartz reforms remain
statistically significant (in column 2, while the rank remains 1 for the earlier statis-
tically significant estimated impacts, the p-value and the donour probability remain
small).
It can be argued that the gap between the synthetic and the treatment units found so
far is caused by the synthetic’s inability to replicate the treatment’s post-intervention
outcome. To deal with this concern we use a “time placebo” test using a fictitious
event of Hartz reforms as a falsification test (Mideksa (2013); Abadie et al. (2015)):
We assign a placebo Hartz reforms intervention in Germany at some year earlier than
2003. Greater confidence can be attached to the results if the synthetic in this case
replicates the treatment’s outcome following this fictitious intervention (i.e., there is
no statistically significant post-intervention gap).
In other words, we apply a placebo Hartz Reforms five years earlier (in 1998) and
analyse post-intervention data (1999-2002). This placebo intervention shows no im-
pact on outcomes like labour force participation and employment rates of specific
groups.
6.6 Discussion
We estimate that the Hartz reforms did not causally impact unemployment in Ger-
many. Is this finding compatible with markedly and steadily falling unemployment
rate that coincided with the period after the Hartz reforms? Dustmann et al. (2014)
in an influential paper point to significant reductions in the unemployment rate to
the inherent flexibility of the German labour market that predates the Hartz reforms.
Specifically, the authors argue that the specific governance structure of the German
7The same robustness check was also conducted for the outcome variables presented in Table E.3.
The findings of Table E.3 were robust to this perturbation.
Chapter 6. The Hartz reforms and the German labour force 81
system of industrial relations made the labour market highly flexible. In particular,
they point to the process that shifts setting of wages, hours, and other aspects of
working conditions, from the industry- and region-wide level to the level of the sin-
gle firm and even a single worker. Note that these features predate the Hartz reforms.
While we find that the Hartz reforms did not impact the overall unemployment rate
(Table E.8)8 we do find that they had a significant causal impact on labour force
participation rates, specifically for women and the older workforce. Our findings are
buttressed by the additional findings of increased proportion of employed in the work-
ing age population.
The push towards greater labour force participation would be consistent with the
changes related to unemployment benefits. Recall that the maximum number of
months of unemployment benefits was reduced from 26 to 12 months for those under
55 years of age, and from 32 to 18 months for those 55 and older. With this reduction,
the transition to employment could certainly be hastened and, for that, temporary
employment could be the outlet for many workers. The employment rate has risen
steeply for people aged 55 to 64, from around 37% in 2000 to 61.5% in 2012. In 2012,
there were more people in the 60-65 age group in employment than in retirement for
the first time since 1974 (Federal Institute for Population Research, 14.08.2013).
The survey by Kettner et al. (2007) finds that unemployed persons increased their job
seeking activity and made greater wage concessions during job interviews. As another
indicator of temporary employment, among people assigned to the PSAs, under 25
year olds were significantly over-represented.
As part of the reforms, spouses or partners of benefit recipients were strongly incen-
tivised to seek work which was accompanied by the phasing-out of early retirement
options (Bouvard et al., 2013). In Germany, economically active population increased
by 4.9% between 2004 and 2011, despite a decline in the working age population, on
the strength of the 4.6-point rise in the participation rate.
The increase in participation rate is particularly stark for workers near the retirement
age from 43% in 2003 to 67% in 2013 (OECD, 2016c) As such, the increase in par-
ticipation was particularly high among older persons (16.2 points) and women, for
whom the upward trend gained momentum over the period, rising 6.0 points, while
the male participation rate rose by 3.3 points (Bouvard et al., 2013). These findings
are in line with our finding of a significant impact of the Hartz reforms on labour
force participation rate.
Burda et al. (2016) state that it is also possible that some workers in temporary
employment could be doing so as an additional job. Burda et al. (2016) find that
in 2014, 8% of part-time as well as full time employees had a second job besides
their main occupation. The moonlighting effect along with mobilisation of inactive
8Note that the estimates in Table E.8 show that while the Hartz reforms had a significance effect
on overall unemployment rate and women’s unemployment rate show in Panel A, subsequently in
Panels B and C, they turn out to be non-robust.
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workers following the Hartz reforms could also be contributing to the rise in number
of temporary employees.
Burda et al. (2016) argue that the strong German labour market performance since
2005 is entirely attributable to the extensive, rather than the intensive employment
margin, i.e., the supply of workers that were employed at a given working-age popu-
lation. In 2014, total aggregate hours worked by all persons in Germany was merely
0.4% higher than in 1993, while employment in persons rose from 37.8 to 42.7 million
persons.
Hence there has been a marked reduction in average hours. Burda et al. (2016)
findings are consistent with a positive shock to labour supply, in particular, in West
Germany and thereby underscore the role of the Hartz reforms in increasing employ-
ment. Our findings pick up the causal impacts of the Hartz reforms on labour supply.
Our results are also compatible with near stagnant work hours. Some part of this
can be attributable to the Hartz reforms as it is shown to alter the composition of
employment. While the employment rate hit a historic high of nearly 73% in 2012,
the total number of hours worked per worker declined from 1564 in 1992 to 1366 in
2014 (OECD, 2016d). The outlet of temporary employment would likely have worked
in favour of this trend.
This significant increase in labour force participation of the older workers in such a
short time most likely came through temporary employment. Workers near retire-
ment are unlikely to be offered permanent jobs (Gaskarth, 2014). Also as part of the
reforms, the unemployment insurance benefits were accompanied by the abolition
of a tax-free allowance up to e11,000 for severance pay. Since severance payments
are linked to tenure (how long has the person worked), workers, particularly older
ones, would prefer to increase the tenure of employment by taking up temporary jobs.
It is important to note that temporary employment constitutes a relatively smaller
percentage of the overall labour force, varying between 10% and 15% in Germany
(OECD, 2016b). Yet, amongst individuals entering and leaving the workforce, the
share of temporary agency workers is considerable. According to Spermann (2011),
while the number of temporary employment relationships that begun and ended was
between 600,000 and 700,000 per annum in 2000–05, in 2006–08 both figures had
grown to over one million.
Following the Hartz reforms, some companies also started restructuring their labour
force to shift towards more temporary employment, a substitution effect. Sper-
mann (2011) presents the example of in-house staffing agency formed by Schlecker, a
large drug store chain. Dauser (2009) presents a number of other examples as well.
Crimmann et al. (2009), however, argue that in house temporary staffing is not a
widespread phenomenon.
The creation of public interest employment in 2005 in the form of “one-euro” jobs
as part of Hartz IV reforms was also a step towards temporary employment and in-
creasing labour force participation of some groups. There were 200,000 one euro jobs
in 2005 and it rose to 320,000 in 2009. Billed as a pathway to a permanent job for
those that were unemployed or not even looking, it could have also spurred their job
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search. The maximum working time in these jobs was 30 hours. These jobs typically
lasted between six and nine months.
The other important aspects of the Hartz reforms are likely to be mini-jobs and midi-
jobs that refer to low-wage employment contracts for a small number of hours worked.
Mini-jobs existed before the Hartz laws although Hartz raised the monthly salary cap
from e325 to e400, and created a higher level, called midi-jobs, which were capped at
e800.9 Midi-jobs are subject to lower social insurance contributions, which gradually
rise to the standard rate when monthly earnings reach e850. Workers in midi-jobs
are entitled, overall, to the same benefits as employees subject to social insurance
contributions at the full rate.10
The numbers working in mini-jobs on top of other paid work (who are already counted
in the employment figures because of their main job) have grown sharply since the
Hartz reforms: From 1.69 million in 2004 to 2.53 million in 2011; on the other hand,
those working only in a mini-job increased by just 81,000 between 2004 and 2011 (to
4.9 million, 66 percent of whom are women). The number in midi-jobs rose from 1.19
million in 2007 to 1.37 million in 2011 (74 percent of whom are women).
6.7 Conclusions
Contesting the objective of European policy leaders of achieving economic conver-
gence, the current situation in Europe may very well be characterised by divergence
since a specific set of countries are performing systematically better than the rest of
Europe. One such country is Germany, the largest country in Europe both in size
(physical and economic) and population.
We investigate the impact of the Hartz reforms on overall German labour market. We
opted for a method that fits the context of estimation of the impact of an aggregative
policy with a single treatment unit. The need was also felt for a method that is able
to address the role of observed and unobserved factors to the best extent possible.
These motivated us to use the SCM in assessing the impacts of the Hartz reforms
on the German labour market. Our method of SCM is quite rewarding in this context.
While the results show no significant impact of the Hartz reforms on unemployment
rate, we find that labour force participation increases, especially among women and
9Mini-jobs are subject to employee social insurance contributions at a reduced or zero rate. Em-
ployer contributions for jobs earning less than e400/month are higher than for those for a ‘regular’
job, approximately 28% instead of the roughly 20% standard rate for employers. Workers in mini-
jobs are not entitled to unemployment insurance benefit, and pension benefits are optional in that
workers may opt to pay a pension contribution at a reduced 4.9% rate, which gives them pension
rights similar to the standard contributions. A mini-job does not in itself entitle the worker to health
insurance insofar as the employer does not pay health insurance contributions. The individual may
nevertheless be entitled to health insurance if it is provided under another activity, or if covered
through a family member.
10A workfare arrangement in the non-private sector established by Hartz IV, under which the
claimant continues to receive benefits, in addition to payment of at least one euro an hour for work
in the public interest.
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the elderly. We also find an increase in the proportion of working age population
employed.
Finally, what do the results imply for other countries? It has been suggested by some
researchers that other countries, particularly the core countries, in Europe could
benefit from their own Hartz type reforms (European Central Bank, 2012). This ar-
gument is conditioned by the belief that the Hartz reforms caused significant changes
in unemployment in Germany, which is not supported by the estimates in this paper.
Also, several labour market policies that characterise Germany such as no minimum
wage (it was introduced only recently) might not be similar in other countries. This
implies that the employment outcomes that we show as impacted by the spurt in
labour force participation could be quite specific to Germany.
Our analyses point to opportunities for a great deal of future research. The pathway
of rise in temporary employment and no change in unemployment is suggestive. It
needs to be strengthened with longitudinal study that would have tracked different
types of workers (firms) as well as job seekers (employee seekers) before and after
the Hartz reforms. This would be important to explore the motivations (incentive
structures) of the workers (firms).
Further, there is ample evidence in the literature that East Germany and West Ger-
many behave differently in terms of their respective labour markets (Snower, D.,
Merkl, C. (2006); Burda (2006)). Exploring these differences will not only provide
additional insight into the regional variations but may also offer valuable insights into
the long-term effects of sociopolitical institutions.
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7 Conclusion
This final chapter summarises the results of all four essays, discusses limitations, pol-
icy implications, and open questions that we could not address and therefore, devote
to future research. Moreover, we relate the essays into the broader research context.
The raising relevance of food standards constitutes the point of departure of the first
three essays of the thesis. Because standards are a subset of NTBs overall, their effect
on international trade is a matter of concern. Theoretical as well as empirical results
remain ambiguous. The entire debate has been entitled as “standards-as-catalyst vs.
standards-as-barriers” to trade. All three essays aim to provide additional insights
why the effect is neither positive nor negative in all settings. Instead, the thesis
provides arguments under which conditions which effect predominates. Whether the
effect is positive or negative depends on market structure, complexity of products,
public institutions, the type of standard, and the income level of the exporting coun-
try. Consequently, we contribute to the debate by suggesting a compromise in the
sense that both views are correct, depending on the research context.
7.1 Overview of results
The first essay (Chapter 3) focuses on the role of export volume as additional deter-
minant for the effect of standards on trade. Based on the argument that compliance
costs are primarily of fixed costs character, the hypothesis claims that leading ex-
porting countries benefit from stricter standards in terms of trade volume because
these are more likely to invest while country-pairs with relatively low trade volumes
do not invest and trade less. Based on a quantile regression framework within the
gravity model of trade, we indeed find empirical evidence of heterogeneous effects of
standards and of tariffs on trade. As standards become stricter, country-pairs from
the first to the eighth decile are expected to trade less while country-pairs at the
highest decile trade more. The discussion addresses potential implications for the
degree of concentration of global agricultural export markets.
The role of fixed costs of compliance with standards remains the point of departure
of the second essay (Chapter 4) as well. We claim that exports to markets with rela-
tively strict standards does not only require sufficient income-levels of the country of
origin, but also non-monetary factors like public institutions need to be of sufficient
quality. The essay shows that the quality of public institutions is especially relevant
for exports of rather complex products like dairy- and meat-products. We use the EU
as an example of a destination market of sufficient size and relatively strict standards.
Thus, the quality of public institutions of the country of origin as well as the degree of
product complexity are important factors as well which determine whether standards
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increase or reduce trade.
The third essay (Chapter 5) is related to the previous essay by focusing on more com-
plex agricultural products, which are processed foot items in this case. The number
of IFS certified producers is the main variable of interest within a gravity model of
trade. This is a particular interesting case because IFS data, as an important private
food standard, are difficult to obtain. Moreover, IFS is a post-farm gate standards
which refers to the upper part of the value chain in contrast to other private stan-
dards like GlobalGAP which are more frequently analysed. In contrast to the first
essay in Chapter 3, standards are found to increase exports at the aggregate level.
However, the effect remains robust only for high-income countries and disappears for
other, that means lower income groups.
Overall, we contribute to the catalyst- and barriers-debate by highlighting important
determinants which affect the direction of the coefficient of interest. Standards are
likely to reduce trade between country-pairs which trade little in any case but increase
trade between country-pairs with well-established trade flows. Moreover, the qual-
ity of public institutions is an additional determinant to what extent countries can
meet standards of destination markets. Furthermore, product complexity matters.
Finally, the type of standard is relevant, too. Arguments of the catalyst-perspective
such as lower information asymmetries and reduced transaction costs seem to be more
relevant for the private standards IFS certification whereas compliance costs offset
potential trade-enhancing factors in the case of the public food safety standard MRL.
The final essay four of Chapter 6 is unrelated to the previous studies and analyses
the effect of the most comprehensive labour market reform in Germany on various
outcome variables like unemployment and LFP. Based on SCM, we find weak effects
of the reforms, which aimed to make the labour market more flexible and dynamic, on
unemployment. However, LFP increased due to the reforms especially of women and
elderly people. This is an important contribution to the tensed and intensive public
debate of successful labour market reforms in particular during an era of multiple
crises within Europe. Our findings raise doubt about the often stated argument that
unemployment has declined as a result of these reforms. In line with the few other
existing previous studies, we do not find support that the reforms have caused the
decline after 2005.
7.2 Limitations
All essays are subject to limitations to at least some extent. The rules of good sci-
entific practice require to state those explicitly to make contributions to scientific
debates of this thesis as transparent as possible. Moreover, stating limitations clearly
facilitates future work to address those as adequate as possible.
Chapter 3 could have been improved by estimations at the product-level. Earlier
versions of the chapter were based on analyses at the product-level. However, as
the empirical strategy became more advanced to address all empirical challenges,
we faced severe problems due to collinearity and non-convergence. MRLs are given
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at the product level and it is reasonable to assume that effects on trade differ by
product. Since we included country-pair-product fixed effects, we are still convinced
that our estimates remain unbiased. However, an analysis at the sectoral level would
have been interesting and could provide more precise policy implications. Moreover,
the theoretical foundation of gravity suggests to use production and consumption as
proxies for the economic size of trading partners. However, we faced significant data
problems because production data at the disaggregated level remain often incomplete.
This problem would have been amplified because consumption data would have been
computed by simple accounting techniques as the sum of production and imports
minus exports. Finally, other indices like Winchester et al. (2012) and Achterbosch
et al. (2009), which are dyadic, could be considered as additional robustness checks.
The interpretation of these two indices differs from the Ferro-index. The Ferro-index
measures the restrictiveness of the importing country relative to all other countries.
In other words, it indicates the multiregional restrictiveness of a particular country.
In contrast, the other two indices of Achterbosch and Winchester are measures of the
relative difference in terms of restrictiveness within a particular country-pair. Thus,
the interpretation refers more to the “bridge-to-cross” (Munasib et al., 2011) assum-
ing that exporting countries that are less strict than the importing country needs to
spend more effort in meeting the standard of the importing country than countries
that have similar standards.
Strictly speaking, the empirical model in Chapter 4 does not completely account for
multilateral resistance. It relies on the Baier-Bergstrand method, which is overall
well accepted, but mostly at the aggregate level. Since we use five different product
categories, this procedure is not ideal. If we were able to use fixed effects, we would
have needed country-year-product fixed effects. This was computationally not fea-
sible. However, we include product fixed effects instead to account for multilateral
resistance as good as possible. In addition, instruments need to be considered as
further robustness checks.
The limitation of the previous chapter regarding Baier-Bergstrand at the sectoral level
is partly valid for the analysis in Chapter 5 as well. Moreover, the type of standard
proxy is not ideal. Whereas we use requirements of importing countries in Chapter 3,
this essay implements standards as the number of certified producers of the exporting
country. However, we do not know how much each producer exports. We also do
not know the share of certified exports of total exports of a particular product. In
addition, to answer the research question precisely, we would need a measure which
indicates the restrictiveness of importing countries with respect to IFS as we do in
the MRL-setting. A negative estimated coefficient would then indicate support for
the trade-barriers view. In contrast, a negative sign of IFS certified producers is less
straightforward to interpret. But since most standards also refer to qualitative re-
quirements, most will remain difficult to quantify. Another limitation might be that
total number of IFS certification is an absolute measure. Instead, a relative variable
would be more adequate that is for example weighted by the number of producing
firms. However, we are not aware of any data source that provides number of firms
at this disaggregated level.
The last essay about the German labour market and how it is affected by the Agenda
2010 relies on the argument that no other systematic treatment took place during
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the years 2003 to 2005 which might bias our results. However, we believe that the
arguments and robustness checks discussed in the chapter are comprehensive and
convincing.
7.3 Policy implications and open discussion
Policy makers need to take into account the trade-off between potential trade-reducing
effects as well as exclusion of small-scale farmers and preferences of consumers for food
products that meet specific standards in various dimensions. Although there is no
argument related to food safety why requirements should differ across human beings,
preferences regarding food safety and other objectives like environmental aspects, an-
imal welfare, and labour standards do differ across consumers and countries. This
inhibits complete harmonisation of standards as policy recommendation because it
might actually provide additional arguments for anti-trade advocates. If standards
become harmonised for a given country, harmonised standards are either lower or
higher on average than before. If these turn out to be lower, consumers’ concerns
about food safety might increase and therefore, anti-trade attitudes. If harmonised
standards are stricter on average, trade might be even more adversely affected even
though harmonisation should increase trade in principle.
Although a lower amount of varying standards might be desirable from a trade-
policy point of view, governments should rather support farmers to meet standards
by providing required infrastructure, credits, and knowledge. The raising relevance
of standards should not result in additional advantage for leading exporting countries
as it is currently the case (see Chapter 3). Instead, since standards do affect interna-
tional trade, these should be least-distortive to trade as possible. This is more likely
to be the case if compliance costs are low or covered by other sources.
Since the effect of standards on trade differs by the degree of complexity of a partic-
ular product, tariffs of processed food products should be further reduced to support
developing countries to participate not only in value chains but also in high value
chains. We do not find empirical evidence for the ability of private standards to en-
hance the integration of developing countries into global value chains. Consequently,
we can not conclude that private standards constitute a one-suits-all development
tool.
In terms of public standards that are covered by SPS-regulation, governments need
to ensure scientific justification of standards to reduce the risk that public standards
are implemented due to protectionist motives. This implies to strengthen the WTO
as the major global institution which designs and enforces the regulatory framework
for international trade. It remains questionable to what extent regional trade agree-
ments are useful substitutes for a period during which the WTO and the Doha-round
remains blocked by several member states. However, if countries manage to form
supranational institutions like the EU which negotiates trade agreements and stan-
dards for their member countries, these at least partly harmonise standards within
this particular group of countries.
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As it became evident during negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), consumers are concerned about food safety standards. This pro-
hibits complete harmonisation and an overall drastic reduction of standards. At the
first glance, these concerns need to be addressed seriously and transparently inde-
pendent of their scientific justification to avoid future raises of anti-trade movements.
This implies to provide communication platforms which allow consumers to express
their opinion and to discuss related arguments. Appearance, participation, and cred-
ibility of scientists of related disciplines are essential at this stage. It is not only
the case that all parties involved often provide and believe in studies which favour
their individual views, it is also the increasing non-acceptance of scientific evidence
which is problematic as it became evident with the term fake-news. Participants of
public debates seem to ignore arguments of their opponents which makes finding a
compromise increasingly difficult. However, the willingness and empathy to compro-
mise is essential not only in debates about free trade and regional trade agreements
like TTIP but for the functionality of democracies overall. Consequently, it is about
scientists to obey rules of good scientific practice and to discuss their arguments in
public such that the general public and involved groups with varying interest trust
these findings. In the case of standards and trade, this implies to state explicitly
to what extent a specific residue is harmful at which levels of consumption. Finally,
wrong arguments need to be addressed as well. For example in the case of TTIP, I
have rarely observed scientist who argue against the rumour that the US has lower
food standards on average than the EU.
The final policy recommendation of the three trade essays does not directly follow
from the conducted analyses in this thesis but are crucial for the debates about stan-
dards and trade as well. The founders of the German constitution1 had good reasons
to limit power of plebiscites. Public opinions can be easily misguided by powerful
groups with specific interests. It is the author’s belief that this partly happens dur-
ing TTIP-debates which were often not based on justified arguments. Since decisions
on food safety and international trade are complex as well and many powerful inter-
est groups are involved, these decisions are not binary and should not be made by
plebiscites but only by representative parliaments.
Overall, we conclude that standards do affect international trade and are likely to af-
fect the trade-GDP ratio. Our main argument is that standards can either enhance or
reduce trade depending on various parameters. Therefore, the net effect of standards
on the trade-GDP ratio remains unclear such that predictions regarding changes of
the global slow-down of trade – as discussed in Chapter 1 – as a consequence of
raising relevance of standards are difficult. But it is not difficult to conclude that
analyses regarding the effect of standards on trade remain important. If nationalist
movements intensify, governments might make use of hidden protectionist measures
such as NTBs more frequently. At the same time, global institutions such as the
WTO or the United Nations which are fundamental for the regulatory framework of
global exchange need to be strengthened or at least sustained. The crucial role and
responsibility of the EU – and hence Germany as its largest economy – can not be
overemphasised in this respect.
1Strictly speaking, Germany does not have a constitution but only a Grundgesetz which was meant
to be temporary. However, meaning, significance, and functioning is the same as for constitutions.
But no English translation exists for the German-specific term Grundgesetz.
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Policy implications of the fourth essay are manifold. First, the Agenda 2010 increased
LFP of women and elderly people. Traditionally, these are groups, that are often less
frequently available for the labour market. The increasing LFP of women is desirable
in general. Whether or not elderly between 55 and 64 shall be part of the labour
force remains a normative decision of each society. However, there are valid argu-
ments in favour of increasing LFP of both groups. If these groups continue to work,
they do not only contribute more and longer to economic output, an aging society
also relies on an experienced and diverse workforce. Furthermore, it supports the
public pension scheme which relies on a working population of sufficient size. Second,
policy makers should not implement policies which are erroneously built upon pure
correlation. Similarly, economists should not recommend policies based on pure cor-
relation as done for example by (Goecke et al., 2013). This discussion refers directly
to the previous argument above about the role of economists and scientists in gen-
eral. Providing policy recommendations and results of impact evaluation packed in
a box which is labeled as science but which are de-facto based on non-scientific work
undermines credibility of science and real news.
However, external validity of our results remains ambiguous. In contrast to Germany,
youth unemployment is a major problem in many other European countries in par-
ticular in the south. The Agenda 2010 addressed primarily the supply side of the
labour market, i.e. groups without employment. Increasing incentives by lowering
unemployment benefits to accept job offers remains pointless if there aren’t any or
only very few jobs available. In these cases of severe shortage of employment oppor-
tunities, other policies are required which facilitate creation of jobs and improves the
functionality of the economy in general.
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A Appendix Chapter 1
A.1 Literature overview: notes for Table 1.1
Table A.1: Notes for the literature overview of Table 1.1.
a Chad, Egypt, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe
b
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germay, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway
c STIC Reveision 2, “cereals and cereal preparations” and “fruits, nuts and vegetables”
d SITC Revision 1, edible groundnuts (05172), groundnut oil (4214), shelled groundnut (2211)
e
The authors find a positive effect for developed countries and a negative effect for developing
countries. In addition, leading exporters benefited from HACCP whereas small-scale
producers faced a negative effect.
f
The number of included importing countries varies. The EU-15, USA, and Japan
among others are always included.
g The comtrade commodities are garlic (070320), onions (070310, 071220), and spinach (070970, 071030).
h
17 developing countries are included: Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, Honduras,
India, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Senegal,
South Africa and Uganda.
i EU, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia
j EU27, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa
k Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Japan, Mexico, Russian Federation and USA
l The direction of the effect highly depends on the corresponding country pair.
m The corresponding commodity codes are (081330) for dried apples, (200970) for apple juice, and (200840) for pears.
n
The importing countries are: US, Mexico, Canada, Colombia, Brazil, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain
Hong-Kong, China, Japan, Saudia Arabia, Arab Emirates, India, and Russia.
o
The authors esimated two models: the first applies an aggregated index of stringency whereas the second index
is disaggreagted into its different dimensions, namely phytosanitary regulations, maximum residue limits,
good agricultural practice (GAP), and quality standards.
p
Apart from the GAP-index which is found to have a positive impact, the disaggregated indexes are not
statistically significant.
q
The exporting countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Morocco, South Africa, China, India, Indonesia,
Philippines and Taiwan.
2 The importing countries are: Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, the Netherlands, UK, Canada, Japan,New Zealand, Switzerland, and the US.
s SITC Revision 1, code 0513.
t
EU (treated as one entity), Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Russia
and the United States.
u
HS 6-digit commodities for fruits (080810 and 080820), vegetables (070110, 070190, 070200, 070930, and 070960)
and cereals-grains (100300,100510, 100590, 120510, and 120590).
v The authors calculated several heterogeneity indexes. All of them had no effect on trade flows, except MRL.
w See Table B for a list of exporting and importing countries.
x These are plant products ranging from HS-06 to HS-12.
y
The authors provide evidence for trade enhancing effect due to higher demand and, simulatenously,
trade reducing effects due to reduced supply. This is interpreted as one reason for the mixed results
in the corresponding empirical literature.
z The exporting countries are: Kenya, Sri Lanka, China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Argentina, and Iran.
aa
The importing countries are: France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Ireland,
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Holland, Sweden, and Finland.
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B.1 The partitioned iterative algorithm and high-dimensional
fixed effects
As a point of departure, consider the normal linear regression model:
Y = Xβ + ε (B.1)






However, depending on the field of research datasets might contains several million
observations. Whenever controlling for group heterogeneity by including fixed effects
becomes necessary, the amount of coefficients to be estimated increases as the sample-
size increases. For example, the more countries, products, and years we include in
our dataset, the more fixed effects are required be estimated. In other words, if the
matrix X increases due to more fixed effects, computing the inverse of X′Y might
become infeasible due to computational constraints, especially due to limited memory
capacities of computers.
Therefore, Guimaraes et al. (2010) propose a partitioned iterative algorithm to solve
for β̂ which is inefficient but has lower memory requirements. Thus, we decompose
Equation (B.1) into a matrix Z which contains all explanatory variables, and a matrix
D of dummy variables to account for fixed effects.
Y = Zβ + Dα+ ε (B.3)
which can be re-written as
[
Z′Zβ + Z′Dα = Z′Y
D′Zβ + D′Dα = D′Y
]
Solving for β and α yields:
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[
β = (Z′Z)−1 Z′ (Y−Dα)
α = (D′D)−1 D′ (Y− Zβ)
]
(B.4)
Equation (B.4) shows that an estimate for β is obtained via a linear regression by
only using Z and a transformed Y. Ultimately, β and α are estimated according to
the following procedure:
I Dα is added as an additional covariate to the regression of Y on Z. The elements
of Dα are initially equal to zero but are subsequently replaced until convergence
is achieved.
II We save the sum of squared residuals of the regression of step one.
III A temporary variable is computed which is the difference between the dependent
variable Y and the fitted values of the regression in step one plus the product of
Dα and its coefficient of step one.
IV The elements of Dα are replaced by the group-average of the above mentioned
temporary variable.
All steps are repeated until the coefficient on Dα is equal to one. The covariate
Dα contains all estimated coefficients of the fixed effects which we need to subtract
from the dependent variable, see Equation (B.4). Eventually, the new transformed
dependent variable will be used in the quantile regression.
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B.2 Descriptives on MRLs
Table B.1: Number of regulated residues per country and year
Importer 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ARG 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0 506.0
AUS 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0 457.0
AUT 492.0 505.0 548.0 624.0 767.0 767.0 767.0 767.0 767.0 767.0
BEL 456.0 479.0 473.0 537.0 732.0 732.0 732.0 732.0 732.0 732.0
BGR 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
BRA 335.0 338.0 444.0 351.0 361.0 364.0 363.0 371.0 217.0 236.0
CAN 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0 322.0
CHE 426.0 438.0 480.0 547.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0
CHL 154.0 166.0 305.0 163.0 173.0 186.0 181.0 226.0 234.0 241.0
CHN 170.0 180.0 340.0 214.0 244.0 259.0 255.0 281.0 382.0 412.0
COL 154.0 166.0 305.0 163.0 173.0 194.0 180.0 190.0 215.0 222.0
CYP 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
CZE 363.0 370.0 412.0 491.0 652.0 652.0 652.0 652.0 652.0 652.0
DEU 450.0 463.0 550.0 582.0 755.0 755.0 755.0 755.0 755.0 755.0
DNK 217.0 247.0 319.0 473.0 636.0 636.0 636.0 636.0 636.0 636.0
EGY 154.0 166.0 305.0 163.0 173.0 194.0 180.0 190.0 215.0 222.0
ESP 378.0 573.0 586.0 618.0 786.0 786.0 786.0 786.0 786.0 786.0
EST 201.0 234.0 362.0 484.0 643.0 643.0 643.0 643.0 643.0 643.0
FIN 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
FRA 428.0 443.0 504.0 564.0 727.0 727.0 727.0 727.0 727.0 727.0
GBR 244.0 263.0 330.0 488.0 635.0 635.0 635.0 635.0 635.0 635.0
GRC 201.0 234.0 311.0 465.0 632.0 632.0 632.0 632.0 632.0 632.0
HKG 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0 353.0
HRV - - - - - - - - 612.0 612.0
HUN 201.0 234.0 460.0 540.0 694.0 694.0 694.0 694.0 694.0 694.0
IND 154.0 166.0 305.0 173.0 245.0 257.0 255.0 264.0 272.0 279.0
IRL 201.0 234.0 308.0 485.0 632.0 632.0 632.0 632.0 632.0 632.0
ISR 154.0 314.0 417.0 321.0 331.0 345.0 343.0 348.0 333.0 339.0
ITA 416.0 510.0 463.0 512.0 738.0 738.0 738.0 738.0 738.0 738.0
JPN 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0 707.0
KOR 379.0 382.0 473.0 410.0 430.0 445.0 448.0 454.0 459.0 463.0
LTU 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
LUX 201.0 234.0 308.0 567.0 715.0 715.0 715.0 715.0 715.0 715.0
LVA 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
MEX 154.0 290.0 394.0 286.0 303.0 311.0 310.0 314.0 313.0 318.0
MLT 201.0 234.0 369.0 488.0 648.0 648.0 648.0 648.0 648.0 648.0
MYS 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0 428.0
NLD 237.0 559.0 603.0 667.0 816.0 816.0 816.0 816.0 816.0 816.0
NOR 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0 521.0
NZL 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0
POL 343.0 359.0 451.0 525.0 696.0 696.0 696.0 696.0 696.0 696.0
PRT 326.0 357.0 396.0 485.0 655.0 655.0 655.0 655.0 655.0 655.0
ROU 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
RUS 154.0 166.0 320.0 389.0 413.0 425.0 422.0 428.0 450.0 471.0
SGP 154.0 166.0 305.0 163.0 199.0 216.0 214.0 224.0 235.0 242.0
SVK 229.0 260.0 419.0 501.0 654.0 654.0 654.0 654.0 654.0 654.0
SVN 201.0 234.0 308.0 465.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0 612.0
SWE 254.0 289.0 337.0 485.0 636.0 636.0 636.0 636.0 636.0 636.0
THA 154.0 167.0 305.0 166.0 174.0 189.0 184.0 194.0 204.0 213.0
TUR 253.0 271.0 448.0 380.0 382.0 413.0 433.0 437.0 445.0 447.0
UKR 154.0 166.0 305.0 163.0 406.0 407.0 404.0 412.0 444.0 454.0
USA 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0 575.0
VNM 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0 358.0
ZAF 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0
Total 15,631.0 17,343.0 21,198.0 22,970.0 27,929.0 28,127.0 28,094.0 28,255.0 28,952.0 29,093.0
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Figure B.1: Average number of regulated residues per product by country of year 2005
and 2014
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data on MRL regulation from Homologa, S.A.
Figure B.2: Average number of regulated products by country of year 2005 and 2014
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data on MRL regulation from Homologa, S.A.
Note: (1) Only products with Harmonized System concordance included in this paper.
          (2) From 2009, all EU member states have harmonized MRL regulation;
           they thus appear as one observation in the right panel.
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Table B.2: Many countries use Codex MRLs as
default values if national regulation is missing



























Note: Default MRL information were obtained
from Homologa database upon request.
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Figure B.3: Number of regulated residues
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Figure B.4: Restrictiveness of countries (Ferro-index RS2
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B.3 Coefficients of restrictiveness indices of quantile re-
gressions across deciles
Table B.3: Coefficients of restrictiveness index based on Ferro et al. (2015) of quantile
regressions across deciles.
VARIABLES 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
lnTariff -1.023*** -0.794*** -0.440*** -0.559*** -0.126*** -0.187*** -0.0942*** -0.158*** -0.351***
(0.101) (0.0583) (0.0319) (0.0555) (0.0143) (0.00543) (0.00257) (0.00219) (0.00375)
Ferro_RS2 -1.973*** -1.192*** -0.130*** -1.585*** -1.720*** -1.336*** -0.941*** -0.353*** 0.544***
(0.0555) (0.0300) (0.0160) (0.0258) (0.0189) (0.00953) (0.00416) (0.00163) (0.0129)
Constant -3.690*** -2.172*** -1.654*** -0.918*** -0.365*** -0.0325*** 0.0576*** 0.162*** 0.222***
(0.0321) (0.0179) (0.0103) (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.00194) (0.00117) (0.000935) (0.00317)
Observations 333,258 398,922 496,251 302,624 324,140 454,470 937,776 1,369,154 1,369,960
lnTariff -0.838*** -0.472*** -0.787*** -0.802*** -0.485*** -0.505*** -0.0647*** -0.172*** -0.471***
(0.0937) (0.0557) (0.0269) (0.0710) (0.0414) (0.0385) (0.00425) (0.00197) (0.00455)
Ferro_RS1 -2.032*** -1.180*** 0.856*** -1.740*** -1.560*** -1.284*** -1.023*** -0.227*** -1.555***
(0.0903) (0.0453) (0.0190) (0.0453) (0.0363) (0.0135) (0.00688) (0.00229) (0.0267)
Constant -3.348*** -2.026*** -2.215*** -0.603*** -0.281*** -0.0174** -0.0384*** 0.0619*** 1.560***
(0.0666) (0.0338) (0.0157) (0.0328) (0.0263) (0.00842) (0.00378) (0.00183) (0.0241)
Observations 343,880 413,029 571,072 284,363 297,991 345,401 675,800 1,369,871 1,369,960
lnTariff -0.866*** -0.495*** -0.266*** -0.425*** -0.142*** -0.0540 -0.717*** -0.0753*** -0.509***
(0.0949) (0.0473) (0.00896) (0.0478) (0.0443) (0.0547) (0.0198) (0.00246) (0.00455)
Ferro_RS0 -1.972*** -1.524*** 0.0133 -2.899*** -2.779*** -2.253*** -1.243*** -0.762*** -1.036***
(0.105) (0.0511) (0.0153) (0.0484) (0.0102) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.00305) (0.0281)
Constant -3.741*** -2.147*** -1.337*** -0.332*** -0.0228*** 0.0706*** 0.0254*** 0.0809*** 1.077***
(0.0929) (0.0453) (0.0148) (0.0426) (0.00797) (0.00843) (0.00812) (0.00278) (0.0268)
Observations 365,334 445,815 906,297 251,499 256,602 286,669 358,053 1,287,270 1,369,960
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.1 Principal component analysis
Table C.1: Correlation-matrix of WGI, Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Corruption Government Political Regulatory Rule of law Voice and
effectiveness stability quality accountability
Corruption 1.0000
Government effectiveness 0.950 1.0000
Political stability 0.7873 0.7604 1.0000
Regulatory quality 0.9066 0.9416 0.7360 1.0000
Rule of law 0.9569 0.9603 0.7992 0.9343 1.0000
Voice and accountability 0.8066 0.8114 0.6984 0.8369 0.8343 1.0000
Table C.2: Principal component rotation
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Component 1 5 491.911 0.8757 0.8757
Component 2 .334907 0 0.0558 0.9315
Component 3 .248212 .160632 0.0414 0.9729
Component 4 .087579 .0480812 0 0.9875
Component 5 .0394978 .00370557 0.0066 1
Component 6 .0357923 - 0.0060 10.000
Table C.3: Principal components - eigenvectors
Variable Component 1 Unexplained
Control of corruption 0.4214 .06687
Government effectiveness 0.4230 .06005
Political stability 0.3679 .282
Regulatory quality 0.4174 .08447
Rule of law 0.4274 .04043
Voice and accountability 0.3872 .2122
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C.2 Descriptive statistics
Table C.4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Imports (current US-$, in million) UN Comtrade 532720 8.184 67.8 0 5.12e+03
GDP_Exporter (current US-$, in million) World Bank 52813 8.86e+5 2.24e+6 12.3 1.74e+7
GDP_Importer (current US-$, in million) World Bank 520804 6.37e+5 1.86e+6 12.3 1.74e+7
Dist (km) CEPII 532720 6316.499 4519.529 59.617 19812.04
Contig (=1 if common border) CEPII 532720 .052 .222 0 1
Comlang_off (=1 if same language) CEPII 532720 .176 .381 0 1
Colony (=1 if colonial ties) CEPII 532720 .038 .192 0 1
lnAdvalorem_Tariff (Advalorem equivalent) ITC 532720 .011 .048 0 .994
Control of Corruption (Index: approx. -2,5 -2,5) World Bank 531178 .432 1.117 -1.924 2.586
Government effectiveness (Index: approx. -2,5 -2,5) World Bank 531178 .516 1.001 -2.479 2.430
Political stability (Index: approx. -2.5 -2.5) World Bank 531379 .103 .933 -3.324 1.938
Regulatory quality (Index: approx. -2.5 -2.5) World Bank 531203 .482 .951 -2.675 2.247
Rule of law (Index: approx. -2.5 -2.5) World Bank 531497 .397 1.030 -2.669 2.121
Voice and accountability (Index: approx. -2.5 -2.5) World Bank 531491 .335 .998 -2.234 1.826
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D.1 List of included products and country groups
Table D.1: Products categories
Product group HS Code HS Description
Bakery products
1704 Sugar confection
1806 Chocolate & other food products containing cocoa
1901 Malt extract, food preparations of flour etc.
1902 Pasta, prepared or not, couscous
1903 Tapioca and substitutes from starch in flakes, etc.
1904 Foods prep by swell cereal, cereal n.e.s.o.i.
1905 Bread, pastry cakes etc.
Beverages
2009 Fruit juices (& grape must), vegtables juice, no spirit
2201 Water, natural etc., not sweetened etc., ice & snow
2202 Water, sweetened & other non-alcoholic beverages n.e.s.o.i.
2203 Beer made from malt
2204 Wine of fresh grapes, grape must n.e.s.o.i.
2205 Vermouth & other wine of fresh grapes with specific flavor
2206 Fermented beverages n.e.s.o.i. (cider, berry, mead)
2207 ethyl alcohol, un-denatured, n/un 80% alcohol, alcohol, denatured
2208 ethyl alcohol, un-denatured, 80% alcohol, spirit beverages etc.
Dairy products
401 Milk and cream, not concentrated or sweetened
402 Milk and cream, concentrated or sweetened
403 Buttermilk, yogurt, kephir etc.
404 Whey & milk products n.e.s.o.i.
405 Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk
406 Cheese and curd
Egg products 407 Birds’ eggs, in the shell, fresh preserved or cooked408 Birds’ eggs, not in shell &yolks, fresh dry, etc.
Fruits and vegetables products
2001 Vegetable, fruits, nuts, etc.
2002 Tomatoes prepared or preserved n.e.s.o.i.
2003 Mushrooms & truffles prepared or preserved n.e.s.o.i.
2004 Vegetables n.e.s.o.i. prepared or preserved, frozen
2005 Vegetables n.e.s.o.i. prepared or preserved, not frozen
2006 Fruit/nuts/fruit-peel etc., preserved by sugar
2007 Jams, fruit jellies, marmalade etc., cooked
2008 Fruit, nuts etc., prepared or preserved n.e.s.o.i.
Fish products
303 Fish, frozen (no fillets)
304 Fish fillets, other fish, fresh, chill or frozen
305 Fish, dried, salted etc., smoked
306 Crustaceans, live, fresh, cooked
307 Mollusks, aquatic invertebrates n.e.s.o.i.
1604 Prepared or preserved fish, caviar & caviar substitutes
1605 Crustaceans and mollusks prepared or preserved
Meat products 1601 Sausages, similar prepared meat1602 Prepared or preserved meat, meat offal & blood n.e.s.o.i.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E Appendix Chapter 6
E.1 The Synthetic Control Method (SCM)
E.1.1 The synthetic control
The following exposition is based on Abadie et al. (2003), Abadie et al. (2010) and
Abadie et al. (2015). For countries i = 1, . . . , J + 1 and periods t = 1, . . . , T , suppose
country i is exposed to the intervention (Hartz reforms) at T0 ∈ (1, T ). The observed
outcome for country i at time t is,
Ya = Y Na + αSa (E.1)
where Y Na is the outcome for country i at time j in the absence of the intervention,
the binary indicator variable Sit denotes the existence of the intervention (Hartz re-
forms) taking the value 1 if i = 1 at t > T0 and αtt is the effect of the intervention for
country i at time t. Thus, country i is exposed to the intervention in periods T0 +1 to
T . We assume that the passage of the Hartz reforms had no effect on the outcome in
Germany before the implementation period. We restrict the donor pool to countries
that were not exposed to the Hartz reforms over the period t = 1, . . . , T , and assume
that the outcomes of the untreated countries were not affected by the passage of the
Hartz reforms in Germany.
Indexing the exposed country Germany as country 1, we want to estimate (α1T0+1, . . . ,
α1T ) . From Equation E.1 we note that α1t = Y1t − Y N1t for t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T}, and
while Y1t is observed Y N1t is unobserved. We, therefore, need to estimate Y N1t .
Suppose Y Nit is given by the model
Y Nit = δt + θtZt + λtµi + εit (E.2)
where, δt is an unknown common factor constant across countries, Zt is a (r × 1)
vector of observed covariates (not affected by the intervention), θt is a (1× r) vector
of unknown parameters, λt is a (1 × F ) vector of unobserved time-varying common
factors, µi is a (F × 1) vector of unknown unit specific factors, and εit are the unob-
served transitory shocks at the country level with zero mean.
Consider a (J × 1) vector of weights W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)′ such that {wj ≥ 0|j =
2, . . . , J + 1} and
∑J+1
j=2 wj = 1. Each value of the vector W represents a weighted
average of the control countries and, hence, a potential synthetic control. Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) show that, there exist W∗ = (w∗2, . . . , w∗J+1)′ such








jZj (that is, pre-intervention
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matching with respect to the outcome variable as well as the covariates, henceforth
referred to as predictors), then under standard conditions we can use,
α̂1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYjt t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T} (E.3)




jYjt on the right-hand-side of Equatin E.3
is simply the weighted average of the observed outcome of the control countries for
t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T} with weights W∗ . The procedure to obtain W∗ is discussed in
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010).
It is important to note, as Abadie et al. (2010) argue, equation (E.2) is a general-
isation and that the traditional regression-based difference-in-difference model can
be obtained if we impose that λt be constant for all t. Thus, unlike the traditional
regression-based difference-in-difference model that restricts the effects of the unob-
servable confounders to be time-invariant so that they can be eliminated by taking
time differences, this model allows the effects of such unobservables to vary with
time. In particular, Abadie et al. (2010) show that a synthetic control can fit Z1 and
a long set of pre-intervention outcomes, Y11, . . . , Y1T0 , only as long as it fits Z1 and
µ1 (unknown factors of the exposed unit).
E.1.2 Inference
Once an optimal weighting vector W∗ is chosen, the “synthetic Germany” is obtained
by calculating the weighted average of the donor pool. The post-intervention values
of the synthetic serve as our counterfactual outcome for Germany. Following Abadie
et al. (2010) we calculate the ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention Root Mean
Square Prediction Error or RMSPE (the square root of the squared difference between
the actual outcome and the synthetic outcome), denoted by ∆DUE . This ratio puts
the magnitude of post intervention gap (between the actual and the synthetic out-
come) in the context of the pre-intervention fit (between the actual and the synthetic
outcome): the larger the ratio the greater is the impact of the intervention.
To formally test the significance of this estimate, we apply the permutations test
suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), Buchmueller et al. (2011), Abadie et al. (2010)
and Bohn et al. (2014). First, for each country in the donour pool, we carry out an
SCM estimate as if the country had passed the Hartz reforms in 2003 (i.e., apply a
fictitious policy intervention). We can then calculate the post-pre RMSPE ratio for
each of these countries. The distribution of these “placebo” post-pre RMSPE ratios,
F (∆) , then provides the equivalent of a sampling distribution for ∆DUE that is used
to calculate the p-value (Bohn et al. (2014), Munasib et al. (2015)). Note that this
answers the question, how often would we obtain an effect of the Hartz reforms of a
magnitude as large as that of Germany if we had chosen a country at random, which
is the fundamental question of inference (Bertrand et al. (2004); Buchmueller et al.
(2011); Abadie et al. (2010).
Following Abadie et al. (2010) we provide two additional tests of inference. First
we examine the ranking of the magnitude of the post-pre RMSPE ratio of Germany
vis-à-vis those of the placebos. If Germany is ranked among the top, then we con-
sider it significant, the rationale being that for the treatment effect to be significant
the placebo effects, in general, should not be larger than the actual effect estimated
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for the exposed unit. And, finally, Abadie et al. (2010) produce a statistic that is
obtained by dividing the rank of the post-pre RMSPE ratio by one plus the size of
the donour pool; this is the probability of obtaining a post-pre RMSPE ratio as large
as the treated if one were to assign the intervention at random in the data. We call
this statistic “donour probability” and report it for each estimate.
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E.2 Descriptive statistics
Table E.1: List of Countries





































OECD country list reported as of 2016. Chile, Estonia, Israel and
Slovenia joined in 2010; Latvia joined in 2016.
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E.3 SCM Estimate of the Impact of Hartz Reforms on
Labour Force Participation Rate in Germany
Figure E.1: SCM Estimate of the Impact of Hartz Reforms on labour Force Participa-
tion Rate in Germany (corresponds to Table E.3)
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E.4 SCM Estimate of the Impact of Hartz Reforms on
% of Working Age Population that is Employed in
Germany
Figure E.2: SCM Estimate of the Impact of Hartz Reforms on % of Working Age
Population that is Employed in Germany (corresponds to Table E.4)
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E.5 SCM Estimate of the Impact of Hartz Reforms on
labour Force Participation Rate by Age Groups in
Germany
Figure E.3: SCM Estimate of the Impact of Hartz Reforms on Labour Force Partici-
pation Rate by Age Groups in Germany (corresponds to Table E.3)
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